THE QUALITY OF LIFE

AND POLITICAL SATISFACTION:

AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN MASS PUBLICS

by
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Now at the end of a very long journey it is difficult to recollect the precise path that brought me here. The many dead-ends I explored no longer stand out as sharply as they once did, and the genesis of good ideas is difficult to trace. But without the various contributions of the members of my committee I would certainly still be far from journey's end.

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CHAPTER 1

AN INTRODUCTION TO PERCEPTUAL SOCIAL INDICATORS

The past three decades have experienced an unprecedented degree of social development in Western advanced industrial societies. In the economic domain, incomes and standards of living have risen immensely.[1] Real income per capita in virtually all Western societies is now at least double the highest level attained before World War II. In many nations it is three to four times higher than prewar levels.

Economic progress has had concomitant effects on other aspects of social development. Secondary education is now widespread among the postwar generation. University education, once considered an elite privilege, has increased enrollment at a dramatic rate in most European societies. This expansion of educational opportunities has increased both the economic resources and conceptual abilities of Western publics.[2]

Economic and educational changes have also been accompanied by a redefinition of lifestyles. Affluence has provided modern conveniences to lessen the servile burdens of life, and furnish a nearly unlimited range of leisure comforts. The amount of leisure time available to enjoy these new opportunities has also increased.

Economic, social and personal advancement has taken place at such a rapid rate that some commentators speculated that progress was moving faster than people could adjust to it.[3]

This broad based improvement in the conditions of life has been documented by a number of recent social reports.[4] Indicators of life expectancy, housing sufficiency, employment and similar measures repeated the same upward trend in Europe and North America. Indeed, inequalities still exist. But, by nearly any objective standard the citizens of Western industrial societies appear much better off than at any other time in history.

In the late Sixties, several analysts began to draw social and political implications from these improvements in the objective conditions of life. Bell made is well-known forecast that rising affluence would lead to a lessening of social conflict (over economic issues) and therefore to a decline in social antagonisms and an end to ideology.[5] Robert Dahl similarly equated the age of affluence with an age of consensus.[6] This same basic treatise was repeated by a number of other analysts.[7]

Yet, the events of the past decade strongly indicate that the age of consensus is not yet upon us. Public demonstrations of discontent are still a common scene in presentday society -- on university campuses, at the workplace, and even within the family. Indeed, most observers would agree that expressions of dissatisfaction may have actually increased during the past decade.

One hypothesized source of this increased popular dissatisfaction has been the rise of a new set of "social issues" which have taken the place of past economic cleavages. It has been argued, for example, that for a growing portion of the population issues of lifestyles, participation, and self-expression outweigh purely material concerns.[8] Indeed, issues of codetermination, environmental quality, self-

expression, and self-determination have injected new controversies into the political arena.[9] Changing values and increasing public discussion of these issues may also have heightened general concern with the overall quality of life. The term, "Quality of Life" only recently entered the vocabulary of Western societies. Public concern has led the French government to create a ministry charged with overseeing the quality of French life. In several other European nations, evaluations of the quality of life have been issues of debate during electoral campaigns.

But changing values cannot be the sole explanation of continuing popular discontent. At present the majority of the population is still primarily concerned with economic and material values, and the personal conditions of life -- not social issues. Moreover, survey evidence has shown that increases in prosperity and economic security apparently have not satisfied the wants and needs of Western publics.[10] Europeans and Americans are still most concerned with economic issues even while the new social issues have gained increased visibility. Economic conditions, housing, leisure, and other personal concerns also continue to influence social and political decisions. In short, the age of affluence has not led to the end of economic concerns as many had assumed, much less the end of ideology.

This situation has resulted in the recognition that, taken alone, objective statistics are not adequate indicators of the quality of life experiences. As objective statistics have improved, so also have popular expressions of dissatisfaction become more visible. Obviously the quality of life experienced by individuals is a much more highly subjective condition than captured by an objective ennumeration of

family income, housing conditions, or the amount of leisure time. Individuals perceive and evaluate the conditions of life as a psychological process, rather than a strict objective assessment of conditions. Moroever, these perceptions, rather than the objective conditions, serve to influence and guide individual behavior and attitudes. Thus, inferences about public mood cannot be based solely on a reading of objective indicators; perceptions of these objective conditions must also be measured.

The past several years have therefore witnessed a concerted effort by social scientists to develop perceptual measures of the quality of life. This type of indicator is based on survey reports made by individuals about their subjective evaluations of life conditions. Perceptual social indicators seek to directly tap the quality of life as experienced by the individual, rather than implying a connection between objective social conditions and personal well-being.

Measuring the quality of life in subjective, rather than objective, terms should not detract from the importance of objective measures. Each class of indicators illuminates the other. Each is particularly pertinent in its own way to the task of understanding the quality of life. However, perceptions of the conditions of life are necessarily more important if we seek to understand the actions and opinions of individuals resulting from life's conditions. To the individual, perceptions of the quality of life, rather than objective conditions, are the psychological states more proximate to other attitudes.

Researchers at the University of Michigan have produced the first major studies of perceptual social indicators resulting from this recent chain of events. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and

Willard Rodgers defined popular evaluations of the quality of American life.[11] Frank Andrews and Stephen Withey have added to this description, and explored many methodological issues involving perceptual social indicators.[12] Erukhard Strumpel has focused on evaluations of economic life concerns.[13] Ronald Inglehart has begun the first extensions of this primarily American research into a cross-national context.[14] And predating these activities has been a tradition of research directed toward assessing the human condition using a variety of perspectives.[15]

Although social indicator research is rooted in general social psychological theory which stresses the independent importance of subjective assessments, past research has largely been descriptive and deductive. Specifically focused social indicator theory is relatively underdeveloped, partially because of the limited empirical experience with perceptual social indicators. Relatively little is scientifically known about evaluations of the quality of life -- either the makeup of its constituent parts, or the conditions and influences which tend to determine it. But gradually evidence is accumulating upon which tentative theories can be built, and which future research can inductively test.

The goal of this research is to develop this empirical base, focusing on the political implications of perceptions of the quality of life. We will first concentrate on describing the levels and determinants of these perceptions within Western Europe. As will be discussed in the next section, social research has often treated personal satisfaction as a political variable, with implications for evaluating the performance of the political system, and as an influence on political support. This linkage between objective conditions, personal satisfaction, and political evaluations will be our primary research focus.

The Political Implications of Social Indicators

Much of the political interest in social indicators has been based on the assumption that it is the government's role, or at least responsibility, to promote individual well-being. Both Andrews and Allardt maintain that the success of a political system has often been judged by its ability to satisfy popular wants and needs.[16] Indeed, survey evidence suggests that the publics of Western industrial societies share these expectations of government responsibility for ensuring the improvement of the quality of life.[17]

If we agree that this fulfillment of human needs is a basic goal of government, then perceptual social indicators may provide a direct measure of the performance of a political system and its component parts, based on the evaluations of the individuals who comprise the system.

Perceptual social indicators have been used to measure several aspects of the life experience. The broadest measures tap satisfaction with life as a whole, which has been a concept of major interest in previous research. Besides overall life satisfaction, past research has also measured satisfaction with specific life concerns such as occupation, housing, or leisure time activities. Satisfaction with these specific life concerns provides detailed and possibly more policy relevant indicators than a single measure of overall life satisfaction. Objective statistics measuring employment conditions, housing sufficiency, time-use and other aspects of the life experience are useful indicators of national performance. However, it is perceptions of these objective conditions which measure the human meaning of life conditions. To know that people are satisfied with

their housing, or dissatisfied with the available health care can provide legitimate and necessary guidance for policy makers when added to the other information at their disposal. In this way, life domain measures can provide focused assessments of system performance in clearly defined policy areas.

Andrews has suggested that the most valuable use of specific satisfaction measures is to "permit cross-sector comparisons -- a form of comparison which is necessary for resource allocation, yet difficult to make with objective data."[18] It is difficult, if not impossible, to compare health and crime statistics as a basis for setting government priorities. Objective measures involve counting of often non-comparable entities such as hospital admissions and the frequency of criminal victimization. Comparison of different domains may, however, be derived from satisfaction measures which subjectively evaluate different life domains using the same satisfaction dimension. In this way, measures of satisfaction with specific life domains provide information that might aid in identifying areas of relatively low satisfaction, and thereby aid in the setting of priorities for government attention.

In short, social indicator research results in an assessment of public attitudes which may be used in evaluating the success of past government policies, and which may provide a baseline against which future progress can be measured. Indeed, the rationale of a democracy implies that elites will attempt to respond to public dissatisfaction with the conditions of life. But rather than wait until dissatisfaction manifests itself in political actions that elites will perceive, social indicators measure public evaluations

before they have behavioral consequences. Since the link between attitudes and behavior is imperfect, we might also consider attitudinal measures to be more direct and accurate indicators of popular evaluations than are behavioral measures. Thus even taken alone, feelings of satisfaction with income, housing or leisure may have basic implications for the operation of democratic political systems.

In addition to assessing popular evaluations of the performance of the political and social systems, feelings of personal well-being may have direct implications for the support of the political system. If the policy relevance of perceptual social indicators such as income, housing or leisure satisfaction rests upon their ability to reflect system performance, this basis of evaluation may also be shared by the citizenry. That is, explicitly political evaluations may be based on perceptions of the personal conditions of life.

Easton's theoretical work on political support has emphasized the significance of determining whether political evaluations are based on short-term gratification of individual wants (specific support), or are relatively independent of these factors (diffuse support).[19] The empirical and theoretical work of Almond and Verba has also stressed the systematic implications of political support being based on the satisfaction of personal demands.[20] They were, for example, cautious about the future of German democracy because it appeared based on the continued success of the economic miracle satisfying economic demands, while British and American publics had apparently adopted a more diffuse form of political support.

In its more extreme form, personal dissatisfaction has also been tied to the likelihood of political violence and the stability of regimes. Since the Greek philosophers, political analysts have seen personal dissatisfaction as one cause for protest on the part of the massess. Gurr, the Feierabends, Muller, and a number of contemporary researchers have empirically linked popular dissatisfaction to political protest, civil unrest, and political revolution.[21]

Some positive relationship between personal satisfaction and political evaluations undoubtedly exists. However, there is obviously not a strict one-to-one relationship between personal satisfaction and system evaluations. Perceptual social indicators outline the patterns of social discontent before political aggregation occurs. Pockets of discontent may remain hidden, because of characteristics of the subgroup or the political system. The research of Gurr, the Feierabends, and others suggests that social discontent serves as a reservoir for mobilizing opposition to the political system; a reservoir that must be tapped if personal dissatisfaction is to have political consequences.

We have noted that despite the material progress of Western industrial societies, personal dissatisfaction has seemingly increased within the past decade. But not only has dissatisfaction increased, its thrust is apparently being redirected from the individual to the government and society at-large. Strumpel has suggested that citizens are now more likely to see the political system as responsible for their own situation in life.[22] With increasing government involvement in society the public is more likely to treat the government as responsible for social, and their personal needs. Thus, personal satisfaction is

far more apt to have political consequences today, than during earlier periods. The extent of popular satisfaction with life may thus have increasing implications for public support of the political system.

In summary, perceptual social indicators have a potentially valuable role in setting national priorities and guiding the framers of policy. Used in conjunction with objective indicators, these perceptual measures can provide a much richer understanding of the human condition. In addition, personal satisfaction levels may have a direct impact on support of the political system.

A Comparative Approach

Our empirical knowledge and understanding of perceptual social indicators rest very heavily upon recent research done in the American context. To some extent, these findings may be culture-bound, or reflect the exceptional affluence of American society. Thus, extending this research to West Europe offers the opportunity to broaden this knowledge and test the applicability of past concepts and conclusions in a new social and political context.

In addition to widening the national scope of this research, we also intend to broaden our investigation to include a wider range of life concerns. Instead of focusing on political satisfaction or economic satisfaction, our research will investigate several satisfaction measures -- economic, housing, leisure, and political satisfaction. Equal attention will be directed toward examining the level of satisfaction and sources of satisfaction for each life concern. We want to follow this balanced approach for two reasons. First, all of the personal life concerns are potentially valuable as indicators of system performance and as sources of

political satisfaction; and political satisfaction provides the ultimate performance measure. Secondly, our interest in understanding the relationship between personal and political satisfaction leads to viewing each satisfaction measure in terms of a single conceptual structure -- as interrelated parts of the overall life experience.

The data for addressing these questions come from two European surveys conducted by the Commission of the European Communities.[23] The studies were conducted in the Fall of 1973 and Spring 1975 in the nine member nations of the European Communities. Each survey contained approximately a dozen perceptual social indicators, covering a range of life concerns. Specific details describing these data will be presented in Chapter 3.

In addition to assessing perceptions of the quality of life, these studies contain a wealth of other attitudinal data of potential relevance to our research. The 1973 survey contains a general index of material/post-material values which was developed based on the Maslovian value hierarchy.[24] Additional questions in 1973 deal with values directly related to job satisfaction. Both surveys contain an inventory of basic political attitudes such as partisanship, political interest, and political efficacy. These surveys also include an extensive set of demographic measures coded in cross-nationally comparable fashion. In short, these surveys offer a rich database for studying European perceptions of the quality of life, building upon the past research done in the United States.

Two approaches can be followed in analyzing these data: to

treat each national survey as a discrete study, or to merge national surveys into a single sample of the European population. Both approaches have their own advantages and drawbacks.

Analyzing each survey as a separate study would yield 16 separate data sources from the two timepoints.[25] This approach would therefore produce a large volume of data for even the simplest analysis question. But one advantage of nation-by-nation analyses is that they may provide evidence on the relationship between objective and subjective indicators. The European Communities offer a range of economic and cultural variation across the eight nations surveyed. The Danes, for example, are nearly twice as affluent as the Italians. And while there is increasing economic integration within the Community, national growth rates display similar variance. To these economic differences should be added variation in language, culture, political attitudes, and historical heritage. Examining how perceptions of the quality of life vary cross-nationally with these objective differences may provide insights into the causal process producing these perceptions not available from a single nation survey. Several of the following chapters will, in fact, attempt to link national and subnational differences in perception of the quality of life to objective conditions of the geographic unit.

Analyzing perceptions separately for each national survey also provides an opportunity to replicate findings on a broad scale, thus increasing the validity of our conclusions. For example, conclusions drawn from analysis of the 1973 survey can be immediately tested with the 1975 survey; or patterns from one nation can be verified by

an independent national sample. Thus many of the vagaries of social science research can perhaps be avoided by focusing on essential and replicable findings.

The alternative approach is to deal with a single European sample, representing the population of the European Communities. In order to pool the data we must first ensure that there is broad cross-national comparability in indicators and the causal processes under study. Undoubtedly subpopulation differences exist for any single sample of Europe or the United States, but these differences must be within a tolerable range if comparisons are to be meaningful.[26] If pooling is feasible, a single European sample presents certain advantages for our analyses.

If the European pattern is a generally accurate representation of the phenomenon under study, then the presentation of results is greatly simplified. Instead of 16 separate analyses we could deal with two. A single European result might thus summarize the essential element of perceptions of the quality of life that may be difficult to abstract from a large number of separate national analyses.

A primarily technical advantage of analyzing a single European sample is that it provides a very large sample size. Each of the separate national surveys numbers only about 1000 respondents. The pooled European sample yields a combined sample of 8000 or more. Several of the analyses in subsequent chapters investigate population subgroups or perform correlational analyses which require large sample sizes to obtain confident estimates of population parameters.[27] In these instances a single European sample is a virtual necessity,

and separate nation-by-nation analyses would not yield reliable results.

The relative value of these two alternative approaches -- separate national analysis or pooled European analysis -- must partially rest upon the pattern of our findings. If cross-national differences in perceptions of the quality of life are substantial, or indicators do not appear to be comparable cross-nationally, then separate nation-by-nation analyses will be necessary. However, several factors suggest that analysis of the combined European sample will also be a useful approach.

First, although there are cultural and economic differences within Europe, by world standards it is a relatively homogeneous area. In terms of the variation among Cantril's 13 nations or Curr's 114, European societies are fairly similar on most social, economic, and political dimensions. Thus we are using a design which stresses the similarities between nations.[28] That is, analyzing a single social process for a group of similar nations which leads to emphasizing the essential and constant elements of the process in this context. Indeed, in the course of this dissertation the flow of our findings has steadily led away from explaining cross-national differences to describing aspects of the quality of life which transcend national boundaries.

Second, the nature of the attitudes under study also affects the decision to consider national context as a predictor variable. Partisan attitudes, for example, are directly linked to political institutions, the actions of political elites, and involve periodic behavioral reenforcement (voting). Thus, it is important to take

the national context into account in this instance. In constrast, perceptions of the quality of life are essentially individual attitudes, without these strong institutional or behavioral links. Thus, the psychological process producing feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction are less likely to be affected by national contexts.

Still, we will not make a single choice between these alternative approaches. Both analytic strategies will be used throughout this dissertation. In the early chapters we will focus attention directly on the question of the cross-national comparability of indicators and the magnitude of cross-national differences. Based on the broad similarities we find, later chapters will rely more heavily on the European sample. Moreover, even when only the combined European results are presented to simplify description, separate national analyses were usually conducted to ensure the representativeness of the pooled results.

Concluding Comment

From this vantage point the next chapter will consider the causal process underlying the concepts we have introduced here, and the interrelationship between perceptions of the quality of life and political satisfaction.

Footnotes for Chapter 1

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[22] Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Well-being as an Object of Social Measurement," in Strumpel (ed.), Subjective Elements of Well-being.

[23] The data utilized in this dissertation were made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for the 1973 survey (ICPSR 7330) and the 1975 survey (ICPR 7416) were originally collected by Jacques-Rene Rabier and Ronald Inglehart. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretation presented here.

[24] Inglehart, Silent Revolution.

[25] The Luxembourg samples have not been included because of their small sample size (N of approximately 300).

[26] The merged European results also produce a single standard against which to judge the separate national results, e.g. Chapter 3.

[27] The subgroup analyses of Chapter 5 often deal with fairly refined groups; we also found that the comparison of regression analyses across population groups in Chapter 7 required a fairly large sample to produce stable and statistically meaningful comparisons.

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CHAPTER 2

FROM OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Although our empirical knowledge of perceptual social indicators has only a recent history, evaluations and perceptions of the quality of life have been a frequent concern of philosophers and social critics -- both for their significance to the individual and to the political system.

In the political arena, analysts since Aristotle have seen personal dissatisfaction and the striving for better social conditions as the root cause of political dissatisfaction and political violence. For Aristotle the principal cause of revolution was the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration of oligarchs for greater inequality than they have. Much later, de Tocqueville linked the violence of the French Revolution to unfulfilled aspirations expanding more rapidly than objective conditions, thereby increasing dissatisfaction and the pressure for change. Finally, Marx posited personal dissatisfaction and the competition between the haves and have-nots as the driving force of history, and the ultimate source of political revolution.

These themes have been echoed and quantified by modern social scientists. One approach has emphasized the link between satisfaction and political stability. Seymour Martin Lipset in his cross-cultural study of Political Man was concerned with the economic and social preconditions of stable democratic government.[1] One of his major conclusions was that economic development (and presumably the satisfaction of economic needs) is directly related to the stability of a political system. Similarly, the End of Ideology literature foresaw a decline in social conflict as affluence became more widespread.[2]

A contrasting, but complementary, approach has been to emphasize dissatisfaction as a source of political instability. The most thorough and extensive study in this area has been the work of Ted Robert Gurr.[3] Personal dissatisfaction does not directly lead to political violence, but Gurr argues that it increases the likelihood of political action. Similarly, Davis, the Feierabends, and several other authors have presented evidence that apparently unfulfilled aspirations often have revolutionary consequences.[4] This approach has also seen frequent application to a specific form of social unrest -- American ghetto riots in the Sixties.[5]

Because of its dramatic and revolutionary nature, research on dissatisfaction and politics has often led to analysis of political violence. But even if deprivation does not ultimately result in political violence, it still can have a significant impact on the political system. In a democratic setting a dissatisfied citizen can become politically active, limiting the decision-making options of political authorities. Sustained dissatisfaction may also eventually

weaken generalized support for the regime and the political community.

Beyond these systemic effects, several analysts have also developed the normative argument that perceptions of the quality of life are a measure of the performance of the political system. Andrews notes that, "there is near universal agreement that promoting individual well-being, at least in the long run, is one of the legitimate -- perhaps the most important goal -- of the modern state."[6] Consequently, the government's performance of this role is one standard of its success. Affirming this point, Allardt states that "the whole concept of public welfare can be defined in terms of need satisfaction. Social development is judged with reference to...states of satisfaction needs."[7]

As we stated in Chapter 1, our ultimate interest in this research is not to predict political violence. Rather, we are interested in how the conditions of life are linked to the political system. How personal dissatisfaction is formed, mobilized, and politicized. Still, these interests are subsumed in broader theories of political violence, which provide a relevant model for us to draw upon. This chapter will present this model, and its links to studies of personal dissatisfaction, in the hope of accomplishing two objectives. First, this will focus our expectations for analyses in the following chapters. And second, this model will furnish a basis for critically evaluating past research.

The Causal Process

Too often research on political violence succumbs to mechanistic attempts to link protest activity directly to objective conditions and personal dissatisfaction. Although we believe these variables are related, they are linked by a causal chain with several intervening variables. In this section we want to lay out this causal chain -- from start to finish.

The question of how the objective conditions of life are actually translated into feelings of satisfaction has received only passing attention from political researchers. Gurr's well-known study of Why Men Rebel adopts the term "relative deprivation" to describe feelings of personal dissatisfaction. Although the term is usually used in the context of comparison to a reference group, Gurr defines it as,[8]

> a perceived discrepency between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them.

In actually operationalizing dissatisfaction, Gurr, the Feierabends, and several other researchers rely on aggregate (and largely economic) indicators.[9] Despite their theoretical pronouncements, most de facto assume a very close fit between objective conditions and personal dissatisfaction, and therefore work solely with the objective indicators. Even those analysts who examine these phenomena at the micro level with subjective measures of satisfaction generally are less concerned with the source of these feelings, and direct their attention to the consequences of these attitudes for political action.[10]

Recent research on perceptual social indicators can furnish many details of this aspect of the causal process which are lacking

from political research, and begin our analysis of the process on a stronger theoretical base.

Individuals do not simply report their conditions of life, they interpret and evaluate them in terms of their wants and needs. It is this evaluative component which gives perceptual social indicators a role as system performance measures, and which sometimes produces inconsistencies between objective conditions and public attitudes. Common to nearly all models and discussions of the satisfaction process are two components: the objective situation and a subjective standard of reference.[11] The following model of the psychological comparison involved in determining satisfaction presents a simple, yet insightful, tool for understanding this process, Figure 2-1:

FIGURE 2-1

From Objective Conditions to Personal Satisfaction



Assessment of the current situation is the most straightforward of the two components. In evaluating satisfaction with income, housing, or life as a whole, one must take stock of the current situation. Assessments may not be entirely accurate, but description of the current economic situation, for example, is a fairly objective process of counting assets and liabilities.

The more complex component of the model involves the individual's standard of reference. In contrast to the objective assessment of the current situation, this component involves highly subjective and individual decisions. The reference standard one uses may press the boundaries of aspirations, or may reflect the narrowest of perspectives. In fact, one of the major problems facing social indicator research is to define the nature of this reference standard, because the comparison of objective conditions to this standard determines satisfaction levels. There are several alternative definitions that have been offered by previous research.

One suggested basis of evaluating objective conditions is to compare them to aspirations. Cantril, for example, judges satisfaction levels against a standard of the best possible life that could be imagined.[12] In fact, Cantril refers to his scale as a method of discovering people's aspirations. Similarly, the Feierabends also conceptualize satisfaction as being measured off against the fulfillment of aspirations.[13]

A second proposed reference standard focuses on the gap between life experiences and expectations. Gurr is perhaps the best known proponent of a model relying on expectations rather than aspirations. He states, "people become discontented when they think they cannot get what the justly deserve, not just what they want in an ideal sense."[14] Abrams and Hall also provide empirical evidence suggesting that most individuals do not use the "best possible" extreme as a reference standard, but base their satisfaction on a feeling of receiving what is justly deserved.[15]

A third possibility is that objective conditions are not evaluated

in terms of an abstract psychological state, but against the status of a clearly identifiable reference group. The American Soldier found that individuals can be satisfied with rather dismal objective conditions if they feel they are doing well relative to their peers.[16] This concept has since been extended by Runciman to include social class and other social groups as references.[17] Thus, depending on the definition of an individual's reference group, the same objective conditions might lead to quite different levels of satisfaction.

Several authors also suggest that temporal comparisons are an integral part of determining satisfaction levels.[18] The present situation may either be judged against past accomplishments or projections for the future. In either case, however, satisfaction is viewed as a dynamic process.

Even this long list does not exhaust the possible reference standards individuals may use. As Withey notes,[19]

> If someone reports satisfaction with a house or a job, without further information, an observer is unaware of what the perceived and experienced qualities of the dwelling or employment are being compared with. It could be an ideal, an aspiration, a realistic expectation, what one should have by standards of justice, what my peers have, a compromised goal that considers the cost or effort of working for higher goals, or a tolerable minimum that is acceptable because one does not attach much importance to housing or the qualities of one's work.

Thus, the standard of reference used in determining feelings of satisfaction is difficult to define, and probably multiple criteria are used.

The modeling of these two theoretical components -- current situation and reference standard -- has several major implications for the interpretation of feelings of satisfaction. If we accept

this model, then satisfaction might have two very different meanings. It might signify an improvement in life's conditions or an adjustment of the reference standard.

Short-term improvement or regression in the conditions of life can apparently lead to corresponding changes in feelings of satisfaction. For example, a small-scale panel study conducted by Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers finds that changes in objective conditions can be linked fairly directly to shifts in satisfaction levels.[20] Similarly, Inglehart has shown that perceptions of change in the conditions of life are strongly correlated with overall life satisfaction.[21]

Prior research has emphasized the more static nature of the reference standard component -- although it also appears to react in the long-term to changes in objective conditions. Images or expectations are often imbedded in the social and cultural fabric of society.[22] While Cantril presents evidence that periods of national mobilization may dramatically change such expectations, the "mature" societies of Western Europe have apparently developed a fairly stable system of norms.[23] Over time, however, individuals begin to accomodate themselves to changes in their life situations. Expectations tend to rise with accomplishment and stagnate or even diminish with failure. Thus expectations and the objective conditions tend to adjust to one another in a dynamic process of homeostatis.

This dynamic process of comparison explains the frequently noted phenomenon of apparent satisfaction in the face of adversity, and discontent although conditions are favorable or even improving. For example, urban unrest increased during the Sixties in apparent

parallel to improvements in the social conditions of American Blacks. Similarly, Dahl has commented on the reverse phenomenon of apathy despite oppressive conditions.[24] Thus, it is essential to directly measure the psychological state of personal dissatisfaction, and not infer it only from objective conditions.

As noted in Chapter 1, we believe personal satisfaction is an important political variable. If we agree that the fulfillment of human needs is a basic goal of society, then perceptual social indicators may provide a direct measure of the performance of a social system and its component parts. Moreover, this measure is based on the evaluations of individuals who comprise the system. Andrews discusses how these indicators can be used in setting national priorities and guiding the framers of policy: identifying problem areas especially meriting attention, population subgroups with below average well-being, and changes over time for specific life concerns or population groups.[25]

An additional factor is that personal dissatisfaction is one possible source of political dissatisfaction. As we will discuss in Chapters 4 and 5, the magnitude and concentration of personal dissatisfaction across social groups suggests the potential for politicizing dissatisfaction, and the groups most likely to be politicized.

But personal dissatisfaction does not directly lead to political violence. Gurr's theory of social unrest is built upon the frustration-aggression theory.[26] As in frustration theory, personal dissatisfaction has many outlets. In the worst case it may lead to suicide or other extreme forms of self-punishing behavior. In other instances it may lead to the lowering of expectations, and thereby to

an eventual increase in satisfaction. Or, personal dissatisfaction may focus attention on the object perceived as responsible for these feelings. For personal dissatisfaction to have political relevance individuals must, to some extent, see political actors as responsible for their personal situation, or believe political actors are able to resolve their problems. Even widespread popular dissatisfaction is not likely to have political effects unless these feelings focus on political objects. Thus, the politicization of dissatisfaction is a vital link in the causal chain, Figure 2-2:

FIGURE 2-2

From Objective Conditions to Political Satisfaction



Increasingly the state of society is determined by the actions and decisions of the government. With greater government involvement the public is becoming accustomed to viewing the government as responsible for social problems and their personal concerns. In a recent cross-national survey Barnes, et. al. find that most Europeans tend to see the government as responsible for those personal and social issues they are most concerned with.[27] Moreover, Strumpel suggests that personal dissatisfaction is becoming increasingly linked to contemporary politics. "Whereas an unsatisfactory condition once tended to be viewed -- even by the discontented themselves -- as

individual failure, blame by the relatively discontented now more frequently tends to be externalized, i.e., attributed to a societal condition."[28] Consequently, for citizens of advanced industrial societies personal satisfaction may have increasing implications for the political and social systems.

While political dissatisfaction undoubtedly increases the likelihood of political violence, this also is obviously not a perfect relationship. A dissatisfied citizen may simply do nothing, because dissatisfaction is not sufficiently intense to stimulate action. Moreover, even the activated citizen generally turns to conventional, non-violent, means to influence the government. The next step, then, is the development of an attitudinal predisposition, or willingness to participate in an unconventional form of political action. Such a predisposition has generally been labeled protest potential.[29]

Protest potential implies a willingness to participate in unconventional forms of political behavior such as petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, and ultimately political violence. Individuals may not actually perform these actions. But as Almond and Verba note with reference to conventional political action, "the democratic citizen is not the active citizen, he is the potentially active citizen."[30] Moreover, protest activities are examples of "elite-challenging" political action, where the public selects and structures the input process rather than responding within institutionalized and "elite-mobilized" channels such as voting and campaign activity.[31] Thus, the potential of political action by the mass public may serve to influence and restrain elites. And even if one does become active, acceptance of protest can provide important social support for those

who participate in political actions which are still considered unconventional.

The final step in the causal process is actual participation in a form of protest activity or social unrest. Actually resorting to political violence is an exceptional case, probably requiring exceptional circumstances. Gurr's research suggests that taking part in violent action is heavily dependent on factors such as cultural sanctions for violence, the opportunity to join in violent actions, the coercive powers of the state and other societal variables.[32] Moreover, the evidence to date suggests that because these societal variables are more proximate to decisions to participate in political violence, they have a stronger direct influence on the likelihood of civil strife. The influence of personal and political dissatisfaction, which are the ultimate though further removed sources of protest activity, tends to be mediated by the more proximate variables.

This total causal process linking objective conditions to protest activity is summarized in Figure 2-3,

FIGURE 2-3

From Objective Conditions to Protest Activity



This causal process is not, of course, a closed system. Several research efforts have identified other important correlates of political

satisfaction,[33] protest potential,[34] and protest activity.[35] Our interest, however, is not in explaining the greatest possible variance in a dependent variable. Rather, we are interested in a specific independent variable -- personal dissatisfaction -- and how these feelings become linked to political evaluations. That is, to what extent do citizens in the advanced industrial societies of Western Europe evaluate their political system in narrow terms of their satisfaction with the quality of their personal lives? The central role personal dissatisfaction has played in theories of social unrest makes this an important linkage to explore. Furthermore, as we have noted above, levels of personal satisfaction may also serve as indicators of the performance of the political system.

The last steps of this causal process -- protest potential and social unrest -- will not be studied in this research project. This decision is dictated by the fact that our data lack an attitudinal measure of protest potential, let alone an indicator of actual protest behavior. But even if a protest measure were available, there are several reasons for concentrating our effort at this point on political dissatisfaction rather than the later causal steps. First, despite its significance, political violence is a fairly rare occurrence. Although its use increased rapidly during the Sixties, the frequency of political protest has probably levelled off or decreased in recent years. To some extent this limits the significance of findings on political violence within Western European societies as well as making it a difficult topic to adequately (or accurately) study with general public opinion surveys.[36] On the other hand, as we have argued at the beginning of this chapter, political dissatisfaction is

becoming a common element of political life. Its impact on the political system is multifaceted, often direct and usually constant. Moreover, examining the formative steps of this process throughout European society is still a major undertaking.

The Plan of Research

The first necessity of comparative research must be to ensure that measures are cross-nationally comparable.[37] While several investigators have already conducted cross-national research of perceptions of the quality of life, the initial question of whether life satisfaction (or any satisfaction measure) means the same thing to different individuals has received less attention.

Western societies may be in basic agreement on the meaning of specific satisfaction items, and the interrelationships between life concerns. But there are also reasons, cultural and economic, why we might expect some groups to view life concerns differently. Italians, for example, may perceive economic well-being in a different context than the much more affluent Danes. If this were the case, it would present problems for the interpretation and comparison of satisfaction measures across cultural or national boundaries. Therefore, the uniformity of life perceptions is a question which must be resolved before further comparative research can continue.

Chapter 3 will provide the necessary evidence that West Europeans generally share a common perception of our satisfaction measures. Dimensional analyses will identify the clustering of satisfaction items and the relationships between clusters as perceived by Europeans. The patterning of these spatial results provides a basis for interpret-

ting and comparing the meaning of satisfaction items. By separately analyzing each national space we can determine whether these items are perceived in basically the same way -- and hence share a common meaning -- by the eight nationalities in our study. A shared consensus on the structure and meaning of life perceptions appears a necessary precondition to further analyses of these indicators across national boundaries.

Having dealt with the question of indicator validity, we will then consider the first step of the causal process described above -- the source of personal satisfaction. There is a lively and important debate on the exact nature of the satisfaction process. What is the relative importance of objective conditions and the reference standard in determining satisfaction levels? Are aspirations, expectations, or group norms predominately used as the reference standard? What other factors are involved in the process?

In Chapters 4 and 5 we will marshal indirect evidence relevant to these questions. By examining satisfaction levels across the eight nations surveyed and the individual-level correlates of satisfaction, we hope to provide some new insights into the dynamics of the satisfaction process. However, several aspects of our data necessarily limit the extent of these investigations.[38]

The second objective of Chapters 4 and 5 will be to describe the levels of personal satisfaction across European society. We have argued that perceptual social indicators may provide general and specific measures of system performance. Therefore, we will describe evaluations of different aspects of system performance -- income, housing and leisure satisfaction -- as rated by various elements of

the population. In addition, these analyses will locate areas of widespread personal dissatisfaction which may be transformed into political dissatisfaction.

After investigating the patterns of personal satisfaction we will then consider the next step of the causal process: how personal satisfaction is linked to evaluations of the political and social systems. Our analyses in Chapter 6 will begin by identifying the patterns of political satisfaction within European societies. However, we are more concerned with the relationship between personal and political satisfaction.

Chapter 6 will initally examine the direct relationship between these two areas. Both Strumpel and Miller have presented American data which display a positive relationship between economic satisfaction and political evaluations.[39] We might even expect this relationship to be stronger in most European nations where the government has traditionally been more involved in directing society. Moreover, our various satisfaction measures will allow us to determine which aspects of the life situation have the greatest impact on political satisfaction.

However, it would be too simple to assume that the relationship between personal and political satisfaction is direct and uninfluenced by other factors. Our theoretical summary of the causal process emphasized that personal dissatisfaction must be politicized before it develops political implications. Chapter 7 examines this politicization process -- how political organizations or individual attitudes tie personal situations to evaluations of the political and social systems.

Several testable hypotheses about the politicization process have been offered by previous research. For example, Gurr stresses institutional factors as mobilizing agents.[40] The presence of anti-system parties (generally Communist) or political organizations which emphasize the political system's responsibility for popular dissatisfaction should stimulate the politicization of dissatisfaction. Gurr also maintains that the relationship between personal evaluations and political evaluations is greater when the government is more involved in society and the economy. Finally, the sheer size of the discontented sector might increase the likelihood of events or elite behavior mobilizing discontent.

The politicization of dissatisfaction may also be stimulated by attitudinal factors. We might, for example, expect individuals with greater political interest and understanding to see a closer relationship between their personal situation and political evaluations. Changing political values and expectations of government might also influence the politicization of discontent.

The European Communities contain a range of institutional and individual variation relevant to these questions. France and Italy, for example, have the largest Communist parties in any non-Communist state. By drawing on such situational diversity, Chapter 7 will examine in detail the causal process of politicizing personal dissatisfaction.

Footnotes for Chapter 2

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[2] Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1965); Robert Dahl, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," American Political Science Review, 59 (Dec., 1965).

[3] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," American Political Science Review, 62 (Dec., 1968).

[4] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, 27 (Feb., 1962); James C. Davies, "The J-curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction," in Hugh Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (Eds.) Violence in America, (New York: Signet, 1969); Ivo Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend, and Betty Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," in Graham and Gurr (Eds.), Violence in America; Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior Within Politics, 1948-1962," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (Sept., 1966).

[5] Don Bowen, et. al., "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation toward Protest of the Urban Poor," in Louis Massotti and Don Bowen (Eds.), Riots and Rebellion (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1968); Joel Aberbach and Jack Walker, Race in the City (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); A. Miller, et. al., "The J-curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots," American Political Science Review, 71 (Sept., 1977).

[6] Frank Andrews, "Social Indicators of Perceived Quality of Life," Social Indicators Research, 1 (1974), pg. 279.

[7] Erik Allardt, About Dimensions of Welfare (Helsinki: Research Group for Comparative Sociology, 1973).

[8] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pg. 13.

[9] Ibid.; Feierabend, et. al, "Social Change."

[10] Edward Muller, "A Test of a Parial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, 66 (Sept. 1972); Bernard Grofmann and Edward Muller, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, 67 (June 1973); Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (Eds), The Matrix of Political Action (Beverly Hills: CA: Sage, Forthcoming).

[11] This conceptual model is largely derived from the proposal in Angus Campbell, Philip Converse and Willard Rodgers, The Quality of American Life (New York: Russell Sage, 1976).

[12] Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

[13] Feierabend, et. al., "Social Change."

[14] Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

[15] Mark Abrams and John Hall, "Life Satisfaction of the British People," Paper presented at the OECD Conference on Social Indicators, Paris, 1972.

[16] Samuel Stoffer, et. al. The American Soldier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).

[17] W.G. Runicman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1966).

[18] Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Well-being as an Object of Social Measurement," in Burkhard Strumpel (Ed.), Subjective Elements of Well-being (Paris: OECD, 1974); Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs and Subjective Satisfaction," Comparative Political Studies, 9 (1977).

[19] Stephen Withey, "Values and Social Change," in Strumpel (Ed.), Elements of Well-being.

[20] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life, pg 199ff.

[21] Inglehart, "Values, Needs, and Satisfaction"; also Strumpel, "Economic Well-being."

[22] P. d'Iribarne, "The Relationships between Subjective and Objective Well-being," in Strumpel (Ed.), Elements of Well-being; Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life, Chapter 6.

[23] Cantril, Human Concerns.

[24] Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (London: Yale University Press, 1973).

[21] Andrews, "Social Indicators."

[26] Leonard Berkowitz, "The Concept of Aggressive Drive," in Leonard Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. II (New York: Academic Press, 1965); Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

[27] Samuel Barnes, Felix Heunks, and Barabara Farah, "Personal Dissatisfaction and Political Action," in Barnes and Kaase (Eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[28] Strumpel, "Economic Well-being," pg. 76.

[29] Muller, "Partial Theory of Political Violence"; Grofmann and Muller, "The Strange Case"; Barnes and Kaase (Eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[30] Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[31] Barnes and Kaase (Eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[32] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Chapters 7-9.

[33] Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt, West German Politics in Transition (Forthcoming), Chapter 2; Strumpel, "Economic Well-being"; Arthur Miller, "Change in Political Trust: Discontent with Authorities and Economic Policies," (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, undated).

[34] See footnote 29.

[35] Gurr, Why Men Rebel; Feierabend, et al., "Social Change"; Graham and Gurr (Eds), Violence in America.

[36] Merrill Shanks, "Survey-based Political Indicators," Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1975.

[37] A Przweorski and Harold Tuene, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley Interscience, 1970).

[38] One difficulty we faced was a change in question wording between studies which limits longitudinal analyses. In addition, our data lack indicators designed to measure the reference standard used by individuals. See Chapters 4 and 5.

[39] Strumpel, "Economic Well-being"; Miller, "Change in Trust."

[40] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Chapter 9.

CHAPTER 3

THE STRUCTURE OF THE LIFE SPACE

This chapter begins our empirical exploration into European perceptions of the quality of life. We want to determine how life concerns, and the aspects of life they measure, are perceived by Europeans. How individuals perceive and organize specific life concerns provides a reference structure for interpreting feelings of overall life satisfaction. A structure which defines these perceptions also provides a context for understanding each of the specific satisfaction measures by examining the interrelationship between life concerns.

There is, of course, a nearly limitless list of concerns that comprise the life experience. Cantril accumulated an extensive inventory by using open-ended questions.[1] Similarly, Andrews and Withey measured satisfaction levels for over a hundred separate items and still these authors saw gaps in their data.[2] But from this nearly unlimited range of potentially relevant concerns it is possible and advisable to concentrate on a limited number of priority areas. The European Communities have collected data for over a dozen satisfaction items apparently covering six broad areas: economics, housing, occupation,leisure, social relations, and society and politics. These areas were chosen because of their obvious importance to the total

life experience, and also because of their potential relevance to public policy. Government policy may influence satisfaction levels in each of these areas by altering objective conditions or public expectations. European governments have, for example, traditionally been active in directing their national economies. We might therefore ask how successful they have been in promoting income satisfaction or satisfaction with one's job, and use this information as another input into the policy process. Government involvement in society now extends, of course, into many areas besides economics. However, areas of life still not directly relevant to policy formation -- such as marriage and children -- have not been questions of interest in these studies.

The logic of subsequent analyses in this chapter is that the interrelationship between satisfaction measures enables us to map European perceptions of the concerns of life. From this mapping we can draw implications of the "meaning" of various satisfaction items to European publics. Life concerns which are similarly perceived and evaluated will tend to cluster together, forming a life domain. Besides their related meaning, items within the same life domain are also likely to be influenced by the same causal factors. Conversely, life concerns evaluated in different terms -- perhaps job and leisure satisfaction -- will fall into separate life domains. By implication, the causal processes determining satisfaction in one domain are not likely to have as great an impact on unrelated domains. Thus, the relative placement of items and life domains provides a context for interpreting satisfaction measures and the relationships between them. We will refer to this mapping of life concerns as the life space

perceived by Europeans.

While these perceptions of the various concerns of life may be fairly uniform across individuals, this is an assumption that also deserves attention. Cultural stereotypes exist for most nationalities, and they might lead us to expect cross-national variation in perceptions of the life space. Germans, it might be argued, would attach greater importance to economic concerns in their overall view of life.[3] On the other hand, the French addiction to the "good life" and the religious observance of the summer vacation might imply that leisure concerns are more central to the French public. Comparable national stereotypes exist for most nationalities. In addition to national variation, perceptions of the life space may also differ across social groups based on income, value priorities, urban/rural life styles, or other characteristics. From a more empirical perspective, several researchers have gone on record to stress possible differences in perceptions of life concerns.[4]

Thus, the first objective of this chapter is to define a broad-based Eurpean life space in order to interpret specific satisfaction items and to provide a reference standard for subsequent comparison to population subgroups. Our second objective is to compare the structuring of the satisfaction space across the eight nations in our sample to determine if Europeans do share a common perception of the life space. Assuring that Europeans perceive the space in a similar way -- and hence view these items in an equivalent manner -- is a prerequisite for further research comparing the levels of satisfaction across nations.

Measuring the Quality of Life

The first step in examining perceptions of the quality of life is to determine how to measure these feelings. Although social indicator research has only recently received widespread attention, several decades of research and empirical findings have been steadily accumulating. The international Gallup organization has been measuring American and European feelings of happiness for over two decades.[5] Respondents were asked whether "taking all things considered, [were they]...very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy". Some of these data have been exploited through secondary analysis, though much of it remains underutilized.[6] In the late Fifties Gurin, Veroff and Feld conducted a major academic study of American mental health.[7] Their national opinion survey relied on the same happiness measure as an indicator of the perceived quality of life. This instrument was also used by Bradburn's studies of happiness and mental health.[8]

A second theoretical tradition was marked by Cantril's cross-national research on The Patterns of Human Concerns.[9] Cantril presented respondents with a ten-point scale, describing the endpoints of the scale as "the best life" and "the worst life" the respondent could imagine. Individuals expressed their satisfaction with life conditions by placing themselves on this continuum. Following Cantril's example, the "self-anchoring striving scale" has been repeatedly used by commercial polling firms and academic researchers in the widest variety of cultural settings.[10] Even when Cantril's scale has not been used, his emphasis on measuring satisfaction states (rather than happiness) has often been followed in operation-

alizing quality of life indicators.[11]

Although happiness and satisfaction are theoretically distinct, in practical terms there is a substantial overlap between the two. For example, our 1975 study contains a measure of overall life satisfaction and overall happiness. These two questions correlate at better than .60 for the combined European sample.

There are, however, crucial theoretical and empirical differences between the concepts of happiness and satisfaction, especially in relation to their possible use as social indicators. As Campbell and his colleagues note, satisfaction has a more precise definition, integrated into the theoretical work of Kurt Lewin and Robert Merton.[12] In short, "satisfaction implies a judgemental or cognitive experience, while happiness suggests an experience of feeling or affect."[13] Satisfaction measures may also provide a quality of life indicator more appropriate for guiding policy. That is, policy makers will likely find the fulfillment of needs a more realistic objective than creating happiness. Past empirical research also implies important quantitative differences between happiness and satisfaction. The Quality of American Life found that although the two concepts are closely related, their empirical correlates are often substantially different.[14] For example, happiness decreases with age, while satisfaction appears to increase. Therefore, the researcher should choose between these concepts as a method of measuring perceptions of the quality of life.[15]

We have decided to measure perceptions of the quality of life in terms of satisfaction, which raises the question of how to operationalize this concept. The theoretical model presented in Chapter 2

implies important conceptual questions of how satisfaction should be measured to account for the various possible reference standards an individual may use in determining satisfaction? Cantril's scale, for example, requires several different methods of construction to allow for different reference standards. The raw score can be taken alone, compared to past or future self-ratings, the perceived position of a reference group, or what the respondent feels rightly entitled to. There is presently some justification for each alternative, but no strong basis for selecting between them. Moreover, a single operationalization applied to the entire sample cannot hope to capture the actual complexities of a satisfaction process where several criteria may be used. Such a single constructed measure must undoubtedly contain a substantial amount of error in assessing feelings of satisfaction.

Our research has overcome this problem by asking respondents to make their own evaluation of their current situation, and directly express their feelings of satisfaction. This approach probably limits our ability to study the process of psychological comparison. On the other hand, this technique should produce a more reliable self-assessment of satisfaction than could be obtained using Cantril-type constructed measures. Moreover, this same method can easily be applied to a range of life experiences, thus facilitating a direct comparison of satisfaction levels for different life concerns.

As part of an ongoing program of public opinion research, the European Communities have inquired about feelings of satisfaction in national surveys of the member nations. In 1973 and 1975 represent-

ative national samples of the population in France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Britain and Ireland were asked about their satisfaction with life as a whole and with a series of more specific life domains. The satisfaction measures available at each timepoint appear in Table 3-1. Although the specific items asked in each study differ somewhat, there is a substantial overlap in the broad concerns of the two studies. And while neither contains a complete inventory of human concerns, both European surveys do tap most of the essential experiences of life.

Between 1973 and 1975 the phrasing and coding of these questions changed slightly, to increase the variance of responses. In the 1973 survey satisfaction is measured with a four-point scale running from "very satisfied" to "not at all satisfied,"

> I would like to ask you how you regard certain aspects of your present situation. I will read out a number of aspects and for each of them I would like you to say whether you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

The 1975 study measures satisfaction levels with an eleven-point scale of "very satisfied" to "completely dissatisfied,"

> I am going to ask you now to indicate on this scale to what extent you are satisfied with your present situation in the following respects. Zero means you are completely dissatisfied, and 10 means you are very satisfied.

In some instances the variables of interest will only be available in one survey, thus limiting the analysis to a single survey. However, in most instances both studies will be used in tandem. Conclusions from one survey will be tested with an independent survey at a different point in time. In short, we will use these comparative studies to identify essential and constant relationships, findings that are replicable across a range of cultural, linguistic, and economic contexts.

TABLE 3-1

SATISFACTION MEASURES FROM EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES: 1973, 1975

DOMAIN	1973	1975
LIFE	The life you lead (4 point)	The life you lead (4 point)
		Your life as a whole (11 point)
		Would you say you are happy
INCOME	Your income	The income (you and your family) have
		Your standard of living, the things you have like furniture, car, housing, and so forth
HOUSING	The house, flat or place you live in	The house, flat or apartment where you live
		The area of town or village you live in
WORK	Your work as a housewife or on the job	(If employed) Your work
	The social welfare benefits you would receive if you became ill or unable to work	(If unemployed) Your spouse's satisfaction with his/her work
SOCIETY	The kind of society in which we live in (R's country) today	The kind of society in which we live in (R's country) today
	The way democracy is functioning in (R's country)	The way democracy is functioning in (R's country)
	Education your children receive	
RELATIONS	In general terms, your relations with others	In general terms, your relations with others
	Relations between the generations	
LEISURE	Your leisure (spare time)	The way you spend your spare time
		The amount of time you have for doing the things you want to do

Based on British questionnaire.

The Structuring of the Life Space in 1975

This section will attempt to define the perceptual structural underlying European evaluations of the quality of various aspects of life. We began by combining respondents from each nation in the survey to act as a single "European" sample. A matrix of Gamma correlations between satisfaction items was computed for this sample of over 9000 individuals.[16] Not surprisingly, we find that satisfaction tends to be positively intercorrelated. That is, people who say they are satisfied with one aspect of life are also more likely to report being relatively satisfied with other life concerns. However, clear variations exist in the strength of these relationships. Some life concerns are highly interrelated while others display only minimal overlap. With dimensional analysis methods these correlations can serve as signposts in mapping the perceptions of the life space -- that is, distances between life concerns in the satisfaction space as described above.

These intercorrelations were input into a non-metric scaling program to identify this map of the European life space.[17] We find that the relationships between life concerns can be mapped fairly well in two dimensions (stress=.27), but a three-dimensional solution provides a more exact representation of European perceptions of the life space (stress=.13). The first and second of the three dimensions are presented graphically in Figure 3-1, and coordinates for the third dimension are listed within the circle for each variable.

Four general life domains appear in the 1975 data: economics, housing, leisure, and socio-political satisfaction. Although it is difficult to portray a three-dimensional space in two-dimensions, life domains generally organize themselves in the form of a sphere.

FIGURE 3-1

STRUCTURE OF THE 1975 LIFE SPACE



Overall life satisfaction lies at the core of the satisfaction space. This is because overall satisfaction has a relatively strong and equivalent relationship with all life domains. Quite literally it is the central measure of life satisfaction. The four clusters seen in the two-dimensional figure can be conceived as forming areas on the surface of a sphere surrounding overall life satisfaction, or as falling within sectors (cones) which radiate from the sphere's core.[18]

The economic domain is comprised of three life concerns: income, job, and standard of living. The relatively strong link between income and job satisfaction (Gamma=.40) is somewhat surprising considering the other numerous aspects of employment which might also influence work satisfaction. In fact, the pairing of these two satisfaction items is the only major difference between this European life space and the American findings of Campbell and his colleagues.[19] The American public perceives work satisfaction as distinct from the economic cluster, while Europeans place work satisfaction within this domain. A partial explanation may be that the affluence of Americans enables a number of individuals to view their jobs in other than harsh economics, while Europeans still see economic rewards and security as the primary goals of employment.[20]

Satisfaction with one's standard of living falls within the economic domain, but this item also tends toward the housing cluster. The intermediary nature of this life concern probably reflects the questionnaire's description of standard of living as "the things you have like furniture, a car, housing and so forth." Thus, while satisfaction with one's standard of living is predominately an economic matter, it also contains an obvious referent to housing and other life concerns.

A second life domain involves leisure activities. This cluster contains two items clearly related to leisure: the amount of leisure time available, and the way leisure time is spent. These two life concerns are correlated at .57 (Gamma) for the total European sample. In addition, instead of forming a distinct life domain, satisfaction with social relations is also perceived as lying within this domain.

Within both the economic and leisure domains there appears to be a further distinction between these items based on the third dimension loadings. Items which might be seen as dealing with social concerns, such as job satisfaction and social relations, load positively on the third dimension, while the negative loadings for leisure, income and living standard suggest a common theme of personal needs is touched these life concerns. Still, these differences are secondary to the broader similarities within life domains.

A common impulse when one thinks of leisure is to contrast it to time spend on the job. More leisure time is nearly always desirable, especially if it means less time spent working. Charles Reich, for example, has argued that "work is mindless, exhausting, boring, servile and hateful, something to be endured, while 'life' is confined to 'time-off'."[21] The contrast is no doubt an overstatement, but to some extent this work/leisure dichotomy describes the 1975 satisfaction space. Europeans see economics (including their job) and leisure as contrasting areas in their life space, occupying opposing sides of the satisfaction sphere.

The housing domain contains two related satisfaction items: evaluations of one's neighborhood, and one's house or apartment. Compared to the economic and leisure domains, Europeans see housing satisfaction as a slightly less central life domain -- that is, more distant from

overall life satisfaction.

The fourth and final life domain consists of evaluations of society and the political system. A wide variety of individual needs such as physical security, welfare services and environmental protection are increasingly viewed as the responsibility of public agencies.[22] As the character of modern life is more and more influenced by the activities of these institutions, evaluating their performance may be increasingly relevant to feelings of overall life satisfaction. And yet, consistent with the findings of other researchers, Europeans see politics and society as remote aspects of their lives.[23] Satisfaction with the way democracy functions and with society as a whole both cluster together, implying a generalization of system and regime evaluation.[24] Both satisfaction items are, however, at a relatively large distance from the center of the satisfaction space. Satisfaction with the way democracy functions lies at the very border of the life space. This patterning confirms Inglehart's finding that these socio-political measures form a separate dimension in factor analyses of the satisfaction space.[25] Thus, while system performance may be increasingly important for overall life satisfaction, it presently is a distant life concern, much more peripheral than economics, housing, leisure and other personal life domains.

Campbell and his colleagues, and Andrews and Withey investigated American perceptions of life satisfaction with a somewhat different list of life domains.[26] And yet a comparison of our analyses to the findings of these American researchers uncovers similar perceptions of the life space on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition, a

replication of the analyses in this chapter by Andrews and Inglehart also uncovers broad American-European parallels.[27]

Focusing on the findings of the Campbell study, American perceptions of the life space also suggest the form of a satisfaction sphere. Satisfaction with family and friends round out the personal sphere in the American study. Our housing cluster closely resembles the content of an equivalent cluster in the United States. The Michigan researchers identify an economic domain of savings and standard of living which generally corresponds to the economic cluster in the European space. And just as Europeans generally perceive a work/leisure dichotomy, Americans place "non-work" satisfaction in opposition to the economic cluster. Americans also define a socio-political cluster at a distance from the core of the satisfaction space. In fact, the only major difference between these two analyses is the location of work satisfaction described above. Thus despite substantial differences in instrumentation and the areas studied, Europeans and Americans display considerable similarity in their perceptions of the life space. The Andrews and Inglehart study also concludes that a basic congruence exists between European and American perceptions of satisfaction.[28]

The Structure of the Life Space in 1973

The availability of the 1973 survey provides an immediate opportunity to test the consistency of these findings within Europe. The 1973 study used a slightly different set of satisfaction items and slightly different instrumentation. Yet there is a sufficient equivalency between studies to expect similar perceptions of the life space.

Replicating the scaling methods applied to the 1975 survey, we first learn that both surveys are comparable in the number of dimensions needed to adequately represent the satisfaction space. A two-dimensional space maps an approximate structure (stress=.25), while three dimensions describe the satisfaction space more accurately (stress=.13). The first and third dimensions in Figure 3-2 display the clearest graphic representation of the 1973 space, the second dimension coordinates are listed within the circles for each variable.

The most notable difference between the two studies is the emergence of a policy domain in the 1973 survey. The policy cluster contains two items measuring satisfaction with government outputs: the education one's children receive, and the social welfare benefits available in case of disability or unemployment. Although these two items form a single life domain, it is a weakly defined cluster (Gamma=.27). But significantly, these items do not fall within other domains. We might normally expect education and welfare satisfaction to be closely related to socio-political satisfaction. In fact, they are only weakly related. Satisfaction with welfare benefits is more closely tied to income and job satisfaction, than to political evaluations.[29] Still, this relationship is not sufficient to draw satisfaction with welfare benefits into the the economic cluster. It appears, then, that these two government programs are perceived as relatively independent of satisfaction with the political system, and yet also distinct from the relevant personal life domains.

The personal satisfaction items in 1973 closely replicate the groupings found in 1975. Income and work satisfaction combine to define the economic cluster. The leisure domain is composed of two

FIGURE 3-2

STRUCTURE OF THE 1973 LIFE SPACE



items: satisfaction with one's leisure, and with social relations. And, the single housing item in the 1973 study, satisfaction with one's house or apartment, forms a separate housing domain.

Finally, satisfaction with society and the functioning of democracy comprise a distinct socio-political cluster as they did in 1975. In addition to these two items, Europeans place "relations between the generations" within this domain. The "generations" item apparently taps a system level social phenomenon, thus defining it as another aspect of system evaluations.

Besides identifying corresponding life domains in both studies, we also find a generally similar spherical form to the satisfaction space. Three domains -- economics, housing and leisure -- closely surround the core element of overall life satisfaction. However, there are slight differences in how these three clusters distribute themselves in the 1973 study. The leisure and economic clusters are not as clearly contrasted as they were in 1975. In the three-dimensional space the leisure cluster lies equidistant from both the economic and housing domains.

The policy and socio-political clusters are most distant from overall life satisfaction, occupying positions beyond the personal life domains. But as we have noted before, Europeans perceive these domains as being located in different regions outside the inner sphere. In addition, the presence of the policy cluster in 1973 appears to force the three personal satisfaction clusters more closely together in the life space.[30]

In summary, both the 1975 and 1973 surveys display a fairly clear and consistent structuring of life domains. A set of 13 separate

items can be grouped into five distinct life domains, tapping most of life's essential concerns. Moreover, this structure is generally comparable to the perceptions of the life space held by the American public. The significance of these life domains is twofold. First, to some extent items within a single domain share a common meaning. Thus income and work satisfaction are related indicators of a broader concept of economic satisfaction. Secondly, related satisfaction items such as income and work satisfaction most likely are influenced by similar causal factors, while the causal forces behind housing or leisure satisfaction might be quite different (See Chapter 5). Because of these reasons, much of the organization of analyses throughout the rest of this dissertation will follow the theoretical structure of life domains defined in this section.

The European and National Life Spaces

Mapping a single European life space must raise the question of whether this space is a common perception of Europeans. There may be one single European life space generally describing the satisfaction space as all Europeans see it. Or, we might find that the single European space describes a solution averaged across quite different satisfaction structures for various population subgroups.

Cantril, in fact, maintains that there are systematic differences in the patterning of human concerns,[31]

> It has become abundantly clear that the concerns of people are patterned largely according to the phases of development they are in, both culturally and ontogenetically within their society. Except in certain critical situations such as war or revolution, the stage of social and political organization characterizing a nation appears more closely related to human concerns.

Cantril's conclusions were largely based on statements of individual hopes and fears, and thus are especially sensitive to cross-national differences in the concerns of life. Moreover, the 13 nations he sampled covered a wider range of social and economic development than we find within industrialized West Europe. Still, substantial differences are also possible between the eight nations in our studies.

In addition to the possible effects of national development, the obvious problem of language differences may also alter the equivalency of satisfaction items. Similarly, differing life styles between social groups and nationalities in Europe may affect perceptions of the satisfaction space. If this is the case, it presents problems for the interpretation and comparison of satisfaction measures across cultural, social, or national boundaries.

Comparative analyses of population subgroups within a single nation have generally found a common pattern of perceptions.[32] But these studies did not span different cultural, linguistic, or national settings. Therefore, the uniformity of life perceptions remains a relatively open question needing resolution before further comparative research can continue.

Nationality provides a demanding test of the uniformity of the European satisfaction space, combining both language differences and substantial differences in economic level and cultural background. For example, past research has shown that the Germans are particularly concerned with economic well-being, reflecting the history of German economic crises in the past.[33] Are these differences also present for perceptions of the satisfaction space? If a rigorous comparison of separate national life spaces detects reasonably close resemblence

to the European space we can be fairly confident that perceptions are also shared by population subgroups based on income, generation, value priorities, or similar criteria. In short, we can, and indeed should, test the assumption that the publics of Western industrial societies share a common perception of the life space.

For each of the eight nations in the 1975 and 1973 studies we repeated the multi-dimensional scaling procedures used in mapping life satisfaction for the combined European sample. A three-dimensional satisfaction space was first computed for each nation. We then compared each national space to the European space using a technique developed by Schoenemann and Carroll.[34] This method rotates each problem (national) space to obtain the closest possible match with the target (European) space. The fit is maximized by rotating only the three axes of the problem space. This leaves the relative positions of points within both the problem and target spaces unchanged. Each comparison produces an overall measure of fit, which can also be broken down by the contribution of each life domain to the total fit.

Table 3-2 presents the similarity coefficients obtained by comparing the national and European life spaces. The Lingoes' coefficient of alienation measures the overall dissimilarity between the spaces being compared. That is, lower coefficient values represent better fit. The values of the coefficient suggest that the European solution serves as a relatively good approximation of the satisfaction space for each nation.[35] Separate visual inspection of the overlaid structures of national and European spaces conveys a clear sense of the general similarity of life spaces represented by these statistics.

TABLE 3-2

COMPARING THE SIMILARITY OF EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL SPACES

	1973	1975
Ireland	.34	.19
Germany	.35	.19
Belgium	.36	.19
Denmark	.31	.32
France	.37	.32
Italy	.45	.32
Netherlands	.40	.34
Britain	.22	.36

Entries are Lingoes' Coefficient of Alienation.

There is, of course, variation in the degree of fit across nations. In both years The Netherlands and Italy display relatively large deviations, while Ireland and Germany resemble the European space more closely. Furthermore, perceptions of the life space in 1975 display less cross-national variation than in 1973. Coefficients of alienation are nearly always lower in the 1975 study. We suspect that the better European-national fit in 1975 can largely be attributed to the nature of the satisfaction clusters in the study, i.e. an artifact of instrumentation. The 1975 survey contains fewer clusters, each of which is well-defined and is measured by at least two satisfaction items. The 1973 study, in contrast, includes the weakly defined policy cluster and a single item representing the housing domain.

Disaggregating these national-European comparisons allows us to focus more precisely on the areas of fit and misfit. The national comparisons presented in Table 3-2 also yield a dissimilarity measure for each variable. Combining these statistics within clusters pinpoints the areas of the greatest nation-specific variation. Figure 3-3 summarizes these results for the 1975 study, presenting the total dissimilarity for each life domain summed across all eight nations.[36]

Fairly clear agreement appears to exist in 1975 on where life satisfaction and economic satisfaction are located. Placement of the remaining three domains exhibits somewhat greater variation. The French and Italian publics tend to perceive socio-political satisfaction as closer to the center of the life space, thus leading to a moderate dissimilarity total. But overall, national deviations in 1975 are slight.

As we have already seen, perceptions of the life space lack the same degree of consistency in the 1973 survey. The major source of

FIGURE 3-3



cross-national variation can apparently be traced to the policy domain, Figure 3-4. In most nations the two policy items -- education and welfare satisfaction -- remain distinct from the remaining life domains, but their positions in the life space shift considerably from one national sample to the next. In fact, in several instances these two items lie so distant from one another that they fail to even group together into a single life domain. The lack of cross-national consensus on the placement of these two policy items should caution us to possible national idiosyncracies in the meaning and interpretation of these measures.

The leisure domain in 1973 also exhibits substantial divergence between the European and national life spaces. Visual inspection of these comparisons finds, however, a quite similar positioning of this cluster in each of the national spaces. European-national differences arise primarily from differences in the relative positions of the two leisure items within the leisure domain. To some extent housing also is a limited source of misfit -- the single item in 1973 produces the same total dissimilarity as the two items in 1975. The remaining clusters in the 1973 national spaces -- life, economic, and socio-political satisfaction -- fairly closely resemble their structuring in the European space, with roughly the same degree of fit as in 1975. Thus, with the notable exception of the policy cluster, perceptions of the life space appear fairly similar across the eight nations surveyed in both 1975 and 1973.

FIGURE 3-4



Perception Patterns Between European Nations

While cross-national differences in perceptions of the life space are slight, they do exist in both the 1975 and 1973 surveys. This leads us to ask a final question -- is there a systematic pattern to these perceptions between nations? Does economic development or level of affluence, for example, alter life perceptions; or do language or culutral characteristics affect life perceptions in some systematic fashion?

To test this possibility we began with the eight national satisfaction spaces previously computed for each timepoint. Each national space was rotated and compared to all other nations using the Schoenemann/Carroll technique. These comparions yield a matrix of inter-nation dissimilarity measures like those in Table 3-2.[37] For example, one matrix entry represents the similarity between German and French perceptions of the life space. The next step is to search for a systematic patterning in these statistics. For example, do the more affluent nations see the same structure to life domains, while the less affluent nations have another view of how life domains are interrelated?

It is nearly impossible to detect whether a systematic international pattern exists by visual inspection of the dissimilarities matrix. The fit between all nations is relatively good (although necessarily less exact than the comparison to the European space), and the range between the best and worse fit is fairly narrow. Consequently, in pursuit of a more rigorous method we subjected the matrix of inter-nation dissimilarities to the same dimensional scaling technique used throughout this chapter. Only now, instead of grouping similar

satisfaction items, the method grouped nations with similar satisfaction spaces. The procedure was relatively laborious and the payoff relatively slim,[38] so we will only summarize the results here.

Even with the assistance of this statistical technique we are unable to uncover any systematic patterning of national perceptions of the life space. For example, in 1975 the satisfaction space in Ireland -- a poor, English-speaking, rural nation -- most closely resembles that of relatively affluent, industrialized France. Yet in 1973 we find a strong similarity between the Irish, British, Italian and Dutch life spaces, with France set off from the other nations. Reviewing the grouping of nations we could not identify similarities which follow economic, cultural, or linguistic patterns. Moreover, there is even less evidence of a consistent patterning across both surveys. An ordered pattern to national differences does not appear, we feel, because Europeans in fact share a relatively common perception of the life space, with similarities far outweighing the differences. Futhermore, it is difficult to envision a more exact search for these differences than the analyses conducted in this chapter.

Concluding Comments

In this chapter we have attempted to map the life space as Europeans perceive it. Indeed, this is a challenging task, to organize the major concerns of life within a single framework. But we believe that this framework is necessary if we are to understand the meaning and interrelationship of life domains.

A clear and fairly consistent structuring of life domains emerges at both of our timepoints. Theoretically, and empirically, satisfaction with one's life is located at the center of the life space. Three clusters of satisfaction items closely surround life satisfaction -- economic, housing, and leisure satisfaction. These domains represent the immediate and more central concerns of life, the areas to which overall life satisfaction is predominately oriented. Based on comparable American studies we would expect other life domains such as satisfaction with family and friends to combine with our three observed clusters to fully define the personal satisfaction sphere.

Further from the center of the space we find satisfaction with society and political institutions, and in 1973 policy outputs. Despite the deep involvement of contemporary European politics in the life and welfare of individuals, the link between personal and political satisfaction is not strong. Even policy outputs such as satisfaction with social welfare benefits and the performance of the educational system are perceived as relatively distant from the central concerns of life. The relationship between personal and political satisfaction will be the focus of the second half of this dissertation. These results should caution us as to the weak relationship we may expect to find.

The second question we considered was whether perceptions of the life space vary across West European societies. Certainly one of the first problems of comparative research is the unknown equivalency of empirical measures. Is satisfaction with one's standard of living, for example, perceived in essentially the same way by different

segments of the European population? American studies have found only minor differences between population subgroups in perceptions of the life space. Whether this same result would occur within other nations, or cross-nationally, had not yet been determined. Establishing that our satisfaction items are generally perceived in the same way is a prerequisite for further comparative research.

Therefore, our analyses in this chapter have continued to examine the uniformity of life perceptions within Western Europe. We chose nations as the units of comparison because they combine several possible dimensions of differentiation, such as economic level, language, and culture. Our cross national comparisons provide an even more rigorous test of the uniformity of the life space than previous within-nation comparisons.

Using a technique developed by Schonemann and Carroll the "European" life space was compared to the separate life space of each nation. We find a high consensus on the overall structure of the life space across all eight European societies. National differences from the European space are generally of small magnitude. Only one cluster -- policy satisfaction -- displays enough variation to make us question the exact cross-national comparability of these two items. However, perceptions of the four major satisfaction domains are generally similar in each nation. Although this does not prove the equivalency of items, similar perceptions provide some empirical justification for assuming equivalency.

However, slight differences between nations do exist. Therefore, the last step of our analysis searched for possible patterning of national spaces. Every possible pair of national life spaces was

compared in searching for groups of nations with distinct perceptions of the life space. We were unable to detect any systematic patterning to these national differences. These analyses lead us to conclude that the cross-national differences which do exist are relatively insignificant, determined primarily by random "bounce" in the data and non-systematic national idiosyncrasies.

Our search for systematic differences in perceptions of the life space was initally stimulated by Cantril's caution on possible national differences derived from cultural and economic factors. Finding substantial similarity in perceptions does not, however, invalidate Cantril's concerns. The caveat may be well-founded in dealing with nations ranging from India to America, which display wide differences in economic level and cultural background. But European society is considerably more homogeneous by comparison. This chapter suggests that Western industrialized societies share a fairly stable and similar perception of life concerns. Thus, these broad equivalencies in life perceptions can provide a basis for further comparative use of these measures.

Footnotes to Chapter 3

[1] Hadley Cantril, The Patterns of Human Concerns (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

[2] Frank Andrews and Stephen Withey, Social Indicators of Well-being: American's Perceptions of Life Quality (New York: Plenum Press, 1970)

[3] George Katona, Burkard Strumpel and Ernest Zahn, Aspiration and Affluence (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).

[4] Cantril, Human Concerns; Frank Andrews, "Social Indicators of Perceived Quality of Life," Social Indicators Research, 1 (1974).

[5] George Gallup, The Gallup Polls, 3 Vols. (New York: Random House, 1972); The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain, 2 Vols. (New York: Random House, 1976); The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: France (New York: Random House, 1976).

[6] Richard Easterlin. "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot," in Paul David and Melvin Reder (Eds.), Nations and Households in Economic Growth (New York: Academic Press, 1974); also see Chapter 4 below.

[7] Gerald Gurin, et. al. Americans View their Mental Health (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

[8] Norman Bradburn, The Structure of Psychological Well-being (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); Norman Bradburn and David Capolvitz, Reports on Happiness (Chicago: Aldine, 1965).

[9] Cantril, Human Concerns.

[10] Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (Eds.), The Matrix of Political Action (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications, Forthcoming); Edward Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, 66 (1972); W. Watts and Llyod Free, State of the Nation 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Assoc., 1974).

[11] Angus Campbell and Philip Converse (Eds.), The Human Meaning of Social Change (New York: Russell Sage, 1972); Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Willard Rodgers, The Quality of American Life (New York: Russell Sage, 1976).

[12] Campbell et. al., Quality of American Life, p. 8

[13] Ibid., p. 8.

[14] Ibid., Chap. 2; Frank Clemente and William Sauer, "Life Satisfaction in the United States," Social Forces, 54 (1976).

[15] Andrews and Withey selected an alternative route, developing a measure which combines both cognitive and affective components. Besides producing some ambiguity in interpretation, this mixing of components is also likely to have an impact on the behavior of the measure. For example, the Andrews and Withey indicator might range from a positive to negative relationship with age depending on the relative weight given to the cognitive and affective components (See Chapter 5 below); Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[16] The Gamma correlations for both the 1975 and 1973 surveys were based on the combined European sample without weighting by population. This procedure gives approximately equal weight to each nation in defining the European space. The 1975 matrix is reproduced below:

Work	.40									
LivS	.38	.59								
Hous	.35	.32	.51							
Neig	.29	.31	.43	.58						
Leis	.29	.27	.40	.35	.34					
LAct	.33	.32	.45	.39	.40	.57				
Relt	.26	.36	.37	.39	.43	.36	.44			
Demo	.23	.17	.23	.17	.17	.18	.20	.20		
Soc	.27	.22	.26	.23	.23	.23	.26	.28	.65	
Life	.45	.52	.51	.47	.43	.40	.52	.52	.28	.36
	Inc	Work	LivS	Hous	Neig	Leis	LAct	Relt	Demo	Soc

[17] J.B. Kruskal, "Multidimensional Scaling by Optomizing Goodness of Fit to a Nonmetric Hypothesis," Psychometrika, 29 (1964); OSIRIS III (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1977).

[18] Cf. Shlomit Levy and Lois Guttman, "On the Multivariate Structure of Well-being," Social Indicators, 2 (1975).

[19] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life

[20] For an example of American research see Burkhart Strumpel, "Economic Life-styles, Values and Social Welfare," in Burkhart Strumpel (ed.), Economic Means for Human Needs (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1977); for European findings see Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, and Subjective Satisfaction in Western Publics," Comparative Political Studies, 9 (Jan. 1977); and for a cross-Atlantic comparison see Katona, et. al., Aspirations and Affluence.

[21] Charles Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Random House, 1970)

[22] Samuel Barnes, Barbara Farah and Felix Heunks, "Political Dissatisfaction and Political Action," in Barnes and Kaase (Eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[23] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life, Chapter 3; Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[24] In Easton's terms this would imply the merging of community and regime support as a generalized attitude; David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965)

[25] Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs."

[26] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life; Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[27] Frank Andrews and Ronald Inglehart, "The Structure of Subjective Well-being in Nine Western Societies," Procedings of the American Statistical Association, 1977.

[28] Ibid.

[29] For the complete sample satisfaction with welfare benefits correlated at .41 with income satisfaction and .28 with job satisfaction. Including only unemployed respondents the respective correlations were .53 and .40.

[30] Exclusion of the policy items from the 1973 space produces a more even distribution of the three personal life domains in the region around overall life satisfaction, more closely resembling the 1975 space.

[31] Cantril, Human Concerns, pp. 301-302.

[32] Campbell et. al., Quality of American Life; Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[33] Katona, et. al., Aspirations and Affluence.

[34] Peter Schoenemann and Robert Carroll, "Fitting One Matrix to Another Under Choice of a Central Dilation and Rigid Motion," Psychometrika, 35 (1970).

[35] Andrews and Inglehart, "Structure of Well-being," point out that this coefficient of alienation can be interpreted in terms analogous to a Pearson correlation. The coefficient of alienation is equal to the coefficient of alienation ($\sqrt{(1-R^2)}$). Low S values imply high similarity. For this study S values generally vary between .20 and .40, which is equivalent to Pearson correlations in the .90-.95 range between the sets of dimensional coordinates.

[36] The more detailed breakdown of national differences in the fit of each item is presented in Table 3-a on the following page.

[37] The inter-nation similarity coefficients (coefficients of alienation) are the following for the 1975 study:

Neth	.54						
Den	.53	.56					
Belg	.46	.46	.39				
Irel	.42	.43	.58	.40			
Germ	.55	.51	.38	.31	.48		
Brit	.54	.53	.58	.57	.34	.52	
Fran	.46	.65	.57	.38	.45	.50	.56
	Ital	Neth	Den	Belg	Irel	Germ	Brit

[38] Although a mapping of nations was computed, these results were not presented because no clear patterning of nations emerged. As another indicator of the lack of structure, these analyses produced a stress value of .38 for the two-dimensional space in 1973 and .33 for the three-dimensional solution. These excessive values imply a lack of structure, especially given the small number of nations involved.

INTERNATION DISSIMILARITIES IN LIFE SPACE, 1973

	Britain	Neth.	France	Italy	Denmark	Eire	Germany	Belgium
Life	.08	.44	.02	.04	.03	.11	.01	.04
Economic	.05	.23	.23	.42	.06	.12	.09	.21
Housing	.03	.13	.17	.01	.11	.38	.17	.31
Leisure	.06	.63	.35	.08	.04	.23	.35	.43
Socio-Political	.11	.15	.21	.19	.32	.07	.08	.03
Policy	.37	.68	.31	1.12	.07	.05	.50	.03

Entries are the average residual between items in the respective national solutions and items in the combined European solution. Residuals are averaged for items within a cluster.

INTERNATION DISSIMILARITIES IN LIFE SPACE, 1975

	Britain	Neth.	France	Italy	Denmark	Eire	Germany	Belgium
Life	.01	.04	.05	.00	.01	.09	.04	.08
Economic	.19	.05	.13	.14	.11	.04	.08	.06
Housing	.39	.16	.15	.22	.23	.08	.12	.04
Leisure	.09	.31	.13	.12	.28	.11	.17	.07
Socio-Political	.15	.25	.46	.26	.05	.23	.11	.10

Entries are the average residual between items in the respective national solutions and items in the combined European solution. Residuals are average across items within a cluster.

CHAPTER 4

SATISFACTION ACROSS TIME AND NATIONS

Having dealt with the question of the comparability of our indicators in Chapter 3, we can direct our attention to assessing the level of personal satisfaction within Europe. Implicitly, at least, we have assumed that a large number of Europeans are dissatisfied with the conditions of life. Certainly public expressions of dissatisfaction have become a fairly commonplace occurance in both Europe and the United States. Occasionally, expressions of dissatisfaction have reached the intensity of the May Revolts in France. More often, dissatisfaction appears as with the upsurge of public protests in traditionally consensual British politics, dealing both with major social issues and narrow parochial concerns.[1] Or, witnessed in the rise of citizen initiatives in a German political system formerly marked by apathy and disengagement.[2] Moreover, these actions have a sufficiently broad popular base that they cannot be discounted as the work of a few extremists, or urban terrorists.

Even the arts, music, films and other popular cultural media have gained the public's interest by relying on themes of discontent. The Greening of America and Without Marx or Jesus became handbooks of the changing times, providing sharp criticisms of contemporary society, and leaving a prognosis of radical change for the future.[3] While

these influences may be waning, there is little doubt that a more open acceptance of criticism and dissatisfaction are now visible elements of social and political life.

This chapter examines European perceptions of the quality of life in a more scientific fashion. We will start by asking how satisfied Europeans are with their lives as a whole, and the various domains of life experience. Then we will examine cross-national differences in satisfaction levels. This and the following chapter will focus primarily on the domains of economics, housing, and leisure, in order to define satisfaction with the personal life domains. In Chapter 6 we will return to the political domain, and more importantly the linkage between the personal and political worlds.

We have three objectives in mind as we begin the analyses in this chapter. First, to develop a deeper understanding of personal satisfaction measures by observing how they vary across time and across the eight nations we have surveyed. Secondly, we intend to use these findings as evidence of whether perceptual social indicators can serve as legitimate measures of system performance. And finally, we want to develop an understanding of personal dissatisfaction in order to ultimately discuss its political consequences.

On Comparing European Feelings of Satisfaction

Evaluations of the overall quality of life provide a broad overview of European feelings of well-being, summarizing the total life experience. To provide a first impression of these evaluations, we combined eight separate national samples into a single European sample. Table 4-1 presents the distribution of overall life satisfaction for a series of European surveys beginning in 1973 and ending in May 1977. In contrast to earlier cited evidence of increasing popular dissatisfaction, we find that Europeans are predominately satisfied with their lives as a whole across the entire timespan of these data. In our 1973 survey, for example, 79% of all Europeans feel "very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied" with their total life experience. And in our May 1975 survey an equivalent 77% express satisfaction. As Inglehart has already noted, satisfaction with the overall quality of life is fairly stable across these surveys.[4] Between 1973 and 1977 the proportion of dissatisfied Europeans increases slightly, but by only 4 percentage

Table 4-1

European Feelings of Overall Life Satisfaction

	Sept 73	Nov 74	May 75	Nov 75	May 76	Nov 76	May 77
Very Sat	21%	20	20	19	20	20	20
Fairly Sat	58	58	57	56	55	55	55
Not very	16	16	16	17	18	18	18
Not at all	4	5	5	6	6	6	6
Don't Know	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
(N)	(13484)	(9058)	(9543)	(9150)	(8635)	(8627)	(9044)

Percentages based on European sample weighted by national population

points. The most recent surveys show a flattening of this downward trend, and some evidence that life satisfaction may even be increasing slightly.[5]

Although most Europeans express satisfaction with the conditions of their lives, this does not imply a complete absence of dissatisfaction. In absolute numbers the fifth of the population who are dissatisfied with their life overall represent nearly 40 million Europeans. Even the 4-6% of extremely dissatisfied adults account for almost 10 million individuals, certainly enough to severely strain their respective political systems. Thus, the small percentage figures should not dispell the vast potential significance of this stratum for European political system, nor their implication for assessing the past performance of these systems.

Feelings of satisfaction also extend to other personal life domains, as Figure 4-1 shows. This chart presents the mean satisfaction scores for each life concern in the 1975 and 1973 surveys, based upon the combined European sample. Nearly every life domain is again skewed toward feelings of satisfaction.

In both years the life domains are ranked very similarly in evaluations of satisfaction. Most Europeans are satisfied with their housing, both their neighborhood and their own accomodations. Leisure satisfaction varies across items within this domain, but leisure concerns generally produce high levels of satisfaction. In 1973, for example, 74% of all Europeans were satisfied with their leisure. Even larger numbers express satisfaction with their relations with others. Economic concerns -- especially job and standard of living -- also receive high satisfaction ratings. Yet all of the economic

FIGURE 4-1

LIFE DOMAIN SATISFACTION, EUROPE 1973-1975



Entries are mean scores based on combined European samples.

indicators rank lower than overall life satisfaction at both timepoints. Indeed, income satisfaction ranks lower than all other personal life domains despite the unprecedented affluence of Western Europe. In 1973 only 63% of all Europeans were satisfied with their income.

At the very lowest end of the range is satisfaction with the socio-political domain. Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy actually shows a majority of dissatisfied respondents in both surveys. Slightly more Europeans are satisfied with the nature of the society. In 1973, satisfaction with the two policy items -- education and welfare benefits -- is higher than general political satisfaction, though still low in absolute terms. On the surface these data provide ominous support for the so-called "Crisis of Legitimacy" facing Western democracies.[6] Europeans find the socio-political domain much less satisfying than their lives as a whole.

This relative ordering of life domains for the European sample is closely replicated within each nation. Housing and leisure satisfaction consistently receive very positive evaluations, while economic and socio-political satisfaction rate much lower. In 1975 the average Spearman's Rho comparing these national rankings is .78[7] Considering the cross-national differences in objective conditions, this similar ranking of life domains is surprising. In addition to sharing a common perception of which life concerns produce the greatest and least amounts of satisfaction, Chapter 3 has also found a common European perception of the life space. Thus, citizens of Western industrial societies apparently share a common conceptual framework for evaluating life quality.

These findings are also consistent with survey analyses of American

perceptions of the quality of life.[8] American research finds, for example, that most people are fairly satisfied with the major aspects of their lives. Moreover, the ranking of life concerns in both of our European surveys is strikingly similar to the American pattern found by Campbell, Converse and Rodgers.[9] Life domains which appear in both studies are almost identically ranked. The primary difference is that the American survey includes three additional items -- marriage, family life, and health -- which rank above all other life concerns.

In short, Chapter 3 has found basic similarities between American spatial perceptions of life domains and the perceptions of Europeans. The data in this chapter present evidence that the relative ranking of satisfaction items is also a point of consensus among Western industrial societies.

Running counter to these similarities, we find a considerable range in the level of satisfaction between nations. Table 4-2 presents the percentage in each nation satisfied with their life overall (4-point scale) in 1973 and 1975. While the majority in each nation expresses satisfaction, this ranges from approximately 60% in Italy to near unanimity in Denmark. As Inglehart has shown, compared to other social characteristics, nationality explains far more variance in perceptions of life quality than measures such as income, age, or value priorities.[10] Moreover, these national differences in life satisfaction carry over to specific life concerns. The ranking of nations is nearly identical whether we examine income, housing, or leisure satisfaction. Simply put, the magnitude of cross-national differences is sufficiently large to outweigh most variation between life domains.

Much of past comparative research on perceptual social indicators

TABLE 4-2

FEELINGS OF LIFE SATISFACTION BY NATION, 1973-1975
(% Satisfied)

	1973	1975
Denmark	95%	92%
Belgium	92	91
Ireland	92	88
Netherlands	93	85
Britain	85	84
Germany	82	79
France	77	75
Italy	65	59
Eta	.36	.35

has focused on cross-national comparison, and we will repeat that focus in this chapter. As we argued in Chapter 3, part of the emphasis on nation-states is because they are natural units in analyzing variations in life conditions. But in addition, the importance of nationality as a predictor of satisfaction requires further examination and explanation of the macro-level pattern before analyzing the micro-level pattern in Chapter 5.

Cross-national Differences in Satisfaction

Cross-national differences in overall life satisfaction and domain satisfaction have always proved something of a mystery. Cantril found substantial cross-national variation in national ratings on his self-anchoring striving scale.[11] Such variation was understandable given the range in economic levels, political systems, and cultural backgrounds of the nations Cantril studied. Yet subsequent analyses have found that economic development could only explain a minor portion of this cross-national variation. By comparison, European societies are relatively homogeneous on most economic, political and social dimensions. And still, we find large cross-national differences within Europe. In his original presentation of these European data, Inglehart concludes that national rankings defy any simple explanation.[12] Neither socio-economic development, language differences, nor recent economic trends seem to fit the cross-national satisfaction pattern. Of the two poorest nations in Europe, Ireland and Italy, the former rates near the top in life satisfaction and the latter ranks at the very bottom. Only the distinction between large and small nations seems consistent with the patterns in Table 4-2. But despite the work of

Dahl and Tufte, this explanation carries little appeal for explaining national differences.[13] Still, the consistency of this pattern over a several year timespan suggests there is some real basis for these differences.

Drawing on the conceptual model presented in Chapter 2, the level of satisfaction in a nation should reflect the influence of two components: the objective conditions of the nation, and the reference standard used by the population in evaluating objective conditions.

Analyses below will measure the extent to which objective conditions, or changes in objective conditions, can be linked to national satisfaction levels. For example, can low levels of national economic satisfaction be traced primarily to the less affluent nations, while the more affluent nations may be satisfying basic economic needs and be more dissatisfied with their leisure or housing opportunities. The seeming contradictions between objective economic conditions and national rankings that we have already noted make us skeptical that a significant relationship exists. We will, however, explore this possibility in a more rigorous fashion.

Alternatively, national levels of satisfaction may reflect differences in the expectations or aspirations of nations. To this point, Campbell has suggested that considerable restraint be exercised in interpreting[14] cross-national satisfaction levels,

> The obvious problem of language differences may be less important than differences in the meaning of crucial concepts such as those of satisfaction or positive affect in different societies. It is probably impractical to try to come to a global measure of the quality of life experience that can be compared from one country to another.

Campbell is proposing that the standard of reference used in the satisfaction process -- and hence the comparability of absolute

levels of satisfaction -- may differ cross-nationally. Expectations and aspirations may be derived from different sources across these eight societies, Or, satisfaction levels may be influenced by a culturally determined affective component. Thus, the pervasive negativism of Italian society may facilitate or even encourage expressions of dissatisfaction, while the positivism of Irish culture may stimulate statements of satisfaction. Without controlling for such hypothsized cultural/affective factors direct comparison of the level of satisfaction between societies could not be considered an indicator of system performance, which is one of our objectives.

It is not possible to empirically determine the source of cross-national differences without data more directly focused on this question. But substantial indirect evidence suggests a cultural/affective component does contribute to cross-national differences.

Where long-term survey results are available, satisfaction with our three personal life domains appears fairly constant over the past decade.[15] In Table 4-3 we see that the British public has expressed fairly stable levels of satisfaction with their economic, housing and leisure situation from 1963 until 1976. For example, 64% were satisfied with their living standard in 1963, and 70% in 1976; housing satisfaction changed only 4 percentage points over these 13 years. Only the leisure domain experienced a significant change in public evaluations, increasing 12% over this timespan. Thus even through the tumult of the late Sixties and early Seventies there has been only incremental change in these indicators of British perceptions of the quality of life. Furthermore, these changes which have occured describe an increase in satisfaction.

TABLE 4-3

BRITISH TRENDS IN SATISFACTION, 1963-1976
(% Satisfied)

	Sep 1963	May 1964	Mar 1967	Apr 1969	Dec 1970	Feb 1973	Sep 1973	Jan 1976
Living Standard	64%	59	71	58	64	66	*	70
Income	54	55	*	45	49	51	57	58
Work	88	89	*	83	86	84	82	85
Housing	71	72	*	73	75	73	85	75
Leisure	69	67	71	71	72	73	80	83

* Data not available for these timepoints. See note 16 for source.

TABLE 4-4

FRENCH TRENDS IN SATISFACTION, 1963-1973
(% Satisfied)

	Aug 1963	Nov 1965	Sep 1973
Standard of Living	56%	*	*
Income	52	51	54
Work	87	87	68
Housing	75	79	84
Leisure	64	*	62

* Data not available for these timepoints. See note 16 for source.

Similarly, Table 4-4 uncovers this same constancy for a decade series of French survey results. The economic, housing and leisure domains receive approximately the same satisfaction ratings in 1973 as in 1963, changing by only a few percentage points. Only job satisfaction exhibits substantial change, declining from 87% satisfied in 1963 to 68% in 1973.[16]

From these data we would generally conclude that perceptions of well-being have changed little over the past decade and a half, despite obvious changes in objective conditions. When a change in satisfaction levels occurs it is of an incremental nature, rather than a radical shift in perceptions of the quality of life. Thus, when we observe cross-national differences in satisfaction, these differences apparently reflect long-term feelings of a society, rather than short-term differences between nations in their present perceptions of life.

Evidence more directly related to the existance of a cultural/affective conponent comes from a recent cross-national study coordinated by Barnes and Kaase.[17] Using Cantril's self-anchoring ladder, Barnes and his co-investigators find that normative expectations of life are roughly comparable in Britain and Germany, while lower in the Netherlands. That is, residents of the two former nations expect more out of life than does the Dutch public. Because of these lower expectations, the Dutch were relatively more satisfied with life overall and the material side of life than were the British or German public. While these findings are only suggestive, if further analyses can prove that these differences in expectations are also stable elements of a society then Campbell's caveat has been substantiated.

There is no clear resolution of what the primary source of cross-national differences in satisfaction levels really is. However, the preceding points of evidence point to the importance of the cultural/affective component. Moreover, the magnitude of these differences outweighs within-nation variation in satisfaction levels, thus handicapping our comparative study of the satisfaction process.[18]

To deal with this problem we will attempt to minimize the cultural/affective component apparently contributing to national satisfaction levels. An independent measure of this component is not available, although the Barnes analyses suggest that it could be measured.[19] Instead, we propose using overall life satisfaction as a control variable. Overall life satisfaction is most likely to be suseptible to cultural influences because the focus of evaluation is an abstract and all-encompassing entity. In addition, data we have just presented and other evidence suggests that satisfaction with the overall quality of life is more stable over time than domain satisfaction.[20] Therefore, throughout this dissertation satisfaction with specific life concerns will be computed as deviations from the average life satisfaction of the respondent's nation.[21] Conceptually, we can view this procedure as measuring satisfaction in each nation against a common yardstick; in each nation domain satisfaction is measured relative to how society feels about life as a whole. Our analyses in this and subsequent chapters will thus focus on life domains, comparing their adjusted satisfaction scores within and between nations.

Because these "adjusted scores" will be used throughout this volume, the implications of this procedure deserve attention.

To some extent, cross-national differences in life satisfaction

reflect more than only cultural/affective variation. If citizens are satisfied with their income, housing and leisure, then overall life satisfaction should also be high. This variation in domain satisfaction is minimized by adjustment procedure since our control variable partially reflects the satisfaction measure being controlled. But on the assumption that national differences in overall life satisfaction represent cultural/affective factors to a greater degree than "real" differences, the net result of the adjustment procedure will be to improve the accuracy of the data. Still, the adjusted scores will "over-control" for national differences and therefore should be considered conservative indicators of cross-national variation.

The adjustment procedure will not, however, affect the results of within-nation correlational analyses. The same constant is used for all respondents in each national sample, and for all life domains. Thus, the results of within-nation correlation and regression analyses will be identical using either adjusted or unadjusted scores.

The adjusted scores also do not affect the relative pattern of satisfaction across life domains, since the same constant is used in adjusting each life domain. That is, if adjusted scores show a 1 point difference between income and housing satisfaction, the unadjusted scores would also differ by 1 point.[22]

The impact of the adjustment procedure is thus limited to analyses based upon the combined European sample, or which use nation as a predictor variable. Removing the cultural/affective component brings a rough balance to within-nation and between-nation variance. For analyses based on the European sample this will strengthen correlations for relationships suppressed by the unadjusted national differences,

while weakening the correlations for variables related to the unadjusted national differences.[23] In actuality, this adjustment is important only when aggregating the data to the regional or national level. The micro-level analyses in subsequent chapters usually find only minor differences in correlations (±.05) using the adjusted and unadjusted scores.

Thus, the total effect of the adjustment procedure is fairly modest, directed toward controlling cross-national variation in satisfaction levels attributable to cultural/affective factors. But the final test of this procedure is, we feel, the strength of our theoretical arguments and the interpretability of the data which result from this process. Thus, some of the analyses in this chapter will use both adjusted and unadjusted scores to assess the relative interpretability of these alternatives. Based on these findings, subsequent chapters will rely exclusively on the adjusted scores.

National Differences in Personal Satisfaction

Several points can be learned from comparing national levels of satisfaction for specific life domains. We have conceptualized personal dissatisfaction as a reservoir of potential political dissent. Not all personal dissatisfaction will be mobilized into political dissatisfaction, but feelings of dissatisfaction define the possible boundaries and likelihood of mobilizing popular discontent. Gurr has also maintained that the sheer size of the discontented sector of society influences whether dissatisfaction is mobilized into criticism of the political system.[24]

Comparing levels of personal satisfaction across these eight nations may also allow us to use situational variation as a tool for exploring the determinants of satisfaction. A longitudinal design would allow us to learn how satisfaction changes with changes in objective conditions. Until a sufficient body of longitudinal data are available we can approach this same end by drawing on the diversity of cross-national experiences. Comparing satisfaction levels across nations may provide insights into how objective conditions influence perceptions of satisfaction. In short, this section begins to make international comparisons of the quality of life domains, and speculate as to the determinants of these perceptions.

The analyses in Chapter 3 defined three personal life domains in European perceptions of the life space -- economics, housing, and leisure -- that will structure our analyses of personal satisfaction. Since the list of items within each of these domains changes slightly between years we have selected one satisfaction measure to represent each domain: a) satisfaction with income, b) satisfaction with one's house or apartment, and c) satisfaction with leisure.[25] The average national level of overall life satisfaction was subtracted from each of these three personal satisfaction items to produce the adjusted scores described in the preceding section.

Our analyses will begin by examining income satisfaction, because it is one of the most central concerns of life. Also, the nature of the economic domain makes it especially amenable to analyses linking objective conditions and perceptions of satisfaction because of the availability of objective economic measures.

In the Fall of 1973 the postwar economic expansion of Europe

had just touched its zenith. For most European societies the preceding decade had been one of steadily increasing affluence. The oil embargo was still a few months away and consumer optimism was relatively high.[26] And still, all nations express relatively low levels of income satisfaction in 1973. Figure 4-2 presents the adjusted income satisfaction scores for each nation, i.e. income satisfaction expressed as a deviation from the national level of overall life satisfaction. Britain and Ireland both stand out for their low levels of income satisfaction. Britain's recent economic woes are well-known; and Ireland is one of the poorest nations of Europe, with one of the highest unemployment rates and lowest per capita income. However, the national rankings do not correspond too closely to overall economic level, even using these adjusted scores. For example, affluent Germany ranks near the middle, while much less affluent Italy rates at the same point. As we suggested in Chapter 2, the psychological comparison involved in determining satisfaction apparently intervenes to weaken the direct correlation between objective conditions and income satisfaction.

Between 1973 and 1975 the economic situation changed dramatically in Europe. The Arab oil boycott and skyrocketing oil prices severely damaged European economies. The ensuing inflation and recession struck a second economic blow. Overall life satisfaction displays only glacial change from 1973 to 1975 as Table 4-2 shows. This is not surprising if we regard overall life satisfaction as a cultural/affective orientation which should bear only weak relation to objective conditions, and which summarizes more than only economic satisfaction. But if reality has any influence on subjective satisfaction we would expect to find changes in income satisfaction from 1973 to 1975.

FIGURE 4-2

CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INCOME SATISFACTION



Scores are deviations of national levels of income satisfaction from national levels of overall life satisfaction.

Because of scaling differences we cannot make direct comparisons between the 1973 and 1975 survey results. We can, however, compare the national rankings as an indicator of how the ensuing events have altered the picture we presented in 1973.

The 1975 ranking of nations is generally quite similar to the 1973 ordering. The British and Irish still display relatively low levels of income satisfaction, and the Belgians and Dutch are still near the top. There are, however, several notable changes which correspond to the changing times. During the period from September 1973 to May 1975 Italy probably suffered more from increased oil prices and the economic recession than most of its European neighbors. This period was marked by constant economic crises within Italy, leading to a severe balance of trade deficit, economic austerity measures, and an apparent decline in income satisfaction to the next to lowest ranking. Conversely, Germany was also suffering economic problems, but relative to the performance of its neighbors its economic position actually strengthened during the recession. Germany moves up, albeit slightly, in its relative level of income satisfaction in 1975.

To provide a more exact assessment of the link between objective conditions and national levels of income satisfaction we computed rank order correlations (Spearman's Rho) between objective and subjective indicators.[27] The affluence of a nation, measured by Gross Domestic Product/capita, is moderately related to income satisfaction in both surveys. However, this relationship holds only with the adjusted scores which control for cultural/affective differences, Table 4-3. Income satisfaction is only weakly related to economic level if the unadjusted scores are used (1973=.29; 1975=.29). This, we would argue,

provides further empirical support for the hypothesis concerning the need to adjust satisfaction scores.

Our description of the cross-national satisfaction pattern in Figure 4-2 also suggests that changes in the economic environment, as well as absolute level, may affect perceptions of income satisfaction. As we noted in Chapter 2, previous social indicator research has often adopted a dynamic model of the satisfaction process. Inglehart, for example, argues on the basis of individual-level data that "Satisfaction is influenced by recent changes more than absolute levels."[28] In addition, economic behavior research also stresses the dynamic process consumers follow in evaluating the economic environment.[29]

If individuals judge the present situation against their past experiences, or the experiences of all of society, then we would expect nations which have achieved the fastest rates of growth to also exhibit higher levels of income satisfaction. The memory of the mass public is generally of short duration. Thus in dealing with the question of what timespan comparisons may be based upon we limited our attention to a one year period.

First appearances suggest that the ranking of nations in 1973 does correspond fairly well to growth rates over the previous year.[30] Denmark and the Netherlands made rapid advances between 1972 and 1973; while Britain, Ireland and Italy progressed more slowly. The actual correlation between adjusted income satisfaction in 1973 and economic growth is .64, significantly larger than the correlation with absolute economic level.

Between 1973 and 1975 the economic reversals were abrupt and substantial. Consequently, we should expect satisfaction levels to

TABLE 4-5

National Affluence and Income Satisfaction

	Adjusted		Unadjusted	
	1973	1975	1973	1975
Gross Domestic Product/capita	.47*	.60*	.29	.29
Annual Change in GDP/capita	.64*	.67*	.43	.26

* $p \leq .10$, N=8

Entries are Spearman Rho coefficients.

reflect these recent changes in objective conditions. The data again show a substantial correlation (.67) between GDP/capita growth rates for the 1974-1975 period and 1975 income satisfaction. In addition, both the 1973 and 1975 correlations are considerably stronger using the adjusted scores than with the unadjusted satisfaction scores.

We would want to have data from a greater variety of nations and timepoints before any final conclusions are drawn from these findings. However, these data suggest that international differences in satisfaction levels may be tied to objective conditions, and changes in objective conditions, once affective levels are controlled. Now we must consider whether perceptions of the housing and leisure domains can build upon these insights into the satisfaction process.

The evidence on income satisfaction suggests that temporal comparison is a commonly used referent in evaluating objective conditions. However, temporal comparison requires temporal change. In this regard, the three personal life domains vary widely. The objective economic situation and even one's job situation are often beyond the individual's control and fluctuate considerably from year to year. Consequently, since objective conditions vary more, economic satisfaction should also be more susceptible to change -- across nations and time. In contrast, housing conditions exist as a more stable aspect of life. Although objective conditions may also vary substantially across nations, housing opportunities change only marginally over time. Whether a nation's housing opportunities are "good" or not, the logic of subjective evaluations would argue that the populace gradually adjusts their expectations to fit the situation. Consequently, expectations and reality can reach a closer match -- and satisfaction

FIGURE 4-3

CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN HOUSING SATISFACTION



Scores are deviations of national levels of housing satisfaction from national levels of overall life satisfaction.

levels would be relatively high. In addition, cross-national differences in housing satisfaction should be less than for the economic domain, and change only marginally between 1973 and 1975.

To a large extent, the cross-national pattern of housing satisfaction fits our expectations, Figure 4-3. As noted earlier, more Europeans are satisfied with their housing than with their income. Housing satisfaction even rates above overall life satisfaction in most nations. The other noticeable property of this domain is that the range of cross-national variation is narrower than for income satisfaction. France, Italy and Belgium maintain levels of housing satisfaction generally higher than the other nations of Europe. The remaining nations follow in a tightly bunched group. Cross-national rankings in housing satisfaction are also relatively stable across time, suggesting equally stable patterns in housing conditions. Thus, housing satisfaction presents a pattern consistent with the assumption of generally stable objective conditions leading to high and relatively constant levels of satisfaction.

31

This rationale is even more applicable to leisure satisfaction. In comparison to other domains, it is much less clear how the objective conditions of the leisure domain changed from 1973 to 1975 in any measureable way. If satisfaction is heavily dependent on temporal comparisons of incremental changes in objective conditions, then leisure satisfaction must be fairly ambiguous -- at least when phrased as broadly as it is in these studies. Turning to the data we find a range of leisure satisfaction between nations which is narrower than for the income or housing domain, Figure 4-4. That is, leisure satisfaction is fairly similar and generally positive across nations,

FIGURE 4-4

CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN LEISURE SATISFACTION



Scores are deviations of national levels of leisure satisfaction from national levels of overall life satisfaction.

leaving little to interpret. While our two long-term trends in leisure satisfaction have uncovered a gradual increase in evaluations, it is much more difficult to identify meaningful patterns in these similar cross-sectional data.

Concluding Comments

In this chapter we have continued our explorations of European feelings of satisfaction with the quality of life. One of our ultimate goals is to determine whether perceptual social indicators can be utilized as measures of system performance, as evaluated by members of the system. Satisfaction measures which allow cross-sector and cross-national comparisons would serve as powerful tools for directing government attention to areas of popular dissatisfaction and need, and towards potential sources of political dissatisfaction.

Overall life satisfaction occupies a central position in the life space, and much of past research has focused upon this measure. However, our findings and other research raise questions about the interpretability of this measure. Overall life satisfaction is a very broad and diffuse concept. In addition, because it summarizes the total life condition, the link between specific life experiences and overall life satisfaction is normally weak. Moreover, it appears that cultural differences in affective levels or the meaning of satisfaction may be a large source of cross-national differences in general satisfaction, and might also explain considerable within-nation variance.[32]

More work is needed in disentangling the various components of life satisfaction. Our findings especially stress the need for

incorporating a measure of aspirations/expectations into the study of satisfaction.[33] This crucial variable has frequently been absent from past research, even though it is an integral part of the satisfaction process. But rather than grapple with the problems of overall life satisfaction this chapter has focused on specific life domains. We have narrowed the object of evaluation to specific aspects of life -- income, housing, and leisure -- because we believe individuals can make a more detailed and meaningful assessment of satisfaction by concentrating on a specific life domain. Satisfaction with one's housing or occupation, for example, provides a more focused and consequently interpretable measure than overall life satisfaction. This, in turn, strengthens the validity of perceptual social indicators as evaluative measures. Also, in concentrating on life domains we have been able to use overall life satisfaction as a control variable to minimize cross-national differences in the cultural/affective component of satisfaction.

Our findings show a fairly consistent ranking of life domains across the eight nations surveyed. Individuals are most satisfied with their housing, then leisure conditions. Even in the advanced industrial societies of Western Europe we find that economics is a major source of personal dissatisfaction among the areas studied.

Analyses of these data suggest that satisfaction results, in part, from a process of comparing the present situation against a subjective standard of reference. Thus the direct correlation between objective conditions and the satisfaction level of the mass public is only of moderate strength, even aggregated to the national-level. The comparison appears to be made as a dynamic process, with past

experiences influencing present expectations, and future expectations adjusted on the basis of present circumstances. Therefore, the amount of change over time in objective conditions will influence the potential level of satisfaction with a domain. The housing and economic domains exemplify the consequences of this process. Housing conditions are fairly stable characteristics of a society in the short-term, consequently expectations may gradually adjust to objective conditions -- producing relatively high levels of satisfaction. Conversely, the economic domain is more variable. Economic resources and demands change constantly; expectations often shift in light of recent experiences. Consequently, expectations and objective conditions are less likely to maintain a very close fit. This should produce generally lower levels of economic satisfaction, even if the economic performance of a society is exceptionally good.

An alternative explanation of differences in domain satisfaction emphasizes social conditioning. Strumpel, for one, argues that social norms vary in the acceptability of expressing dissatisfaction with different life domains.[34] To publicly express dissatisfaction with one's house or leisure reflects negatively upon the individual. Whereas to be dissatisfied with one's income, if not socially encouraged, is more acceptable and might even be viewed positively as a sign of ambition.

Both explanations likely have some relevance to our findings. However, both have the same implication for the use of perceptual social indicators as guides to policy making, suggesting the domain under study may be as important as system performance in determining satisfaction levels.

One source of interest in perceptual social indicators is the possibility of direct cross-sector comparison of policy areas. That is, obtaining comparable perceptual measures of policy performance for life domains where comparable objective measures are difficult to identify. These indicators could then be used to determine areas of most pressing need, and to aid policy makers in setting government priorities.[35] The evidence of this chapter raises some skepticism of whether perceptual social indicators can fill this role.

Differences in the nature of life domains may be as important as objective conditions in determining satisfaction levels. The findings of this chapter suggest that the policy relevance of perceptual social indicators may lie in identifying incremental changes in domain satisfaction. Each domain provides its own baseline which holds constant these spurious effects and against which future changes may be measured. An ongoing timeseries of perceptual social indicators allows us to monitor the performance of society and focus attention on areas of declining satisfaction. For example, the longitudinal data we have presented describe a generally improving situation in Britain, a conclusion much in conflict with impressionistic readings of public opinion. While the same improvement appears in France, satisfaction trends show increasing dissatisfaction with employment, a possible precursor to the plant occupations and industrial disputes which have increased in recent years. Similarly, indices of consumer sentiment and the Center for Political Studies' charting of political orientations are two other functioning examples of what can be achieved.[36]

In looking at the relevance of these findings to political

dissatisfaction, it is unlikely that leisure satisfaction is a major source of political dissatisfaction: government involvement in this area is minimal and Europeans are generally satisfied with their leisure activities. Housing is an area where many European governments have been fairly active. Yet, housing is also an area of relatively high satisfaction, and therefore is less likely to lead to widespread political discontent. It therefore appears that economic concerns are the greatest potential source of political dissatisfaction from among the personal life domains. This domain combines both elements: relatively low satisfaction levels and high governemnt involvement. These hypotheses will be tested more directly in Chapter 6.

In summary, the cross-national findings of this chapter suggest caution in interpretting perceptual social indicators. There are obvious limitations to these measures not always realized in the initial wave of enthusiastic research. Similarly, the causal processes producing satisfaction still remain shrouded in some mystery. Many of the conclusions of this chapter are based on theoretical assumptions on the nature of the process, not empirical proof. In the following chapter we will investigate perceptions of life quality in more detail by examining the distribution of satisfaction within European society, extending the ideas of this chapter to the individual level. From this we hope to gain further evidence, albeit fragile, of the nature of the personal satisfaction process.

Footnotes to Chapter 4

[1] Alan Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness (Beverely Hills, CA.: Sage Publications, 1977).

[2] Thomas Ellwein, et. al., Politische Beleiligung in der BundesRepublik Deutschland (Goettingen: Schwartz, 1975); Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton and Kai Hildebrandt, West German Politics in Transition (Forthcoming).

[3] Charles Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Random House, 1970); Jean-Francois Revel, Without Marx or Jesus (New York: Dell, 1970).

[4] Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[5] Between 1975 and 1976 the eleven-point life satisfaction scale increased for five of our eight nations.

[6] Ronald Inglehart, "Political Dissatisfaction and Mass Support for Social Change in Advanced Industrial Societies," Comparative Political Studies, 9 (Oct., 1977); Juergen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (New York: Beacon Press, 1975); Martin Janicke (ed.), Politische Systemkrisen (Cologne: Kaiperheur and Witch, 1973).

[7] Only the Dutch exhibit significantly lower levels of consensus, due to the juxtaposition of two items: social relations and leisure activity. The following table presents the 1975 inter-nation comparison of satisfaction rankings of eight personal life domains:

Neth	.51							
Den	.78	.57						
Belg	.80	.63	.73					
Irel	.97	.49	.85	.85				
Germ	.83	.42	.87	.79	.88			
Brit	.91	.53	.94	.82	.97	.92		
Fran	.89	.57	.81	.85	.88	.88	.87	
Eur	.96	.57	.87	.91	.98	.91	.97	.92
	Ital	Neth	Den	Belg	Irel	Germ	Brit	Fran

[8] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Willard Rodgers, The Quality of American Life (New York: Russell Sage, 1976); Frank Andrews and Stephen Withey, Social Indicators of Well-being (New York: Plenum, 1977).

[9] Campbell, et. al., The Quality of American Life.

[10] Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, and Subjective Satisfaction in Western Publics," Comparative Political Studies, 9 (Jan., 1977).

[11] Hadley Cantril, The Patterns of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965); Richard Easterlin, "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?" in Paul David and Melvin Reder (eds.), Nations and Households in Economic Growth (New York: Academic Press, 1974); J. Davies, "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Yes, Indeed, about .0005 per year," paper presented at the International Conference on Subjective Indicators of the Quality of Life, Cambridge, England, September 1975.

[12] Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, Subjective Satisfaction."

[13] Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974); also see comments in Inglehart, Silent Revolution, Chapter 6.

[14] Angus Campbell, "The Quality of Life as a Psychological Phenomena," in Burkhard Strumpel (ed.), Subjective Elements of Well-being (Paris: OECD, 1974), pg. 118-119.

[15] These data we obtained from the respective Gallup political indices for each country and from the two following sources: The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain (New York: Random House, 1976); The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: France (New York: Random House, 1976). The September 1973 timepoint is from the European Community survey. All percentages in Tables 4-3 and 4-4 exclude don't know responses when calculating percentages.

[16] It is also possible that changes in question wording are responsible for the shift. Unfortunately the Gallup indices do not include the French wording so this possibility could not be examined.

[17] Because of the large size of cross-national variation we find, for example, that all Irish social groups are more satisfied than all subgroups of Italian society. A more reasonable expectation is that the distribution of satisfaction would overlap between societies at least to a moderate extent.

[18] Samuel Barnes, Felix Heunks and Barbara Farah, "Personal Dissatisfaction and Political Action," in Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (eds.), The Matrix of Political Action (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Forthcoming).

[19] Samuel Barnes, et. al., "Personal Dissatisfaction."

[20] Between 1975 and 1976 changes in the 11-point satisfaction scale were generally larger for specific life domains than for a overall life satisfaction.

[21] The following values of overall life satisfaction were used in adjusting the domain satisfaction scores:

	France	Belg	Germ	Italy	Den	Brit	Ire	Neth
1973	2.11	1.65	2.02	2.32	1.55	1.84	1.57	1.66
1975	7.67	8.81	8.07	7.25	9.25	8.52	9.16	8.51

[22] The same equivalency does not, of course, apply to comparisons between population subgroups. This is because different subgroups most likely contain a different distribution of nationalities. Thus the overall figure used for adjusting scores in one population group is likely to differ from that of other groups.

[23] For a discussion of this methodological point see Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1968), Chapter 4.

[24] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[25] In 1975 we actually combined two items on the amount of leisure time and how leisure time is spent to better approximate the more general measure used in 1973.

[26] Ronald Inglehart, "Socioeconomic Change and Human Value Priorities," in Barnes and Kaase (eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[27] These data were primarily drawn from Eurostats (Brussels: European Communities Information Service, 1975). The present economic situation is measured as Gross Domestic Product per capita standardized in Eurodollars. The indicator of economic growth is the percentage change in GDP product per capita over the preceding year.

[28] Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, and Subjective Satisfaction."

[29] George Katona, The Mass Consumption Society (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964); George Katona, Burkhard Strumpel, and Earnest Zahn, Aspirations and Affluence (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).

[30] See footnote 27 for a description of this objective measure.

[31] For a recent summary of the research on leisure satisfaction see, Rolf Meyerson, "Leisure," in Angus Campbell and Philip Converse (eds.), The Human Meaning of Social Change (New York: Russell Sage, 1972).

[32] See Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, and Subjective Satisfaction" for evidence on regional variations in satisfaction which might reflect sub-national cultural differences.

[33] For an example of research attempting to measure this component see Angus Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life, Chapter 6; Barnes, et. al., "Personal Dissatisfaction."

[34] Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Well-being as an Object of Social Measurement,""in Burkhard Strumpel (ed.), Subjective Indicators of Well-being (Paris: OECD, 1974); Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[35] Frank Andrews, "Social Indicators of Perceived Quality of Life," Social Indicators Research, 1 (1974).

[36] George Katona, et. al., Survey of Consumer Finances (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, Irregular); Center for Political Studies, Political Contours (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, Forthcoming).

CHAPTER 5

THE CORRELATES OF SATISFACTION

The last chapter sketched the first broad outlines of European perceptions of the quality of life. Now we need to begin filling in the details of the outline. At the individual level, who are the satisfied and dissatisfied? Our objectives in attempting to answer this question are similar to those of the last chapter. First, personal dissatisfaction is one possible source of political dissatisfaction. The magnitude and concentration of dissatisfaction across social groups suggest the potential for politicizing dissatisfaction, and the groups most likely to be politicized. Secondly, comparing satisfaction levels across these eight nations may provide further insights into the workings of the satisfaction process. These nations provide a wide variation in the objective conditions of life: economic status, housing conditions, and leisure opportunities. Observing whether satisfaction covaries along with these objective conditions should foster a better understanding of the satisfaction process.

This chapter systematically examines the relationship between a series of social characteristics and our three personal satisfaction measures. A number of social characteristics and attitudinal variables are potentially of interest. The theoretical model described

in Chapter 2 guided our selection of a subset of theoretically relevant variables. If satisfaction levels are determined by the gap between one's present situation and expectations, then we should concentrate on circumstances where either or both of these components vary. On the one hand, this might involve individuals who differ in the objective conditions of life, such as income groups. On the other hand, we are also interested in groups with aspirational differences, such as age cohorts or education groups. While nearly all social groups contain a mix of both components, a selective choice of variables can highlight each component, and tap the important correlates of satisfaction. The first such variable to examine is life cycle as a satisfaction predictor.

Satisfaction Through the Life Cycle

One of the more interesting potential predictors of satisfaction is age. The Quality of American Life finds a relatively impressive relationship between age and satisfaction.[1] Across a number of life domains, though not all, the old are more satisfied than the young. On the other hand, other research reports uncover an inverse or non-existant correlation between age and satisfaction.[2] These contradictory findings have focused additional interest on age as a predictor of satisfaction. Equally intriguing, however, is the theoretical interpretation Campbell et. al. offer for their results.

Youth is presumably a period of high ideals and high expectations. The eternal optimism of youth is a source of vitality and motivation for themselves and society. We would expect the gap between these high aspirations and objective conditions to lead many young people to dissatisfaction with the present quality of their lives. Through the

life cycle reality inevitably falls short of these youthful expectations. At age twenty everyone may expect fame and fortune; but if they have not arrived by age fifty, expectations have probably changed. Individuals begin to accomodate themselves to their position in life and perspectives narrow. Comparing their situation against these lower standards, the old are generally more satisfied with what they have. Thus, the Michigan study suggests that one source of increasing satisfaction with age is the lowering of expectations.

In addition to aspirational differences, the relationship between age and satisfaction may also reflect changes in the objective conditions of life. Campbell and his colleagues describe two ways in which this process may work. First, in the aggregate, objective conditions are likely to show an improvement for any cohort as it passes through the life cycle. Campbell, et. al. state,[3]

> Generally, for example, older people have better jobs with greater security, higher pay, and more prestige than younger people. They live in "objectively better" houses. If their first marriages were unsatisfactory, they have typically moved on to better ones, and so on. Hence there are objective reasons to expect that most domain satisfactions will increase with growing age in a pattern fixed by the life cycle.

A more subtle variant on this same hypothesis involves the concept of "person-environment fit."[4] The same objective life conditions may be viewed quite differently by two individuals because their own needs and desires differ. Consequently, "lateral" changes occur between individuals in situations which are objectively similar, but which better fit their individual needs. These lateral changes might raise satisfaction appreciably even when there is no apparent change in objective conditions at the aggregate level, because people

seek out conditions which best fulfill their individual aspirations. This research thus suggests that three factors -- declining expectations, improving objective conditions, and maximizing the person-environment fit -- should combine to raise satisfaction levels through the life cycle.[5]

Table 5-1 presents the zero-order relationships between age and the three core personal satisfaction items: housing, income and leisure.[6] Overall, these data provide only weak support for the hypothesized age-satisfaction relationship. Housing satisfaction most closely represents the expected age relationship. In every nation surveyed except one, older respondents are more satisfied with their house or apartment. Leisure satisfaction presents a similar pattern with especially strong relationships in the 1975 survey. The relationships between age and leisure satisfaction are, however, relatively weak in the 1973 survey. Furthermore, income satisfaction simply fails to show the expected relationship. Nearly half of these age correlations are in the "wrong" direction, i.e. the young are more satisfied with their income.

To account for the contradiction between these results and the Quality of American Life findings we examined the age-satisfaction relationship in greater detail. One of our first findings is that this relationship is not always linear among European publics. Leisure satisfaction, for example, declines slightly from late adolescence through middle age, then rises precipitously from about age fifty on. Both the 1973 and 1975 surveys provide consistent evidence of this pattern. Conversely, age and income satisfaction display

TABLE 5-1

CORRELATION BETWEEN AGE AND LIFE DOMAIN SATISFACTION

	Income	Housing	Leisure*
1975 Correlations			
France	.03	.20	.22
Belgium	-.02	.12	.14
Holland	.08	.10	.19
Germany	.11	.12	.20
Italy	-.05	.02	.10
Denmark	.13	.04	.21
Ireland	-.05	.08	.17
Britain	.02	.14	.27
1973 Correlations			
France	-.05	.09	-.04
Belgium	-.16	.07	-.05
Holland	.07	.10	.20
Germany	.13	.15	.08
Italy	-.05	.04	-.02
Denmark	.15	.14	.10
Ireland	.00	-.01	.03
Britain	-.06	.13	.08

Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.

* In 1975 the leisure indicator is a simple additive index combining the amount of leisure time and the way it is spent.

nearly the reverse pattern. Income satisfaction rises gradually until middle age, when it begins to decline slightly, i.e. a curve resembling the change in earnings through the life cycle. Although there is some variability across nations, this curvilinear income relationship is clearly visible. Of all the personal satisfaction items in both surveys, only the housing domain and "relations with others" monotonically increase in satisfaction with age.

In retrospect these non-linear relationships are perhaps intuitively more defensible than the linear relationships postulated and found by Campbell and his colleagues. The development of aspirations and objective conditions should follow distinct patterns for different life domains. Housing conditions probably continue to improve in objective terms throughout the lifespan. And income satisfaction, as we have noted, parallels the pattern of income earnings through the life cycle. The curvilinear leisure pattern is also an interpretable reflection of changing objective conditions and opportunities in this domain. The freedom of youth produces relatively high levels of leisure satisfaction which decline as individuals take on financial and family commitments. Then with the approach of retirement leisure wants are again fulfilled.

In short, while aspirations have been suggested as a driving force behind the age relationship, these data suggest that changing objective conditions through the life cycle are perhaps even more important. If this summary is correct, a more refined measure of life cycle position should be a more powerful predictor of satisfaction than age alone, because it more closely represents the objective conditions of life. We explored this possibility by constructing a life cycle variable

combining age, marital status, and family composition:

- Single, under 35 years of age
- Single, 35-49 years
- Single, 50 and over
- Married without children, under 35
- Married without children, 35-49
- Married without children, 50 and over
- Married with children, under 35
- Married with children, 35-49
- Married with children, 50 and over
- Widowed or divorced, under 35
- Widowed or divorced, 35-49
- Widowed or divorced, 50 and over

Because of the curvilinear age/satisfaction relationship we used a non-linear correlation coefficient (Eta) to measure relationship between life cycle position and satisfaction.

As seen in Table 5-2, life cycle position is a signficantly better predictor of satisfaction than age alone (Compare Table 5-1). Moreover, these relationships are strikingly similar in all eight nations. The range of correlations for income satisfaction in 1975 now runs from .15 to .21, while the correlations using age as a predictor ranged from -.05 to .11. This suggests that by correctly specifying the life cycle relationship we uncover a basic cross-national consistency in the nature of this relationship.

The distribution of satisfaction across these life cycle groups was examined in order to assess the relative importance of age, household composition, and marital status in determining satisfaction levels. In Figure 5-1 we have presented the adjusted domain satisfaction scores for each life cycle group based on the combined 1975 sample. The European sample provides sufficiently large N's to discuss group differences with some statistical confidence. In addition, this figure presents a reasonably accurate and much simplified summary of the individual national patterns in the two years.

TABLE 5-2

CORRELATION BETWEEN LIFE CYCLE STATUS AND DOMAIN SATISFACTION

	Income	Housing	Leisure*
1975 Correlations			
France	.19	.23	.29
Belgium	.20	.19	.19
Holland	.18	.10	.19
Germany	.21	.17	.26
Italy	.19	.13	.21
Denmark	.20	.16	.24
Ireland	.15	.20	.23
Britain	.15	.22	.32
1973 Correlations			
France	.14	.15	.14
Belgium	.20	.13	.16
Holland	.16	.19	.23
Germany	.17	.15	.16
Italy	.12	.11	.15
Denmark	.19	.18	.17
Ireland	.15	.15	.05
Britain	.11	.17	.16

Entries are eta coefficients.

* In 1975 the leisure indicator is a simple additive index combining the amount of leisure time and the way it is spent.

Within life cycle groups age differences in satisfaction generally follow the same pattern as the zero-order age relationships. That is, housing satisfaction increases with age; leisure and income satisfaction generally follow the same curvilinear patterns discussed earlier. In addition to age effects, satisfaction levels also vary according to marital status and family composition.

Married respondents without children at home are the most satisfied with each life domain. In the housing and income domain, married respondents with children at home are generally a close second. Marriage, the companionship of a spouse, and the generally better objective conditions of life for married couples are the most likely sources of the higher satisfaction levels for these two groups. We might further assume that the social and financial commitments of children place some additional limitations and demands on families with children, thereby slightly lowering their satisfaction with these domains. This is especially true in the leisure domain where parents with children are considerably less satisfied than childless couples. However, it is likely that satisfaction for other domains intimately connected with family life may compensate families with children for lower satisfaction levels in these three domains.[7]

Unmarried respondents are generally less satisfied with the quality of their lives, and two groups stand out for their exceptionally low satisfaction levels. First, young widowed or divorced individuals are consistently least satisfied with each of the three personal life domains. Such a dramatic change in life style, if it occurs early in life, often catches the individual unprepared financially and emotionally -- as reflected in these data. Members of

FIGURE 5-1. DOMAIN SATISFACTION BY LIFE CYCLE, 1975



this group who were widowed or divorced later in life are more likely to have prepared for this eventuality, and display satisfaction levels generally comparable to married respondents.

Older single Europeans are also relatively less satisfied with their income and housing satisfaction. Most commentators explain this relationship by arguing that living alone presents a major problem of social and emotional isolation for many adults -- a line of reasoning which can be traced to many conceptual discussions, including Durkheim's classic statement on anomie in Suicide.[8] However, this group expresses a level of leisure satisfaction higher than most other groups, and this domain is conceptually closer to a psychological dimension potentially tapping feelings of isolation. In fact, single respondents deviate from other life cycle groups only for the two material domains of income and housing satisfaction. In our view this could suggest that the underlying problem is not as much emotional as it is the limited material resources of a single individual.[9]

In broad perspective, then, our findings support those emphasizing the importance of the life cycle for perceptions of the quality of life. One's position in the life cycle is an important correlate of satisfaction because it represents the intersection of two sets of influences -- aspirations and objective conditions. However, we do not find that satisfaction uniformly increases with age. The pattern is much more varied, differing between life domains. While Andrews and Withey have also questioned past emphasis on the age relationship, their own findings are inconclusive because of instrumentation differences with the Campbell, Converse and Rodgers study.[10] Conceptually our

measures are very similar to those used in The Quality of American Life, so our findings present a more direct challenge. Moreover, the consistency of these patterns across a number of separate national surveys lends additional credence to these results.

But what is called for is not a revision of the basic theory of the satisfaction process presented in Chapter 2, but a restatement of how the conceptual elements of the theory are related to age or life cycle position. Expectations are probably lowered through the life cycle as youthful visions confront middle-age reality. But granting the importance of expectations, these data suggest that objective conditions are an even more important source of the age/satisfaction relationship.

Our findings question the conclusion of Campbell et. al. that the objective conditions of life (and hence personal satisfaction) generally improve as a function of age. The unique form of age differences across these three personal domains and the stronger predictive power of life cycle position argue that life cycle changes in objective conditions differ for each domain. Indeed, upon reflection it seems unlikely that conditions would improve with age at a basically uniform rate for income, housing and leisure. Taking this into account, theoretical expectations would lead to predictions of the differing patterns we find for each life domain.

Social Status and Satisfaction

It is almost by reflex that objective conditions are equated with feelings of well-being. We intuitively should expect those individuals

with higher incomes, better housing, and richer leisure opportunities to be more satisfied. However, we have already seen evidence in this chapter and the last that this relationship is not perfect. An additional problem we face in linking objective conditions and satisfaction is determining which of an almost infinite array of potential objective indicators describing a situation are relevant to feelings of well-being. For life concerns such as income, standard of living, or housing the answer is relatively obvious. But for satisfaction with leisure or social relations we may be harder pressed to say what "objectively better" really means.

This section examines the impact of objective conditions on satisfaction by studying the correlation between subjective feelings of well-being and several indicators of objective conditions -- social status measures.[11] Measures such as income or education tap a dimension of material well-being involved in determining satisfaction for several life domains. For example, we would certainly expect feelings of income satisfaction to be more common for people who enjoy large incomes than for people trying to get by on very meager incomes. Moreover, we know that, generally speaking, higher status individuals live in quarters that are far better appointed than the poor. Hence, presuming that satisfaction follows such objective quality, we would expect that housing satisfaction increases as a function of social status, and income in particular.

The clearest link between objective conditions and satisfaction should exist for the economic domain. The availability of several detailed social status measures allows for a much more direct inquiry into the "objective-subjective" relationship than is possible for most

other life domains. Table 5-3 presents the correlation between income and income satisfaction for each national sample. Not surprisingly, family income shows a strong positive correlation with income satisfaction. In 1973, for example, only 28% of those with a monthly income under $200 were satisfied with this income level, while 37% of those with incomes over $1000/month expressed satisfaction.

This positive linear relationship is generally replicated in each nation. However, these data also present an instance when consistent cross-national differences in the strength of these correlations appear to exist. In Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands objective income has a significantly weaker impact on income satisfaction than in the remaining nations. These national differences may again be due to inequivalencies in our measures, rather than differences in the nature of the underlying relationship. Differences in exchange rates, cost of living, or similar factors may produce national differences in the family income variable which affect the strength of these correlations.[12]

However, it is also possible that these patterns may reflect a process that Ronald Inglehart has already commented upon.[13] Inglehart proposes that the "objective-subjective" income relationship varies as a function of the concern with economic security and well-being. When economic concerns run high, individuals are likely to take an instrumental view of satisfaction; that is, satisfaction means higher income. When economic concerns are less pressing, satisfaction is not as directly linked to the quantity of income.

Inglehart has shown that for individuals concerned with material values the family income/life satisfaction relationship is .13 (Gamma),

TABLE 5-3

CORRELATION BETWEEN FAMILY INCOME AND INCOME SATISFACTION

	1975	1973
France	.32	.31
Belgium	.31	.34
Holland	.18	.21
Germany	.25	.20
Italy	.37	.27
Denmark	.19	.12
Ireland	.35	.27
Britain	.26	.27

Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. In 1975 income was collapsed into quartiles within each nation; in 1973 identical income codes were used in each nation, translated from standardized income levels into the national currency.

for non-materialists these two measures are virtually unrelated (-.002).[14] Extending this logic to the national level, we find that in the three more affluent European nations -- Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands -- objective income has a significantly weaker impact on income satisfaction.

A more detailed measure of family income and household needs would be necessary to explore this question further. But still, the basic pattern suggests greater similarity in this relationship than cross-national differences. Returning to this basic relationship, the magnitude of this relationship in all nations is fairly modest, especially given the close proximity between income and income satisfaction. An explanation for this finding can be drawn from our conceptualization of the satisfaction process in Chapter 2

Social status indicators reflect differences both in objective conditions and expectations.[15] The objective component of social status leads higher status individuals to be more satisfied, since objectively their conditions of life are better. In addition, the well-educated and financially well-off also have higher expectations, that is, they expect better objective conditions because of their present situation. These higher expectations act to lower the satisfaction levels of upper income individuals. When social indicators are as closely linked as income and income satisfaction, the objective component is fairly important, although relationships are still modest. However, as we move away from the direct income/income satisfaction relationship to examine other status measures or other life domains, the link between social status and objective conditions

probably weakens, while differences in expectations are less likely to be affected. Because these two factors represent forces moving in opposite directions (at least as contained in social status) the relative weight of these two forces could significantly weaken, or even reverse, the expected "objective-subjective" relationship between social status and satisfaction.

A clearer sense of the interplay of these two components can be seen when we examine income differences for other personal life domains. Figure 5-2 presents the relationship between income and satisfaction with housing, leisure and income based on the combined 1975 European sample. Income and income satisfaction display the clear positive relationship we have already encountered. The lowest income quartile is nearly a full standard deviation lower in income satisfaction than the top income quartile. A strong objective-subjective relationship connects these two indicators as we have already noted. Besides receiving higher incomes, higher status individuals generally reside in better accomodations and enjoy greater leisure opportunities and resources. Thus, the objective conditions reflected by income should also be positively correlated with housing and leisure satisfaction. Yet, Figure 5-2 shows that housing satisfaction has a surprisingly weak correlation with family income. In only one nation are these two measures correlated above .10 in the 1975 survey. The impression one draws from the figure is that housing satisfaction is nearly independent of income, but it is difficult to believe that the financially well-off do not live in objectively better housing. This is the type of finding which struck initial researchers of perceptual social indicators as counter-intuitive.

FIGURE 5-2

DOMAIN SATISFACTION AND INCOME, 1975



However, a plausible explanation of these findings is that housing expectations increase with income at about the same rate as housing conditions. A relatively equal balance of these two trends would mean that income and housing satisfaction are unrelated -- the pattern we find.

The significance of balancing expectations and objective conditions comes out even more clearly for the leisure domain. Of course, it is difficult to say with certainty what objective conditions of the leisure domain are most relevant to satisfaction. We would expect, however, that people with higher incomes enjoy better leisure opportunities. Surprisingly, we actually find a weak negative relationship (-.07) between income and leisure satisfaction. This negative correlation occurs in six of the eight nations in the 1975 survey. Satisfaction with leisure is generally higher for the lowest income quartile than for any other income group. One could envision elaborate explanations of why income cannot buy happiness in the leisure domain. But again, the most likely explanation is apparently based on the countertrends of objective conditions and expectations. Income differences in the objective conditions of the leisure domain are probably less than for income or housing. But while objective conditions may vary slightly, income is still a significant measure of differences in expectations. The slight differences in objective conditions weighed against the larger differences in expectations succeeds in reversing the expected "objective-subjective" relationship. Although we cannot measure this aspirational component with the data at hand, past research supports this interpretation.[16]

Up to this point we have only focused on income as a social

status measure. We can sustantially broaden our understanding of the causal forces embodied in social status if we consider other indicators such as education or occcupation. Seeing how social status and satisfaction covary across a wider range of measures should provide a rich base for discussing these relationships.

Education provides a generally accurate, though indirect, indicator of the objective conditions of life. Higher income, more education, higher status occupations and objectively better life experiences are all tied together. But since education is a constant social characteristic once formal education is completed, education is less accurate in reflecting short-term shifts in objective conditions. On the other hand, education contains a cognitive element which probably enhances its ability to serve as an indicator of different expectations.[17]

The relationship between education and the three personal life domains for the combined 1975 European sample is displayed in Figure 5-3. In general terms, all three domains follow the same pattern as with family income. Income satisfaction increases monotonically with educational level. This relationship is the strongest of the three domains (.13) and reflects the objective-subjective bases of the social status relationship. Education, however, is only weakly related to housing satisfaction (.03) or leisure satisfaction (-.03). Despite these weak correlations, the latter two domains present an interesting picture of how objective conditions and aspirations converge. First, the negative, albeit weak, relationship between education and leisure satisfaction again suggests that the aspirational component of social status outweighs the objective component in this

FIGURE 5-3



domain. Secondly, satisfaction patterns in these two domains deviate from the expected linear objective-subjective relationship. The housing and leisure domains replicate the "W shaped" pattern found by Campbell and his colleagues.[18] The Michigan researchers attribute the high satisfaction levels of the lowest education group to their limited aspirations. This group is aware of fewer alternatives to their present situation, and most likely have accomodated themselves to their situation in life. Consequently, when the lowest educational stratum compares their present situation to their limited expectations, they are more satisfied than individuals with slightly more education and presumably slightly better objective conditions. The lower satisfaction for the next-to-highest educational stratum reflects an imbalance in the oppositve direction. Education acts to broaden horizons and expose the individual to a wider range of alternative life experiences. Better objective conditions and the salience of alternatives leads to greater expectations among the highly educated. Thus while the next-to-highest education category experiences objective conditions which are probably better than all but the highest educational level, their expectations likely exceed their grasp. In short, we suspect this group shares the expectations of the highest educational stratum, but experiences the objective conditions of a group one step lower on the economic ladder. This discrepency leads to satisfaction levels lower than for adjacent education groups.

Indeed, these educational differences are relatively small. Nonlinear patterns of this magnitude would normally be passed over in research if it were not for the emphasis placed on these patterns by Campbell, Converse and Rodgers.[19] The importance of education

is not the magnitude of the differences, but their theoretical significance in highlighting the processes involved in producing satisfaction.

Before we close this section we want to consider one final measure of social status -- occupation of the head of the household. In addition to objective differences in life conditions between classes, there is also evidence that aspirations and expectations are guided by class cues. Stern and Keller, as well as Runciman, find that it is relatively rare for respondents to take their standards for comparison from persons who are perceived as belonging to a different social class.[20] If comparisons are made primarily within classes, then we should expect only minor differences in feelings of well-being between social classes who differ in their objective conditions. The significance of objective conditions versus these class-based expectations will thus be reflected in the magnitude and pattern of the relationship between class position and satisfaction.

To represent the expected objective-subjective relationship we ordered occupation categories according to their average income.[21] Because the national patterns are similar and a large N is important for several of the smaller occupations groups, national samples were combined into a European sample. Figure 5-4 presents the satisfaction levels for the three life domains by occupation in 1975. We again find a clear relationship between income satisfaction and social status. As should be expected, the low income and financial security of unemployment produces an oppressively low level of income satisfaction. The unemployed display the greatest concentration of income dissatisfaction we identified through the entire course of these analyses. Farmers, and then manual workers, feel somewhat more satisfied with

FIGURE 5-4



their income. But even these groups rate income satisfaction more than a full point lower than overall life satisfaction. As we continue up the occupation ladder we find that middle class occupations have more favorable views of their economic conditions. However, the only stratum to actually express a level of income satisfaction higher than their overall life satisfaction are business executives and directors.

When we turn to other life domains, the objective-subjective relationship blurs, as it has for other social status measures. Housing satisfaction increases slightly with occupational status. But overlaid on this trend are differences in the objective conditions of specific occupational groups which affect feelings of satisfaction independent of income level. Farmers, for example, are more likely to own their own home, and express the greater housing satisfaction characteristic of rural populations (see below). Similarly, European business owners and professionals are more likely to be homeowners because of their occupations, and this probably explains why these two groups display levels of housing satisfaction above those of higher paying occupations. This blending of income effects and occupation-specific influences presents a complex pattern linking objective conditions and satisfaction levels. Yet, these differences produce only modest correlations.[22]

Occupational differences in leisure satisfaction are also very slight. Retired and unemployed Europeans are relatively satisfied with the quality of their leisure, far more than their income alone would predict. Among active members of the labor force, leisure satisfaction increases slightly with occupational status. However, several occupation groups -- farmers, business owners, and profes-

sionals -- again display levels of satisfaction which do not strictly conform to their income levels. Apparently the time commitments and contraints of these three occupations limit the leisure opportunities of these respondents, thus producing levels of leisure satisfaction lower than adjacent income-earning occupations.

The pattern of occupation differences across all three domains also tends to question earlier emphasis on expectations being made within social classes -- thus moderating class differences in satisfaction.[23] Although within-class references may be used, clear differences in satisfaction levels appear between classes. In the income and housing domains the working class is significantly less satisfied than the middle class, apparently realizing their inferior objective conditions. Thus it appears that social classes at least share an overlapping reference standard, leading to significant between-class differences paralleling differences in the conditions of life.

A more detailed look at the satisfaction of retirees suggests the complexities involved in making a direct link between objective conditions and the public's perception of the quality of life. On the average, retirees generally have a relatively low income level. Retirees are, however, at a point in the life cycle when direct comparison to members of the labor force is not always appropriate. The financial pressures of a growing family are past. Income is no longer dependent on employment, but on pensions and retirement benefits which are normally quite generous in Europe. Similarly, retirement brings with it increased leisure opportunities. Furthermore, their position in the life cycle could be expected to lead to a lowering of

expectations. All of these factors combine to raise income satisfaction for retirees above what their incomes alone would predict.[24] This group is also more satisfied with their leisure than any occupation group, and nearly the most satisfied with their housing. This finding underscores the need to take a very discriminating view of how objective conditions and expectations vary across the population in ways which make any simple equation of objective and subjective indicators difficult to accomplish.

In summary, we have used several social status measures primarily as indicators of the objective conditions of life, assuming that the better the objective conditions, the greater the satisfaction. However, the expected objective-subjective relationship between social status and satisfaction is not nearly so simple. These relationships are generally modest at best, and in some instances even reversed in direction. We believe that these weak correlations reflect the fact that social status simultaneously taps both components of the satisfaction process: objective conditions and expectations.[25] Higher status individuals are likely to expect better objective conditions in life, as well as experiencing better conditions. Thus increases in the objective component act to increase satisfaction with rising status, while increases in expectations act to decrease satisfaction with rising status. As we have seen, the result of these two forces can range from a strong positive to a strong negative relationship, depending on the relative strength of the two forces. Moreover, the fact that these patterns are basically similar across the eight nations covered by the data adds additional weight to these findings, and allows us to talk of a European pattern of personal satisfaction.

The Environment and Satisfaction

The variables we have examined to this point all involve personal characteristics of the individual -- age, life cycle position, income and other social status measures. Now we want to broaden our investigation to consider environmental influences on satisfaction levels. Past research provides some evidence that environmental factors may affect feelings of well-being, although the evidence is mixed.

Inglehart's analysis of the 1973 European survey emphasizes region as an important predictor of a summary satisfaction index, "region, province, or Land in which a respondent lives proves to be a relatively good predictor of overall satisfaction in nation-by-nation analyses, only income ranks above it as an explanatory variable."[26] Still, Inglehart was relatively unsuccessful in explaining why and how region had an impact on satisfaction levels. The several Michigan studies of American satisfaction also find significant, though modest, regional differences in perceptions of the quality of life.[27]

In contrast, Schneider not only attempts to measure the size of regional differences,[28] but also their source. Schneider compares life domain satisfaction with indices of objective life conditions for 13 American cities, finding only 11% of the correlations are significant at the .10 level, and half of these are in the "wrong" direction, i.e. better objective conditions correspond to low satisfaction. He concludes by questioning whether there is a direct relationship between the characteristics of a region and satisfaction levels.[29]

Turning to the data, we find only a weak relationship between region and income, housing and leisure satisfaction in both the 1973 and 1975 European surveys, Table 5-4. Region explains 1-4% of

TABLE 5-4

CORRELATION BETWEEN REGION AND DOMAIN SATISFACTION

	Income	Housing	Leisure*
1975 Correlations			
France	.12	.13	.07
Belgium	.20	.20	.15
Holland	.18	.21	.16
Germany	.17	.20	.15
Italy	.17	.21	.20
Denmark	.12	.12	.07
Ireland	.21	.18	.24
Britain	.10	.13	.12
1973 Correlations			
France	.09	.18	.12
Belgium	.21	.12	.21
Holland	.12	.14	.18
Germany	.13	.09	.10
Italy	.20	.13	.21
Denmark	.15	.12	.11
Ireland	.20	.17	.16
Britain	.14	.17	.17

Entries are eta coefficients.

* In 1975 the leisure indicator is a simple additive index combining the amount of leisure time and the way it is spent.

the total variance in satisfaction for these life domains. Given Inglehart's emphasis upon region as a predictor of satisfaction these low correlations are somewhat surprising. However, judged against the other modest correlations in this chapter it seems worthwhile to pursue regional differences a bit further.

Knowing that region is related to satisfaction is less useful than knowing the reason behind the relationship. Region may serve as a surrogate for influences not explicitly measured in a survey questionnaire, such as local culture or historical experiences. Inglehart briefly describes traces of these influences in his discussion of regional patterns in 1973.[30] Alternatively, region might reflect the importance of contextual influences on the satisfaction process. Residents of a region may share a set of expectations or standard of reference based upon their common social context. A Southern Italian, for example, may compare himself to his neighbors or his conditions last year, rather than comparing himself to a more affluent relative living in the North. Shared expectations which vary by region or rural/urban residence could be a second factor promoting regional differences in satisfaction. Finally, regional variation in feelings of well-being may reflect differences in the objective conditions of regions. The general affluence of a region may contribute to a sense of economic well-being by the entire population.

Linking satisfaction levels with regional characteristics such as economic conditions and social structure can provide tentative explanations of regional patterns. To explore this possibility we combined data from all the regions of Europe in the 1975 survey into a single aggregate data file. The mean income, housing, and

leisure satisfaction score for each region was computed following the statistical regions defined by the European Community. These satisfaction scores were merged with census data prepared by Inglehart to produce an aggregate data file of 65 cases (regions).[31] The census data include measures of the economic conditions of the region, occupational structure, population density, and population growth rates. By determining which regional characteristics are related to satisfaction levels we hope to explain the source of the regional correlations described in Table 5-4. Moreover, drawing on the wide range of regional conditions within Europe strengthens the generalizability of our findings, as well as allowing a more detailed study than possible with separate nation-by-nation acomparisons.

Our first set of indicators taps the economic conditions of a region. If satisfaction levels reflect the objective conditions of a region (once the cultural/affective level is controlled), then we can apply the evidence from earlier in this chapter to hypothesize the expected pattern of relationships. A fairly close objective-subjective relationship should link the economic conditions of a region to levels of income satisfaction; just as family income and income satisfaction are related. The objective-subjective relationship is weaker between family income and housing, and consequently we anticipate only a weak relationship between these measures for our regional file. Finally, regional variation in leisure satisfaction is not likely to be affected by economic conditions since it was relatively independent of family income in our micro-level analyses.

Because of the substantial time lag involved before aggregate

statistics are reported at the regional level, the only available economic indicators serve as measures of the long-term economic conditions of each region: Gross Domestic Product per capita in 1969, growth in GDP/capita from approximately 1960 to 1969, and unemployment rates for Spring 1973, Table 5-5.

Despite the frailties of our measures, regional differences in satisfaction closely conform to our expectations. Income satisfaction is strongly related to the economic history of a region, even though the objective indicators were collected several years before the surveys were fielded. Reinforcing Chapter Four's emphasis on the dynamic aspects of the satisfaction process, change in GDP/capita is the strongest correlate of income satisfaction; although its advantage over the other measures is not statistically significant.

While economic conditions are apparently tied to income satisfaction, the economic conditions of a region are virtually independent of either housing or leisure satisfaction. This supports our expectation that we are viewing essentially the same process as seen at the micro-level: a strong objective-subjective relationship for the economic domain, which weakens when linking affluence to other life domains.

The second set of regional characteristics deals with the social structure of a region. These indicators primarily reflect the occupational composition of a region, and therefore regional differences in personal satisfaction might follow the pattern we have described earlier described for occupation. That is, we expect the occupational structure of a region to be more closely related to income satisfaction,

TABLE 5-5

CORRELATION BETWEEN REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND DOMAIN SATISFACTION

(REGIONAL DATA FILE)

	Housing	Leisure*	Income
Economic Setting			
1969 GDP/cap	.06	-.03	.37
GDP/cap 1960-1969	.15	.01	.44
1973 Unemployment	.04	.00	.39
Social Structure: Employment by Sector			
% Agriculture	.09	.07	-.39
% Industry	-.08	-.09	.26
% Service	-.04	.00	.26
Population and Density			
Pop Density 1973	-.24	-.14	.16
Pop Growth 1963-1973	.11	.19	.35

Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. Total N of the regional file is 65. * In 1975 the leisure measure is a simple additive index combining the amount of leisure time and the way it is spent.

with higher income satisfaction among the industrial and service sectors. Conversely, regional differences in housing or leisure satisfaction as a function of social structure should be relatively minor.

The second panel in Table 5-5 presents the regional relationships between social structure and satisfaction. These findings fit closely with our expectations. Income satisfaction is positively correlated with the size of the industrial and service sector, and negatively correlated with the size of the agricultural sector. Moreover, social structure is virtually unrelated to housing or leisure satisfaction -- just as occupation was only weakly related to these domains at the micro level. Areas with a large agricultural sector (or small industrial sector) show only the slightest tendency to be more satisfied with their housing and leisure.

The final set of aggregate indicators concern the population characteristics of regions: population density and increase in population over the past decade. The Quality of American Life finds a significant correlation between urban/rural residence and overall life satisfaction.[32] The authors feel that rural residents live in a slower-paced and more isolated environment, and so they are less aware than urban residents of alternative life styles. Consequently, the moderate expectations of rural residents generally leads to higher levels of satisfaction. With the European data we find traces of these same processes. Population density serves as a fairly direct indicator of urban/rural residence. Population density is negatively correlated with housing (-.24) and leisure (-.14) satisfaction as predicted. However, density is positively related to satisfaction

with income (.16), undoubtedly reflecting objective differences in income between urban and rural populations and the persisting importance of the objective-subjective relationship for the economic domain.

The second population variable, population increase, is conceptually the most interesting. Rapid population growth of a region suggests that its objective conditions of life are attracting new residents into the area. Conversely, regions of decreasing population show that residents are "voting with their feet" and moving to a more appealing area. Thus, population growth might conceivably be seen as a behavioral indicator of the overall attractiveness of a region, summarizing several domains of life experience. In line with this hypothesis, population growth rates are positively related to satisfaction with each of the three personal life domains. This is the only regional characteristic to display such a consistent influence across domains.

Our search for an explanation to regional differences has achieved some success. Region is a significant correlate of satisfaction. But if we consider region as a surrogate for other unmeasured influences then "region" has a quite different meaning depending on the life domain we are discussing. Regional levels of income satisfaction correspond fairly well to the long-term economic conditions of a region, and the occupational composition of the labor force. The attractiveness of a region as represented by population increase is also a significant correlate of income satisfaction. Regional differences in housing satisfaction are unrelated to the long-term economic experiences of a region. However, in contrast to the economic domain we find that housing satisfaction is higher in rural areas.

Finally, the distribution of leisure satisfaction is basically similar to the housing domain. Leisure satisfaction runs higher in rural regions, and areas where the population has been growing at faster than average rates.

Left/Right Ideology and Satisfaction

The final analyses of this chapter involve the relationship between party support and personal satisfaction. It is difficult to agree on the flow of causality between these two concepts. On the one hand, dissatisfaction with the conditions of life may influence the choice of a party. On the other hand, party supporters may follow the cues of party elites in evaluating the nature of the times, and determine their own personal satisfaction at least partially on the basis of partisan cues. In short, the causal flow may move in both directions between these two concepts.[33] Thus, rather than assume causality, we will only determine the covariation between these two sets of attitudes.

Despite the interest of political scientists in feelings of relative deprivation, very little evidence is available on the relationship between personal satisfaction and party support. The available writing generally stresses Left/Right ideology as the basis of this relationship.[34] Parties of the Left are usually identified as vehicles of social change and therefore may attract the support of the personally dissatisfied. And as we will argue in Chapter 7, the ideology of the Left is likely to stimulate feelings of personal dissatisfaction by Leftists supporters.

An alternative hypothesis, however, links personal dissatisfaction

TABLE 5-6

CORRELATION BETWEEN LEFT/RIGHT ORIENTATION AND DOMAIN SATISFACTION

	Income	Housing	Leisure*
1975 Correlations			
France	.16	.12	.03
Belgium	.14	.14	.05
Holland	.14	.07	.04
Germany	.03	.09	-.08
Italy	.11	.04	.03
Denmark	.08	.14	.02
Ireland	.07	.10	.06
Britain	.14	.18	.05
1973 Correlations			
France	.20	.09	.11
Belgium	.13	.10	.12
Holland	.14	.09	.03
Germany	.04	.09	-.08
Italy	.02	.09	-.04
Denmark	.05	.10	.05
Ireland	.02	.09	.09
Britain	.19	.19	.09

Entries are Pearson correlations. * In 1975 the leisure measure is a simple additive index combining the amount of leisure time and the way it is spent.

to support of the incumbent or opposition parties, rather than to Left/Right tendance. Dissatisfied individuals may view the government as responsible for their dissatisfaction and therefore support the opposition party (either Left or Right). Supporters of the incumbents might receive a psychic boost from knowing their party is in power, leading to the assumption that conditions will improve and satisfaction for incumbent supporters will consequently rise.

Thus, there are two rival hypotheses that must be decided between. If personal dissatisfaction and party support tend to covary in terms of Left/Right orientations, then we should find a consistently positive correlation between satisfaction and Left/Right vote intention. If incumbent/opposition party support is the crucial variable, this would produce a positive correlation with Left/Right vote in nations where the Right is in power, and a negative correlation when the Left controls the government.

In addition to the direction of relationships, the strength of relationships should also vary systematically across life domains. The strongest relationships are likely to emerge between party support and and income satisfaction. European party systems are built around economic conflicts. Partisan lines should therefore be more clearly drawn for this domain. The housing domain may present a more varied pattern. Party differences may appear in nations such as Britain where the government is deeply involved in housing. But in most of Europe housing has not been an issue of ideological conflict and so may be relatively independent of party support. Leisure is the least politicized of all three domains. Consequently, we assume that an individual who is dissatisfied with leisure conditions is not likely

to link these attitudes to ideological orientations.

Table 5-6 convincingly argues that Left/Right orientation is the primary correlate of personal dissatisfaction, not incumbent/opposition support. The data show that in each nation Leftists tend to be less satisfied with their income; even in Britain, Denmark and Germany where the Left is in power. While this correlation is only .12 (Pearson r) for Europe as a whole, it is fairly consistent across nations. Housing satisfaction is also related to Left/Right ideology, although with considerable cross-national variation in the strength of this relationship as we expected. Rounding out our hypotheses, feelings of leisure satisfaction are virtually independent of Left/Right attitudes. The relationship between these two attitudes never exceeds the .10 level in 1975, while varying widely across the 1973 samples.

In sum, we have identified a concentration of personally dissatisfied citizens among European Leftists, apparently resulting from basic ideological influences rather than evaluations of incumbent governments. This suggests that the Left generally serves as a magnet to attract dissatisfied citizens, and is always likely to find itself in an advocacy role on their behalf. Moreover, in Chapter 7 we will see how this uneven ideological distribution of personal dissatisfaction serves to magnify the actual demands placed upon European political systems by the personally dissatisfied.

Concluding Comments

If there is a single lesson to be learned from this chapter, it is that the correlates of satisfaction are substantially different for each life domain. Although satisfaction tends to be generalized, the sources of income satisfaction, for example, are considerably different from housing or leisure satisfaction. These relationships between social characteristics and satisfaction even reverse direction between life domains.

Rather than being overwhelmed by an avalanche of possible counter-intuitive findings (such as the lowest income stratum is most satisfied with its leisure opportunities), our emphasis on the theoretical basis of satisfaction has clarified many of these results. Beneath these correlations lie two factors -- objective conditions and expectations. Age, social status, and other social characteristics are important determinants of satisfaction only insofar as they tap one or both of these two factors. The variables selected for study in this chapter are significant predictors of satisfaction because they represent situations where these two factors are in imbalance. But often social characteristics are too far removed from the satisfaction process to directly tap either expectations or objective conditions.[35] Indeed, the strongest correlations in this chapter are only of moderate strength.

If social indicator research is to make significant progress, the findings of this chapter suggest two changes in our measurement of the satisfaction process. First, attitudes more proximate to decisions on satisfaction must be surveyed. Direct measures of expectations and perceptions of objective conditions are needed if we are to

monitor the dynamics of the satisfaction process. It is the comparison of these two factors which is the basic determinant of satisfaction (Chapter 2). Moreover, if these are the crucial concepts to measure, it is easy to understand why social characteristics, as poor surrogates of these concepts, are only weakly related to feelings of well-being.

Secondly, Inglehart has rightly noted that social indicator research should adopt a dynamic perspective, focusing on changes in expectations or objective conditions which produce measurable changes in satisfaction levels.[36]

But these data have told us more than how to plan future research. We have seen that the satisfaction process is complex and to understand it requires sensitive and focused measurement. Objective conditions have a substantial impact on feelings of well-being only when objective and subjective indicators are as clearly matched as family income and income satisfaction. Otherwise, expectations intervene to weaken the objective-subjective correlation. Thus, family income makes very little difference for housing satisfaction, although the affluent obviously have better accomodations. Similarly, occupation has a relatively weak impact on income satisfaction, even though family income and occupation of the head of the household are closely related. Expectations, too, should require a detailed and focused measurement because they are an equally subtle and elusive concept.

More immediately, these data offer another explanation for the generally weak correlations between all social characteristics and overall life satisfaction.[37] Life satisfaction is considered to be the total of satisfaction with the specific domains of life experience. But if these domains are influenced by different forces, then

adding them together would attenuate the already weak relationship between background variables and domain satisfaction. For example, income is positively correlated with income satisfaction (.29) and negatively correlated with leisure satisfaction (-.07). If we combine both income and leisure satisfaction into a single index (much as is done in determining life satisfaction) the total predictive power of income necessarily declines (.17). Thus, by its very nature we should not expect a broad measure of overall well-being to be closely related to the determinants of any single life domain.

While overall life satisfaction is of substantial theoretical interest, its broad and diffuse nature makes it of limited value for social indicator research. Considerable change in expectations or objective conditions would be required before global feelings of well-being would be affected. Rather, it seems more productive to focus on measures such as income, housing and leisure satisfaction which have a clearer interpretation and can be related more directly to specific life experiences.

The findings of this chapter also call for particular attention in linking life domains and political satisfaction through the rest of this dissertation. We cannot simply assume that low social status, or deprived objective conditions in general, lead to personal dissatisfaction and hence political dissatisfaction. Nearly all social groups appear to be dissatisfied with some aspect of life. Thus, the potential reservoir of dissatisfied citizens is quite substantial. And, the specific pattern of relationships between personal and political satisfaction will define which sectors of society are actually politicizing their personal perceptions of the quality of life.

Footnotes to Chapter 5

[1] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Willard Rodgers, The Quality of American Life (New York: Russell Sage, 1976).

[2] Frank Andrews and Stephen Withey, Social Indicators of Well-being (New York: Plenum Press, 1977); J.P. Alston and C. Dudley, "Age, Occupation and Life Satisfaction," The Gerontologist, 13 (Spring 1973); D. Phillips, "Social Participation and Happiness," American Journal of Sociology, 72 (March 1967).

[3] Campbell, et. al, Quality of American Life, pg. 158.

[4] Ibid, pp. 158-164.

[5] Of course, other factors are also operative. There is evidence that younger cohorts are shifting emphasis from economic values to non-economic values. This shift might moderate age difference in economic expectations, while increasing age differences for other domains. The advent of the television age and the information explosion of the modern era might also affect the perspectives of today's youth.

[6] In 1975 leisure satisfaction combines the two satisfaction items (the amount of leisure and how it is spent) in order to obtain a measure comparable to the single broad leisure indicator in 1973.

[7] See Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life, pp. 336-345 for life cycle differences in satisfaction with family and children.

[8] Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, and Sheila Feld, Americans View Their Mental Health (New York: Basic Books, 1960); J.P. Robinson and P.R. Shaver, Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1970).

[9] Even stronger evidence is that the same basic life cycle pattern emerges for satisfaction with social relations.

[10] Campbell, et. al find a negative correlation between age and happiness (an affective measure), and a positive correlation between age and satisfaction (a cognitive measure). Because Andrews and Withey use an indicator including both affective and cognitive elements their findings are not a direct challenge to The Quality of American Life. Our indicators, however, are as clearly cognitive as Campbell's indicators and should produce similar results if their logic applies.

[11] For past evidence on the relationship between social status and perceptual social indicators see, Alston and Dudley, "Age, Occupation and Satisfaction;" J.P. Alston, G. Lowe, and A Wrigley, "Socioeconomic Correlates of Four Dimensions of Self-perceived Satisfaction, 1972," Human Organization, 33 (Spring 1974); Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965); Philips, "Social Participation and Happiness;" Frank Clemente and William Sauer, "Life Satisfaction in the United States," Social Forces, 54 (March 1976); Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life; Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[12] For example, cross-national variation in these correlations may be due to national differences in family size, and hence the different demands placed upon family income. We constructed a welfare ratio index to adjust for family size based on a procedure in Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Deprivation and Societal Discontent," in Burkhard Strumpel (ed.), Economic Means for Human Needs (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1976). This adjusted measure of objective economic conditions does, in fact, yield a more similar cross-national relationship in 1973:

	Fran	Belg	Holl	Germ	Ital	Denm	Irel	Brit
Family Income	.31	.34	.21	.20	.27	.12	.27	.27
Welfare Ratio	.30	.30	.24	.23	.25	.15	.24	.28

We would expect that further adjustments to increase the comparability of our objective indicator would also increase the similarity of these correlations.

[13] Ronald Inglehart, Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), Chapter 5.

[14] Ibid., pg. 141.

[15] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life, pp. 135-156,

[16] Ibid.; Cantril, Human Concerns.

[17] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life, pp. 181-183.

[18] Ibid., pp. 135-156.

[19] Ibid.

[20] E. Stern and S. Keller, "Spontaneous Group Reference in France," Public Opinion Quarterly, 17 (1953); Walter Runcimann, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

[21] For additional evidence see, Alston and Dudley, "Age, Occupation, and Life Satisfaction;" Alston, et. al., "Socioeconomic Correlates of Satisfaction;" Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Life-styles, Values and Subjective Welfare," in Burkhard Strumpel (ed.), Economic Means for Human Needs; George Katona, Burkhard Strumpel, and Ernest Zahn, Aspirations and Affluence (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).

[22] Occupation is correlated (Eta) at .22 with income satisfaction, .10 with housing satisfaction, and .13 with leisure satisfaction in the 1975 study.

[23] Stern and Keller, "Spontaneous Group Reference;" Runcimann, Relative Deprivation.

[24] Even so, retirement apparently results in a lowering of income satisfaction, since retirees are generally less satisfied with than income than employed respondents.

[25] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life, pp. 146-147; Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[26] Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), Chapter 6.

[27] Campbell, et. al, Quality of American Life, Chapter 5; Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[28] Mark Schneider, "The Quality of Life in Large American Cities," Social Indicator Research, 1 (1974)

[29] One serious weakness of Schneider's work is that he divides the population of each city into white and black respondents, and then separately correlates objective indicators for the city as a whole with subjective scores for the two races. Most likely whites and blacks are experiencing different conditions of life even though they do live in the same city. Thus to find that aggregate measures of city characteristics do not correlate well with perceptions is not surprising.

[30] Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, Chapter 7.

[31] Regional data were based on the standard administrative units defined by the European Communities. Data were primarily drawn from Eurostats (Brussels: European Communities Information Office, 1975). We would like to thank Ronald Inglehart for permission to utilize this regional file.

[32] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life.

[33] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pp. 103-105; Alan Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1977); Inglehart, Silent Revolution, Chapter 5. To illustrate the lack of interest in this relationship, The Quality of American Life by Campbell, et. al. does not contain a single relationship between satisfaction and partisanship -- even when explaining satisfaction with life in the United States!

[34] For a discussion of this point see, Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt, West German Politics in Transition (Forthcoming), Chapter 5.

[35] The table on the following page presents the Multiple Classification Analyses of domain satisfaction using all the available social characteristics in each survey as predictors. Potential predictors which were not included in this chapter, such as sex or church attendance, were excluded because their impact was generally inconsequential. Although all of the relationships in the table are weak, there are still obvious differences in the patterns of correlations between domains.

[36] Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, and Subjective Satisfaction in Western Publics," Comparative Political Studies, 9 (Jan., 1977).

[37] Ibid.; Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life; Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSES OF DOMAIN SATISFACTION

	Income	Housing	Leisure
1975 Beta Coefficients			
Life Cycle	.12	.15	.14
Income	.23	.10	.03
Town Size	.07	.11	.08
Occupation	.15	.07	.11
Education	.08	.08	.05
Sex	.04	.02	.04
R	.34	.21	.19
1973 Beta Coefficients			
Life Cycle	.07	.12	.11
Income	.24	.09	.06
Town Size	.04	.07	.06
Occupation	.07	.07	.04
Education	.06	.06	.05
Sex	.05	.05	.03
Church Attendance	.04	.07	.06
R	.29	.19	.17

Entries are MCA beta coefficients. Analyses in both years are based upon the combined European sample.

CHAPTER 6

FROM PERSONAL TO POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION

Perceptions of the quality of life have significance beyond their role as subjective social indicators as discussed in the first half of this dissertation. Personal dissatisfaction has historically been considered a basic cause of political dissatisfaction and political violence. Thus, the first half of this research has examined one portion of the causal chain connecting objective life conditions and social unrest. This and the following chapter will examine this relationship in more detail -- studying how personal dissatisfaction is mobilized into political discontent. But first, let us start by describing Europeans' present feelings toward their political systems.

Levels of Political Satisfaction

In discussing orientations toward the political system one is first struck by how the style of political life has changed radically over the past decade and a half. In the early Sixties the democratic citizen was the active, but well-mannered participant.[1] Now, demonstrations and the politics of confrontation are commonplace. Some of these new forms of political action can be considered anti-system behavior of the type Gurr labels "civil strife."[2] More often

these new forms of elite-challenging political behavior are merely a new mode of political participation developed in response to a changing political environment.[3]

Although there are several reasons for the rise of elite-challenging behavior, it is generally considered symptomatic of increasing public dissatisfaction with politics and the operation of the political system. Trend data from several nations have documented increasing public criticism of political authorities, growing feelings of political inefficacy, and greater distrust of politicians and political institutions.[4]

In order to measure the state of European opinion in the mid-Seventies, both of our surveys contain an indicator of political satisfaction. Respondents were asked how satisfied they were with, "the way democracy is functioning in (their country)". By evaluating the political system in such a broad manner, this indicator should serve as a diffuse measure of political satisfaction, combining evaluations of the political regime and its incumbents. These data show that about half of the European public is dissatisfied with the functioning of the political system. In 1973 a full 56% of the combined European sample express dissatisfaction, and in 1975 a nearly identical 55% give dissatisfied responses. Indeed, of all the items evaluated in both studies, the political system consistently receives the lowest satisfaction ratings. Although these data span a relatively narrow timeframe, they typify a problem that has become so noticeable among Western societies that it is regularly referred to as the "Legitimacy Crisis."[5]

Nearly all European nations had experienced their own "Legitimacy

Crisis" in the years preceeding our 1973 survey. France had suffered through the May Revolts, and the reverberations had not yet died away. The consociational system supporting the Dutch political system was eroding and leading to a fragmentation of the party system. Belgian society was becoming increasingly polarized from the resurgence of Flemish and Walloon ethnocentrism. Even in Britain, the model of democracy, the political leadership was under challenge as the economic system crumbled, Wales and Scotland moved toward independence, and Westminster looked on in a state of "immobilisme." In Germany, student unrest that originally began as leftwing attempts to reform the universities and as demonstrations against the Vietnam war, the rightwing Springer press chain, and police terror tactics, eventually grew to challenge virtually all the traditional social and political values. In fact, student unrest spread thoughout nearly all of Europe, questioning an ever growing set of social issues. The litany of political discontent could be continued for Italy, Ireland, and indeed for nearly all Western industrialized societies.

Figure 6-1 presents the adjusted political satisfaction scores for each nation in both the 1973 and 1975 surveys. Consistent with the methodology used throughout this work, these scores are expressed as deviations from the baseline of how satisfied each nationality is with "life as a whole." As expected, these figures show that the majority of citizens in each of these nations are significantly less satisfied with the functioning of the political system than they are with their life overall. In 1973, for example, the French are more than half a scale point less satisfied with politics (on a four-point scale), and

FIGURE 6-1

CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL SATISFACTION



Scores are deviations of national levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy from national levels of overall life satisfaction.

the Danes rate political satisfaction over a full point lower than their overall satisfaction levels.

Besides this consensus on the poor operation of European political systems, these data display some international variation in satisfaction levels which appears to parallel, intuitively, the performance of these systems. Beginning with the 1973 data, nations which had experienced high levels of economic growth over the preceeding decade were generally ranked near the top of the list, e.g., France and Belgium. Similarly, the prosperity and success of "Modell Deutschland" leads Germans to express relatively less political dissatisfaction. At the other end of the scale, the British and Irish who were suffering economic and political problems of great magnitude were predominately dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in their countries.

The one seemingly unexplainable ranking is Denmark. The Danes enjoy one of the highest levels of affluence and fastest growth rates within Europe. And the dominant theme of Danish politics was clearly that of continuity with the past, free of much of the unrest that swept through Europe. But during the campaign for the upcoming election in December 1973, Denmark seemed to be joining the other nations of Europe with its own legitimacy crisis. Rusk and Borre describe the election as a reflection of the electorate's massive distrust of the "establishment" parties on both the Left and Right, and how they have run the political system,[6]

> Inflation, high taxes and the increased costs of the welfare state -- reputed to be one of the most expensive in Europe -- have all been cited as reasons for people's feelings of frustration and protest against the government and the established order

Thus, our September 1973 data apparently reflect the groundswell of public dissatisfaction that was to upset the existing major parties at the polls, and spur the rise of new parties like the Progressives and Centre Democrats.

The period between our 1973 and 1975 surveys was another difficult time for European governments. Violent and dramatic forms of poltical protest had apparently declined (or become so accepted that they no longer attracted as much attention). But sources of political dissatisfaction had certainly not abated. The Arab oil embargo in Fall 1973 severely weakened Western industrial economies, and the resulting world-wide recession and inflation inflicted further damage. These pressing economic burdens were forced on governments already faced with a full political agenda, and struggling to regain public confidence. The immediate reaction to this wave of economic problems was decline or defeat for governing parties at the polls. Britain was forced to the polls twice in 1974, finally resulting in a government with barely a majority in Parliament. The conservative majority narrowly escaped electoral defeat in the 1974 French presidential election. The ruling Christian Democrats suffered severe losses (as the PCI gained) in Italy's 1975 regional elections. Even in Germany, which economically fared better than most of its neighbors, the SPD vote losses grew in each subsequent Land election.

Without comparable indicators we cannot be certain whether dissatisfaction increased or decreased in absolute terms from 1973 to 1975, but our data show that Europeans were still predominately dissatisfied with the functioning of their political systems in 1975. The French, for example, rate their political satisfaction in 1975 nearly two-points

lower than their overall life satisfaction (on an eleven-point scale), and the Irish rate political satisfaction three points lower. However, as we have done in Chapter 4 with personal satisfaction, comparing the changes in national rankings between the two surveys can intimate a pattern of change.

Two nations display increases in political satisfaction relative to other nations -- Germany and Denmark. Germany's relatively good economic performance during the 1973-1975 recession, and the SPD's success in placing responsibility for economic troubles on increasing international interdependency (and thus outside the reasonable range of responsibility for any German government) results in a noticeable lead in German evaluations of their political system relative to the rest of Europe. Denmark, on the other hand, moves from eighth to fifth ranking -- probably resulting from an easing of tensions after the December 1973 election.

On the other side of the ledger, only one nation displays a significant erosion of public confidence from 1973 to 1975 -- Italy. The economic effects of the Arab oil embargo struck Italy with exceptional force, exacerbating political problems which were already surfacing. Politically, the country seemed on the point of disintegration.[7] From 1973 to 1975 the government faced a constant threat of losing its majority. Kidnapping and political violence became a commonplace occurrence. At several points when unresolved problems froze the government in inaction, the possibility of a coup from the Left or Right was seriously feared. The public responded, as we have noted, by chastising the DC during the 1975 regional elections, and by apparently becoming even more dissatisfied with their political system.

The French also display a relative decline in feelings of political satisfaction, moving from first to fourth in the comparative rankings. Since several nations are closely grouped together this decline sounds larger than it actually is. Still the data provide some evidence that public dissatisfaction was probably fueled by the government's inability to cope with spiraling inflation and unemployment, which was pointed out in great detail by the Leftist opposition.

While these low levels of political satisfaction are clearly unwelcomed by European governments, the significance of these findings might conceivably be discounted on several grounds. Personal life domains such as housing or leisure may be intrinsically different from domains such as politics. To admit that one is not satisfied with their housing or leisure opportunities is, to some extent, to admit to personal failure or inadequacy. Criticism of the political system can be expressed without great psychological cost. Thus, it should be "easier" to say one is dissatisfied with the functioning of the political system than to admit to personal dissatisfaction. While we can find traces of this phenomenon in the data (see Chapter 4), there are also conflicting points of evidence. The greatest challenge comes from longitudinal studies which show that in more idyllic times when thoughts of a Civic Culture were in vogue, citizens in several advanced industrial societies were predominately trustful, efficacious and presumably satisfied with their political system.[8] Widespread popular dissatisfaction with the political system thus seems to be a contemporary phenomenon, and not an inevitable state of public opinion.

Still others have argued that even the long-term trends in political evaluations are more apparent than real. Jack Citrin, for example, posits that the longitudinal decline in American trust in government may merely reflect a change in fashion and social norms, making expressions of political dissatisfaction more socially acceptable (if not socially expected).[9] Citrin then suggests that because political dissatisfaction has largely become a "ritualistic expression of fashionable cliches," such indicators now have only minor relevance for the actual operation of contemporary political systems.

While the link between attitudes and behavior is always tenuous, our data and the work of other researchers provide evidence of the continuing political relevance of popular expressions of political dissatisfaction. A 1976 survey of the European Communities found that our indicator of political dissatisfaction is linked to support for radical change of society.[10] Similarly, Barnes, Farah and Heunks have recently shown that policy dissatisfaction increases the likelihood of supporting elite-challenging forms of political behavior.[11] As one additional piece of evidence, dissatisfied citizens also tend to support opposition parties of both the Left and Right, in France and Italy they are especially concentrated in the Communist party ranks.

Thus, the preceeding evidence argues that political dissatisfaction can lead to pressure on political incumbents, act as a stimulus for social change, and be a relevant force in contemporary political systems. Our goal in this chapter and the following chapter will be to determine to what extent these feelings of political dissatisfaction are the logical extension of personal dissatisfaction. Do European

publics see politics as responsible for their situation in life, narrowly basing their evaluations of the political system on criteria of self-interest? More important, what fators contribute to the political mobilization of dissatisfaction, strengthening or weakening this linkage between the personal and political worlds?

Admittedly there are many possible source of political dissatisfaction besides personal dissatisfaction. But the central role this relationship has served in theories of social unrest makes this an important linkage to explore. In the remainder of this chapter we will lay out the theoretical structure underlying this linkage. Then we will examine the theory and empirical evidence of the causal relationship between our three personal life domains -- economics, housing and leisure -- and satisfaction with the functioning of the political system.

Personal Dissatisfaction and the Political System

The relevance of personal dissatisfaction for political attitudes and behavior has frequently been incorporated into political theory and research. Yet despite a long history of social science research on this topic, much of our knowledge is fragmentary and much of the theory is implicit rather than explicitly stated. This has minimized the cumulative potential of research and increased the need for a single conceptual schema. Probably the most extensive and rigorous attempt to specify the relationship between personal and political satisfaction has been the work of Ted Robert Gurr. Gurr has approached the topic of political violence from the perspective of a political psychologist in writing Why Men Rebel.[12]

Gurr's theory of political violence is built upon the frustration-aggression theory.[13] Like frustration theory, feelings of relative deprivation have numerous outlets -- one of which is aggression or violence.[14] Simply stated, "deprivation induced discontent is a general spur to action. Psychological theory and group conflict theory both suggest that the greater the intensity of discontent, the more likely is violence."[15]

In developing his theory Gurr provides a fine summary of the literature on social unrest that is an accomplishment in itself. From these sources Gurr draws hypotheses of the specific causal processes linking relative deprivation and political violence -- intervening variables, moderating factors, and external influences on the process. The culmination of his research is the development of a causal model predicting civil strife for a sample of 114 nations, based on aggregate data for the period 1961-1965.

Measured by a variety of aggregate national statistics, Gurr finds that indicators of relative deprivation (personal dissatisfaction) are directly related to social unrest.[16] In linking dissatisfaction and protest Gurr proposes a specific causal model of social unrest. Relative deprivation is the initial stimulus, but there are important intervening and moderating variables that affect the strength of the causal link, e.g. system legitimacy, and the coercive power of the state. These analyses are best summarized by Gurr, with his noticeable stress on the causal ordering of variables rather than their "independent influence" in his multiple regression analyses,[17]

> The fundamental cause of civil strife is deprivation induced discontent...People's attitudes about the legitimacy of their political system and the justifiability of civil strife represent a second level of causation. The third level of causation comprises the structural characteristics of nations and their governments that facilitate or minimize violent response to discontent.

The Feierabends have also examined the causal connection between dissatisfaction and political violence using essentially the same theoretical framework as Gurr.[18] Their database is also national aggregate statistics, although from a slightly different set of nations and different timespan. They suggest an alternative operationalization of measures, and place slightly more emphasis on political factors (such as political coercion) over psychological factors (personal dissatisfaction) in explaining political violence. But in general, their reseach supports Gurr's conclusions, which is not surprising given the overlap in methodology and approach.

In reviewing the work of Gurr, the Feierabends and related research[19] the most glaring and often noted flaw is their reliance on aggregate data at the national level. This methodology opens the

door to several theoretical and empirical problems.

Most important, the use of aggregate statistics implies a considerable amount of homogeneity within a nation, so that a single figure can adequately represent the entire population and the general potential for political violence. In fact, it is more likely that the (unequal) distribution of resources and satisfaction within a society is a more accurate measure of the potential for violence than the population average. Small groups of extremely dissatisfied citizens are more likely to turn to political violence than are "average" citizens, and national statistics provide only the crudest approximation of the number and size of these dissatisfied minorities. Moreover, focusing on outlying groups is especially necessary if dissatisfaction is determined using the national norm as a reference standard. If this is the case, as some evidence suggests, it is primarily within-nation comparisons which define dissatisfaction, and not the objective characteristics of the nation as a whole.

Secondly, the causal processes under study are essentially psychological processes at the individual level, and aggregate data are extremely indirect indicators of these underlying concepts. Upon reflection it is difficult to have faith in "GNP per capita, caloric intake, telephones, physicians, newpapers, literacy and urbanization" as the measures of personal dissatisfaction. Indeed, the first half of this dissertation has attempted to show that the link between such objective conditions and subjective feelings of satisfaction is very tenuous, at best. Although Gurr, at least, is well aware of the problem, this does not mean it was resolved. Commenting on this general point, Muller concludes,[20]

> Developing an operational system based on macro indicators is not the most felicitous way to begin testing a theory conceptualized largely in terms of pyschological characteristics of individuals. Even if there were macro indicators that would permit reasonably valid inferences about the psychological variables presumed to affect political violence, tests based on such macro indicators would be most useful after the theoretical propositions had been subjected to intensive micro analysis, so that the dynamics of the behavior of individuals was thoroughly understood.

Only a few individual level studies have filled the void that Muller refers to, developing along the lines of Gurr's research and theory. Muller himself has introduced us to "revolutionary" behavior in Waterloo, Iowa in several articles.[21] Other studies have focused on the attitudinal correlates of a specific form of social unrest -- the ghetto riots of the 1960's or student protests.[22]

Muller's work is closest to Gurr's approach, although his conclusions differ substantially. Muller uses scores on Cantril's self-anchoring ladder to measure personal dissatisfaction (or deprivation) with several life domains. This variable is combined with indicators of the "efficacy of past violence" and "trust in political authorities" in multiple regression analyses predicting protest potential. Muller finds that dissatisfaction does not account for much variation in protest potential once the other two measures are taken into account. This leads Muller to stress the intervening variables over personal dissatisfaction as the primary determinants of social unrest.[23]

While Muller's research responds to the macro/micro level criticism of Gurr's work, many larger questions are not resolved. There is a sharp contrast between the richness and complexity of Why Men Rebel and the spartan simplicity of Muller's essentially three-variable model. In part, Muller is limited from examining environmental

factors and institutional influences because his data are only from one city.[24] Muller is therefore unable to measure some of the most interesting variables in Gurr's analyses -- coercive potential, structural facilitation, and institutionalization. However, the absence of other variables reflects the discretion of the researcher.

More problematic, there appears to be some inconsistency in how Muller and Gurr conceptualize the causal structure linking relative deprivation and political violence. Gurr considers relative deprivation as an initial cause of social unrest, but he also describes numerous variables which are expected to intervene between personal dissatisfaction and social unrest. In considering several alternative models, Muller's comments suggest some uncertainty about this causal structure. Consequently he hypothesizes that personal dissatisfaction must be directly linked to political violence if the relative deprivation theory is accurate. When his regression analyses find that intervening variables do indeed intervene between personal dissatisfaction and protest potential, he apparently feels that these findings challenge the relative deprivation theory.

This loose fit between theory and data does not apply only to Muller. The Feierabends and even Gurr do not always follow their theoretical pronouncements in performing empirical tests. Gurr also tends to focus on a direct link between dissatisfaction and violence as the test of his theory.[25]

In Chapter 2 we presented the causal process linking objective conditions and political violence. The following figure briefly reiterates the theoretical model of the chapter and may serve to

still clarify several points about the process under study, Figure 6-2:

FIGURE 6-2

From Objective Conditions to Protest Activity



Objective conditions and aspirations/expectations are compared to determine feelings of (dis)satisfaction (or relative deprivation). Then, the primary sequence leading to political violence is first the politicization of that dissatisfaction, second, the development of attitudinal support to protest; and finally its manifestation in violent behavior against political objects and actors.

Several empirical points can be drawn from the above model. First, the ordering of variables in this causal chain suggests that the zero-order relationship between objective conditions and political violence should be fairly weak. Even if each arrow in the the above figure represented a hefty .50 correlation, the predicted correlation between objective conditions and political violence would only equal .06 (.50 x .50 x .50 x .50). Similarly, we should only expect a moderate zero-order relationship between personal dissatisfaction and protest potential (e.g., .50 x .50 = .25). Thus the best perspective for viewing personal dissatisfaction is to consider it as a reservoir from which political dissatisfaction can be mobilized, but

not by itself a sufficient precondition. In causal terms, personal dissatisfaction measures the patterns of social dissatisfaction before political aggregation occurs.

Secondly, this model predicts that controlling for an intervening variable should largely remove the correlation between two variables in the chain. Thus, in multiple regression analyses like those performed by Muller and Gurr, we should expect personal dissatisfaction (relative deprivation) to have little direct impact on protest potential or political violence if we also control for political dissatisfaction. Such findings are, in fact, consistent with the relative deprivation theory presented by Gurr and outlined above. Yet, Muller has suggested that his results challenge Gurr's hypotheses.

Finally, Gurr discusses several other variables as affecting the likelihood of social unrest. These other variables act as extraneous influences, moderating factors, and intervening variables in the causal chain we have outlined. The societal variables discussed above are one example of this sort of variable. Gurr generally discusses these measures as affecting the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence without being more specific on where and how these variables are integrated with other elements of the theory. For example, are feelings of political efficacy more important in determining political violence, or in politicizing dissatisfaction? What this specific causal model points out is a need for an even more detailed explication of the concepts involved and their interrelationship in leading to social unrest.

The preceeding chapters of this dissertation focused on the first step of this total causal process: predicting personal dissatisfaction. Thoroughout the rest of this research we will examine the second step: the politicization of personal dissatisfaction. The remainder of this chapter will measure the relative weight of our three personal life domains -- income, housing and leisure -- in determining satisfaction with the functioning of the political system, and assess their combined impact in determining political dissatisfaction.

Our data are fairly rich in the variety of variables that can be examined as predictors of political dissatisfaction, or as moderating factors in the process of politicizing discontent. More extensive analysis possibilities in a variety of cultural contexts and with more elaborate controls may provide convincing tests of Gurr's model at the micro level, and expand upon our knowledge of this process. Therefore, our emphasis will be on the link between personal and political dissatisfaction within Western European societies.

Measuring the Causal Link: Personal and Political Dissatisfaction

European governments have a deep involvement in many sectors of society. Although greatest in the economic arena, the impact of government policy is felt in varying degrees in other life domains. Political elites set housing policy and make economic decisions which affect housing. Even in the leisure domain, government support for cultural programs, recreational facilities, and even control of the electronic media affects the quality of people's lives.

Past empirical and theoretical research linking personal and political dissatisfaction seldom differentiates between the various domains of life. Moreover, underlying most of this research is the implicit assumption that economic dissatisfaction is the primary, if not sole, personal life domain which might lead to political dissatisfaction. For example, Gurr's indicators of relative deprivation are primarily economic, and even Muller's four survey items are drawn from the economic or social status domains. Similarly, Strumpel, and Miller, develop models of political evaluations including only the economic domain.[26]

A priori there is a strong basis for assuming political dissatisfaction will primarily reflect economic dissatisfaction. The Marxian theory underlying this assumption has been an integral part of social science. We have also seen in Chapter 4 that Europeans are less satisfied with their economic situation than with other life domains. Even more important, European party systems have been built around economic conflicts. Thus the electoral competition between parties on economic issues increases the ease of relating economic dissatisfaction to political choices. That is, the economic domain is an area where the politicization of dissatisfaction is a likely occurrence.

But the assumed importance of economic well-being has not been tested, and Inglehart's work on the changing value priorities of post-industrial societies suggests that at least some segments of European society may place greater stress on non-materialist aspects of the quality of life.[27] Although we will not pursue this topic in great detail in the present chapter, we will measure the relative

weight of each of the three life domains among European publics.

Table 6-1 presents the results of regressing political satisfaction on our three personal life domains for the 1973 and 1975 European samples. In both years income satisfaction is the strongest determinant of political satisfaction, substantiating earlier emphasis on economic models of system support. The unstandardized regression coefficient for income in 1973 is .13, which increases slightly to .16 in the 1975 survey.[28] Housing satisfaction, on the other hand, is virtually unrelated to political satisfaction, even though several European governments are seriously involved in the housing market.

The most interesting and puzzling finding in Table 6-1 involves the relationship between leisure satisfaction and evaluations of the functioning of democracy. We expected leisure satisfaction to be the least politicized of the three personal life domains, since government involvement is minimal. Yet, in both surveys leisure satisfaction is a significant (though modest) determinant of political satisfaction.

These findings for the leisure domain are very counter-intuitive. Perhaps the explanation lies in the diffuse nature of the leisure domain. Income and housing satisfaction refer to very clear and specific objects of evaluation, while leisure satisfaction is more abstract. Indeed, Campbell, et. al. noted that Americans interpreted this domain as a residual category, covering the range of life experiences not tapped by other domains, i.e. the "non work" part of life.[29] If this is the case then leisure satisfaction may be a surrogate for other factors with a more obvious political referent.

TABLE 6-1

EUROPEAN REGRESSION ANALYSES OF POLITICAL SATISFACTION

	1973	1975
Income	.13	.16
Housing	.08	.05
Leisure	.07	.11
R	.20	.26
(N)	(12003)	(8490)

Entries for the life domains are unstandardized regression coefficients.

We noted that Inglehart has suggest that political conflict may be shifting toward non-materialist and social issues separate from the materialist concerns of the economic and housing domains.[30] These issues may find expression through the leisure items in our survey since a more direct indicator is not available. For the moment let us postpone this discussion until the next chapter.

The second question confronting us in this section is to measure the total extent to which European feelings of political satisfaction are based on personal life situations. What is the combined impact of all three life domains? The Multiple Correlations (R) in Table 6-1 measure the total impact of income, housing and leisure satisfaction on political satisfaction. These coefficients show only a modest impact of personal satisfaction on political evaluations (1973, R=.20; 1975, R=.26). Although these relationships are not as strong as we might have anticipated, by comparison they are stronger than the relationship between political satisfaction and support for the incumbent party.[31]

The relationship between personal and political satisfaction is the crucial link in the causal chain we are examining. To fully examine this relationship and to justify the use of the single European sample we also conducted separate nation-by-nation analyses, Table 6-2. The specific regression coefficients vary from nation to nation, although the ranking of life domains is generally similar to the total European pattern. Economic satisfaction is the primary determinant of political evaluations for most nationalities, and housing satisfaction again has only minor relevance to politics. While leisure satisfaction is often an important determinant of

TABLE 6-2

NATIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSES OF POLITICAL SATISFACTION

	France	Belgium	Britain	Ireland	Germany	Denmark	Italy	Holland
1973 Regressions								
Income	.158	.139	.159	.138	.116	.128	.059	.029
Housing	.111	.050	.102	.085	.020	.083	.061	.073
Leisure	.091	.128	.103	.008	.095	.055	.088	.039
R	.275	.241	.254	.183	.184	.166	.165	.099
(N)	(1826)	(1129)	(1865)	(1140)	(1880)	(1140)	(1793)	(1230)
1975 Regressions								
Income	.229	.189	.143	.183	.132	.129	.060	.096
Housing	.104	.057	.107	.048	.043	.045	.022	.085
Leisure	.043	.112	.076	.177	.165	.084	.135	.150
R	.311	.297	.283	.309	.294	.227	.201	.255
(N)	(937)	(1475)	(985)	(997)	(1034)	(1015)	(1043)	(1004)

The causal weight of each life domain is represented by the unstandardized regression coefficient.

political satisfaction, its impact appears greatest in three nations: Germany, Belgium and Italy. In both the 1973 and 1975 surveys leisure satisfaction has a more noticeable impact on political evaluations in these nations. Closer inspection of the full correlation matrix suggests that the Italian results artificially inflate the importance of the leisure domain.[32] The German and Belgian deviations, however, remain to be explained when the meaning of leisure satisfaction can be more precisely identified.

The Multiple Correlations in Table 6-2 also show a significant relationship between personal and political satisfaction in nearly every survey, yielding correlations in the .20-.30 range. In addition to basing our assessment of the personal-political link on a single item from each domain, we also constructed scales using multiple items from each domain.[33] This approach sacrifices the comparability between our timepoints (since different lists of items were used) in order to maximize the correlation between personal and political satisfaction. In this second model these three scales (excluding the policy items in 1973) were included in regression analyses predicting socio-political satisfaction. The resulting Multiple Correlations show a noticeable increase in the strength of this relationship, Table 6-3. The more sensitive 11-point scale used in the 1975 study now yields correlations in the .35-.45 range. Thus, to a substantial degree, Europeans see a connection between their own life situation and their satisfaction with the political system.

Besides the mere presence of this personal-political relationship, variation in the strength of these correlations might also shed some light on those nation-level characteristics which affect the politi-

TABLE 6-3

CORRELATION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND POLITICAL SATISFACTION
(ALL PERSONAL SATISFACTION ITEMS)

	1973	1975
France	.34	.39
Belgium	.28	.42
Holland	.19	.39
Germany	.24	.45
Italy	.22	.26
Denmark	.21	.32
Ireland	.23	.43
Britain	.27	.29

Entries are Multiple Correlation Coefficients (R) between personal satisfaction items and political satisfaction.

cization of dissatisfaction. Gurr argues that structural characteristics of nations and their governments can facilitate or minimize the likelihood of political violence.[34] Such factors may also affect the politicization of dissatisfaction. For example, popular feelings of the legitimacy of the system, or a powerful state coercive force may discourage political violence; and similarly discourage the preceding step of politicizing personal dissatisfaction. Other aspects of the social and political infrastructure may also encourage political violence, and strengthen the politicization process. These hypothsized cross-national influences on the politicization process would show up as systematic differences in the strength of the correlation between personal and political satisfaction across nations.

While the relatively narrow range of correlations between nations does not leave much variation to explain, a few brief examples may provide a preview of the research questions addressed in the next chapter.

In Chapter 2 we noted that the likelihood of political violence is affected by the presence of active support for an ideology condoning and encouraging this behavior.[35] We might also expect such ideological and group support to channel personal dissatisfaction toward the political arena. That the activities and stimulus of a vocal and ideologically motivated stratum have often served to mobilize dissatisfaction is an often proven fact. A frequent operationalization of this concept has been the number of Communist Party supporters in the nation. However, using this indicator the data fail to support the hypothesis. Of the two nations with the largest Communist

parties -- France and Italy -- the French public strongly links their personal satisfaction to political satisfaction, while Italians see a significantly weaker link between the personal and political worlds. A broader definition of this ideological concept based on national political cultures produces equally inconclusive findings. France and Britain are often described as antithetical political cultures: the French revolutionary tendance versus British traditionalism. Still, both nations are very similar in the extent to which dissatisfaction is politicized. Thus, within Europe these broad differences in ideology and political culture are apparently not prime determinants of international differences in the politicization of dissatisfaction. In the following chapter we will reconsider the role of ideology as a micro-level influence on the politicization process.

We have also explored other system-level characteristics suggested by Gurr as affecting the relationship between relative deprivation and protest activity with generally similar negative findings.[36] The effects of most systemic variables on these individual-level relationships is weak or inconsistent between the 1973 and 1975 surveys. These analyses lead us to several conclusions about the politicization process in Western Europe. First, Western European societies are fairly homogeneous on each of these dimensions when compared to the variation among Gurr's sample of 114 nations, or even Cantril's cross-national surveys.[37] Therefore, our non-supportive findings do not directly challenge the conclusions Gurr derives from his more differentiated sample. Still, none of these broad theoretical dimensions provides an explanation for the European variation in the

strength of the politicization process. Rather, variations between nations are likely affected in modest degree by all of these factors, which makes any single and simple explanation difficult. In addition, these between-nation differences also reflect idiosyncratic aspects of each nation -- the recent actions of political elites, general levels of political interest, and even the methodological sophistication of the polling organization in each nation (affecting the amount of error in the data and hence the amount of explainable variance).

However, influences which do not appear significant at the macro-level may still prove important at the micro-level. For example, the size of the Communist party may not affect the politicization of dissatisfaction for the nation as a whole, but Communist party supporters may perceive a stronger link between their personal situation and political evaluations. We have only touched on these moderating variables in this chapter. The analyses in the following chapter will be directed to examining the micro-level factors affecting the politicization process in greater detail.

Concluding Comments

A considerable body of theory and research has developed around the hypothesis linking relative deprivation and political violence. In part, this has represented an attempt to rationalize and explain political violence. That is, viewing social unrest as a final outlet for unanswered demands and unfulfilled needs. From this perspective social unrest is an extreme form of public participation in politics -- masses demanding political representation. A strong relationship between personal dissatisfaction and political violence might therefore be seen as a positive sign of grievences being redressed.

Evidence on the link between relative deprivation and political violence is mixed. Group violence may not be primarily attributed to feelings of dissatisfaction and relative deprivation. The structure of political institutions, the interrelationship between political groups, or the catalyst of a random event may be the final determinant of social unrest. Indeed, Curr himself stresses the importance of "structural facilitation."[38] In addition, the conceptual structure we have proposed argues that relative deprivation is far back in the causal chain from social unrest, and is not likely to have a significant direct impact on political violence. Thus feelings of dissatisfaction with the quality of life probably contribute to the likelihood of social unrest, but are not sufficient conditions for stimulating protest.

Personal dissatisfaction may, however, have a direct impact on political dissatisfaction. These attitudes occupy adjacent positions in the conceptual structure we have proposed. Moreover, this

attitude-to-attitude link is not likely to be as affected by structural factors as is the attitude-to-behavior linkage leading to political violence. Indeed, the evidence of this chapter documents a clear relationship between personal and political satisfaction for European publics. And in contrast to the End of Ideology literature, economic dissatisfaction remains the primary influence on political satisfaction among the personal life domains we examined.

These findings partially validate the relative deprivation hypothesis, at least insofar as political dissatisfaction is concerned. However, the significance of these findings goes beyond the relative deprivation hypothesis to the more basic question of how evaluations of the political system are determined. Easton's work on system support stresses the distinction between specific and diffuse support of the poltical system.[39] Specific support refers to a situation where citizens evaluate the system in terms of the gratification of demands or the outputs generated by the system. Diffuse support implies a generalized commitment to the system drawn from early learning, traditions, or a longer-range view of system performance. Easton argues that political systems based on specific support are inherently instable. No political system can continually perform smoothly and efficiently, at some point at least temporary reversal is inevitable. Without a reservoir of diffuse support to drawn upon, even momentary reversals could lead to crises of confidence.

Almond and Verba have presented essentially the same argument in describing the Civic Culture.[40] They posit that a primarily output orientation continually threatens the survival of a system.

The collapse of Weimar, for example, was tied to its failure to meet the expectation of the German public, and the success of the Bonn Republic rests precariously upon the continuation of the Wirtschaftswunder.[41] In contrast, Almond and Verba saw the United States and Britain as able to endure greater demands upon the political system because both societies had developed a reservoir of diffuse political support.

A strong relationship between personal and political satisfaction therefore suggests that evaluations of the functioning of democracy are heavily based on specific support. Some evidence suggests that perceptions of government responsibility for social affairs are becoming more commonplace among Western publics.[42] The magnitude of the relationship between personal and political satisfaction, when coupled with the increasing economic problems of recent years may also explain the rise of legitimacy crises within Europe. Moreover, as the politicization of personal dissatisfaction continues to grow with the enlarged social role of contemporary governments, this condition may worsen. So, while our findings tend to confirm the relative deprivation hypothesis, this conclusion suggests negative implications for the future of European political systems.

Footnotes to Chapter 6

[1] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).

[2] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)

[3] Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (Eds.), The Matrix of Political Action (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Forthcoming)

[4] Arthur Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government," American Political Science Review,68 (Sept., 1974); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (Eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Forthcoming).

[5] Ronald Inglehart, "Political Dissatisfaction and Mass Support for Social Change in Advanced Industrial Societies," Comparative Political Studies, 9 (Oct. 1977); Juergen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (New York: Beacon Press, 1975)

[6] Gerald Rusk and Olle Borre, "The Changing Party Space in Danish Voter Perceptions, 1971-1973," in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie (Eds.), Party Identification and Beyond (New York: Wiley, 1976).

[7] Howard Penniman (Ed.), Italy at the Polls (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, Forthcoming); Donald Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (Eds.), Communism in Italy and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)

[8] Almond and Verba, Civic Culture; Almond and Verba (Eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited.

[9] Jack Citrin, "The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," American Political Science Review, 68 (Sept., 1974).

[10] Inglehart, "Political Dissatisfaction."

[11] Samuel Barnes, Barbara Farah and Felix Heunks, "Political Dissatisfaction and Political Action," in Barnes and Kaase (Eds.), Matrix of Political Action; Edward Muller, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support," American Political Science Review, 71 (June 1977).

[12] Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

[13] Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

[14] Leonard Berkowitz, "The Concept of Aggressive Drive," in Leonard Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. II (N.Y.: Academic Press, 1965).

[15] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pg. 13.

[16] Gurr actually predicts three different forms of social unrest: turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war. We will speak of his findings in a general sense, but largely implying his findings for turmoil. Turmoil was defined as "largely spontaneous strife such as riots and demonstrations."

[17] Ted Gurr, "A Comparative Survey of Civil Strife," in Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr (eds.), Violence in America (NY: Signet, 1969), pg. 620.

[18] Ivo Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend, and Betty Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," in Graham and Gurr (eds.), Violence; Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior Within Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (Sept. 1969).

[19] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, 27 (Feb., 1962; James C. Davies, "The J-curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction," in Graham and Gurr (Eds.) Violence in America.

[20] Edward Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, 66 (Sept. 1972), pg. 929

[21] Ibid.; Bernard Grofmann and Edward Muller, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, 67 (June 1973).

[22] Don Bowen, et. al., "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation toward Protest of the Urban Poor," in Louis Massotti and Don Bowen (Eds.), Riots and Rebellion (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1968); Joel Aberback and Jack Walker, Race in the City (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); S.M. Lipset and Phillip Altbach (eds.), Students in Revolt (Boston: Houghton, 1969).

[23] Muller, "A Partial Test."

[24] Muller has, however, taken steps to redress this problem in his most recent research, Edward Muller, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support," American Political Science Review, 71 (June 1977).

[25] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, esp. pp. 63-66, 317-359.

[26] Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Deprivation and Societal Discontent," in Strumpel (ed.), Economic Means for Human Needs; Arthur Miller, "Change in Political Trust: Discontent with Authorities and Economic Policies," (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, undated); Muller, "Theory of Political Violence."

[27] Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), Chapters 5-6.

[28] This increase in relationships may reflect the heightened economic concerns following the post-OPEC recession. Alternatively, we have consistently found stronger relationships using the 1975 satisfaction items and this may reflect changes in instrumentation between surveys, with the 11-point scales being more sensitive indicators.

[29] Campbell, et. al., Quality of American Life.

[30] Inglehart, Silent Revolution; Inglehart, "Political Dissatisfaction."

[31] In 1973 voting support for the incumbent party was correlated at .17 with political satisfaction; in 1975 the correlation was .16.

[32] We found that in the economic cluster, income satisfaction displayed the weakest relationship with political satisfaction while it was generally the strongest correlate in other nations. Conversely, our choice of one item from the leisure domain evidenced this same problem in reverse. Thus, a more accurate description of the relative weight of the economic and leisure domains in Italy (rather than just these two items) would present a pattern much like the other nations.

[33] Based on the dimensional analyses presented in Chapter 3, we computed the mean scores for all items falling within a life domain. For example, economic satisfaction in 1975 was based on the income, job, and standard of living items. The dependent variable in both years combines satisfaction with the political system and satisfaction with society.

[34] In fact, Gurr labels such factor "structural facilitation" and finds this variable is his strongest predictor of civil strife; Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

[35] Ibid., Chapter 7.

[36] We analyzed the correlations presented in Table 6-3 to determine whether variations in the strength of these relationships were affected by the political variables in Gurr's macro-level model of civil strife: Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," in Ivo Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Anger, Violence, and Politics (New York: Prentice Hall, 1972).

The following table shows that four of these factors do not yield consistent results in the two years, with correlationshshifting from weak positive to weak negative. System legitimacy and coercive potential consistently weaken the personal-political linkage. However, even for these two latter factors the effects are not statistically significant at the .10 level.

	Legitimacy	Coercive Potential	Size Coer Force	Institu- tionaliz.	Past Strife	Struct. Facil.
1973	-.32	-.38	.22	-.30	.47	.48
1975	-.41	-.38	-.66	.37	-.16	-.22

Entries are Pearson correlations, N=8.

[37] Gurr, Why Men Rebel; Hadley Cantril, Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

[38] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Chapter 9.

[39] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).

[40] Almond and Verba, Civic Culture.

[41] Ibid.; Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[42] Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Deprivation and Societal Discontent;" M. Kent Jennings, et. al., "Generations and Families," in Barnes and Kaase (eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

CHAPTER 7

THE POLITICIZATION OF PERSONAL DISSATISFACTION

We have seen in Chapter 6 that Europeans evaluate the functioning of European political systems at least partially in terms of their own life situations. If they are satisfied with their housing, leisure, and especially income, then they are also likely to be relatively more satisfied with the political system. In this chapter we want to maintain our focus on the relationship between personal and political satisfaction, extending the analyses of the last chapter in several directions.

One theme of interest is to delve more deeply into the process leading to the politicization of personal dissatisfaction. What are the attitudinal and environmental factors that strengthen or weaken this process? In statistical terms we are looking for interaction variables which affect the strength of the personal-political link. We will refer to variations in the strength of this relationship as the process of politicizing personal dissatisfaction. Understanding this politicization process aids in determining the political significance of perceptions of the quality of life -- to know when personal dissatisfaction has political relevance and when even widespread discontent does not impinge upon the political system.

This chapter will examine the impact of several attitudinal factors on the politicization process. For example, we would expect that Europeans who are interested in politics or who display high levels of political cognition would see a closer relationship between their personal situation and the political system.[1] For this group the complex world of politics is salient and understandable. At the other extreme, the politically unsophisticated may be uncertain how the distant world of politics is relevant to everyday life. Similarly, perceptions of the responsiveness of government, or other attitudinal dispositions might act to strengthen or weaken the politicization process.

Another set of possible interaction variables reflects environmental or institutional factors. For example, Gurr posits that the presence of an anti-system party (generally Communist) or an organization which emphasizes the political system's responsibility for social and personal conditions should stimulate the politicization of dissatisfaction.[2] The objective conditions of the environment may also affect the urgency of personal needs, and therefore the likelihood of politicization.[3] While Chapter 6 has suggested that these factors are not of clear importance at the macro level, there are micro-level analogs that will be considered in this chapter.

One limitation of past research is that little attention has been devoted to these interaction effects. Attitudinal and environmental factors are seldom considered within the causal approach we have suggested. When these factors are considered, they are generally used as direct predictors -- not interaction variables -- and as predictors of social unrest. In actuality, these attitudinal

and environmental factors may affect the politicization of personal dissatisfaction, the decision to actually participate in violent political activity, or any of the intervening links of the causal chain. Previous research has not determined where these factors have maximal impact on the causal chain. Moreover, the theoretical rationale for examining these variables is usually phrased in terms of interaction effects, and not as direct effects.[4] Our analyses will therefore focus on variables which actually interact with the process of politicizing personal dissatisfaction.

In addition to determining the total impact of personal satisfaction on political evaluations, these analyses will also examine the relative importance of life domains in predicting political satisfaction. For example, the indigent may see their economic situation as the overriding concern when evaluating the political system, while with increasing affluence other factors such as housing and leisure are given greater weight. Previous research has seldom ventured beyond the economic domain so that evidence on the shifting basis of politicized dissatisfaction is a rare commodity.[5]

In sum, the analyses of this chapter will determine the influence of attitudinal and environmental factors on both the <u>total impact</u> of personal satisfaction on evaluations of the political system, and on the <u>relative importance</u> of our three personal life domains.

Finally, it is important to at least briefly comment upon a set of analyses that will not be undertaken. At this point in the research it might seem a natural extension of the preceding chapters to examine additional predictors of political dissatisfaction, placing personal dissatisfaction within this larger frame of reference.

We have not pursued this course for several reasons. Most important, there are outstanding questions on how personal dissatisfaction becomes politicized that would remain unanswered if we widened our analyses to include other predictors. Secondly, while several relevant predictors of political dissatisfaction are available in the European surveys (e.g., Left/Right ideology and political efficacy), other essential elements of a complete model are not available.[6] Therefore, it seems unwise to pursue a path when we know the entire distance cannot be covered, and when an equally important route remains unexplored.

Preliminary analyses for this chapter examined a long list of variables with potential relevance to the politicization process. A subset of analyses which highlight specific theoretical issues or substantive findings are included in this chapter. All of these analyses are based upon the total European sample rather than nation-by-nation analyses. Preceding chapters have steadily accumulated evidence to provide subtantial empirical justification for pooled analyses when examining the satisfaction process within Europe. In addition, the modest relationships between personal and political satisfaction items require large sample sizes in order to confidently compare regression coefficients across population subgroups. In a few critical instances we have replicated and cited analyses at the national level to verify our European-based conclusions. Our primary attention, however, will be directed toward the basic aspects of the politicization process which transcend national boundaries.

Affluence and the Politicization Process

To individuals who are in a severe condition of deprivation, personal dissatisfaction must weigh heavily on other attitudes and behaviors. Chapter 6 also suggested that Western publics are increasingly likely to perceive the government as at least partially responsible for redressing their personal problems. If both of these factors are combined, then we should expect objective deprivation to strengthen the politicization of personal dissatisfaction. That is, when personal problems are intensely felt, Europeans may turn to the political system for assistance in dealing with these problems.

This premise is a common element of the theory and research that has been devoted to this issue. For example, Marxist teaching posits that the exploited classes identify the political system as an instrument the bourgeoisie uses in oppressing the working class. Consequently, workers are supposed to see a very direct link between personal dissatisfaction and political evaluations. In a recent empirical test of this hypothesis, Strumpel shows that the link between economic satisfaction and political satisfaction is indeed stronger among the economically disadvantaged.[7] Strumpel argues that individuals in marginal economic positions are more likely to evaluate the political system in terms of their own situation because their economic problems are so pressing and because their attention is turned toward government action. For more affluent citizens, on the other hand, economic concerns are less dire; their basis of political evaluations may consequently shift to non-economic life domains, or become more diffuse and independent

of personal well-being.

Using satisfaction measures from several life domains we can go beyond Strumpel's exclusively economic model to examine the impact of objective deprivation -- measured by family income -- on the politicization process. It seems obvious to expect a strong relationship between economic and political satisfaction for the economically deprived. It is less clear how this relationship may differ for Europeans near the top of the economic ladder. Do other life domains increase in importance for the more affluent Europeans, or does the total impact of personal satisfaction decrease?

Respondents from the several national samples were first combined into a single "European" sample at each timepoint. This sample was then stratified by family income, and within each stratum we regressed political satisfaction on measures of income, housing, and leisure satisfaction.[8] Comparing the unstandardized regression coefficients for each life domain across strata will determine whether income groups differ in the weight they give to each domain in evaluating the functioning of the political system. Differences in the Multiple Correlations (R) will tell us whether income level is systematically related to a stronger or weaker link between personal satisfaction as a whole, and political satisfaction.

In both years we find that the lowest income group generally gives greater weight to income satisfaction in determining their evaluations of the functioning of democracy, Table 7-1. Similarly, housing satisfaction (to some extent another economic concern) is also stressed more heavily by lower income groups than by the more

TABLE 7-1

POLITICIZED DISSATISFACTION BY INCOME GROUP

1973	Low	2	3	4	5	High
Income	.16	.15	.13	.18	.13	.05
Housing	.13	.10	.07	.03	.05	-.03
Leisure	.10	.13	.11	.11	.09	.10
R	.32	.29	.24	.24	.21	.12
(N)	(1366)	(2839)	(2517)	(1652)	(884)	(688)

1975	Low	2	3	High
Income	.19	.15	.17	.16
Housing	.05	.05	.05	-.01
Leisure	.09	.11	.13	.08
R	.30	.26	.27	.20
(N)	(1966)	(1942)	(1818)	(1507)

affluent. In fact, housing satisfaction actually exerts a slight, though statistically insignificant, negative impact on political satisfaction for the highest income group in both the 1973 and 1975 surveys.

While the causal importance of income and housing satisfaction are understandably weaker among higher income groups, the weight of leisure satisfaction seems relatively unaffected by income level. The most and least affluent sectors of European society attach approximately the same importance to their leisure satisfaction in evaluating the political system.

In short, although the weight of economic factors decreases with increasing income level, there does not appear to be a concomitant increase in the importance of non-economic life domains such as leisure. The net result of this pattern is that the total relationship between personal and political satisfaction declines as a function of family income (or objective deprivation). In 1973, for example, the Multiple Correlation for the lowest income group is .32, while for the most affluent it is .12. Moreover, these findings cannot be explained as solely the result of not including other more relevant personal life domains in the analyses. Replicating these regressions with the full list of personal satisfaction items in the 1973 survey we observe the same interaction between family income and the personal-political relationship.[9] Thus, conditions of objective deprivation apparently increase the weight of personal well-being as a general basis of evaluating the political system.

It would be difficult to argue that the political attitudes of higher income groups are less firmly grounded than those of lower

income individuals. Higher income generally implies a higher educational level and consequently a deeper understanding of politics. Thus we suspect that while affluence apparently lessens the overall importance of one's personal situation -- especially economic concerns -- for political evaluations, other factors might fill this void. A likely possibility is that the political evaluations of higher income groups are based more on non-personal factors than on the personal life domains examined here. Affluence lessens the urgency (and likelihood) of personal economic dissatisfaction. Furthermore, higher social status generally promotes a broader world view, and a shift from a Gemeinschaft to a Gesellschaft orientation.[10] Indeed, the growth of political discontent within contemporary Western societies has increasingly been tied to social and political issues distinct from personal perceptions of the quality of life.[11]

To a limited extent we can test whether higher income groups give greater weight to non-personal bases of political evaluations, although our data are relatively thin in this area. The 1973 survey contains two measures of policy satisfaction which at least tangentially tap larger social concerns beyond the individual's own life experiences: satisfaction with social welfare benefits and satisfaction with the educational system. These two items were combined into a single index of policy satisfaction, and the same procedure was followed in combining the three personal life domains into a single measure.[12]

Table 7-2 presents the results of regressing political satisfaction on these indices of personal and policy satisfaction. Not

TABLE 7-2

POLITICIZED DISSATISFACTION BY INCOME GROUP
(Personal and Policy Satisfaction Indices)

1973	Low	2	3	4	5	High
Personal	.26	.26	.18	.19	.21	.12
Policy	.25	.26	.27	.27	.23	.12
R	.36	.36	.32	.31	.30	.16
(N)	(1515)	(2465)	(2442)	(1565)	(1357)	(770)

surprisingly, policy satisfaction has a substantial impact on political dissatisfaction. Among the lowest income group personal and policy satisfaction have approximately the same causal weight. However, the combined importance of the three personal life domains weakens when we examine higher income groups, while policy satisfaction maintains a fairly stable influence. The most affluent group deviates from this pattern with political satisfaction only weakly related to either personal or policy satisfaction. Several possible substantive and technical explanations of this anomaly were explored without resolving this finding.[13] It appears that for the most affluent sixth of the population a different process is involved in determining their evaluations of the political system.

With the exception of the most affluent stratum, higher income groups generally place slightly more weight on policy satisfaction than on personal satisfaction in evaluating the functioning of the political system. Consequently, the Multiple Correlations now display only a slight decline with increasing income level. Furthermore, in analyses not shown we separated policy satisfaction into its two component parts and repeated the regression analyses. These analyses not only show a declining weight of personal satisfaction with higher family income, but also a shift in policy emphasis away from the economic policy of welfare benefits to a greater stress on education among the higher income groups. Thus, these data provide evidence that higher income groups have equally structured attitudes determining their political satisfaction, although the basis of their evaluations is more likely to involve non-economic and non-personal factors such as policy satisfaction.

Overall, the findings in this section present a pessimistic picture for contemporary political systems. It is among those groups whose objective conditions would lead them to be personally dissatisfied (as we have seen in Chapter 5) that perceptions of the quality of life are most directly transferred to the political system.[14] Conversely, among higher income groups where feelings of personal well-being are more common, these feelings of personal satisfaction have significantly less impact on political evaluations. Instead, the more affluent members of European society place greater stress on socio-political issues in evaluating the functioning of democracy, and dissatisfaction is more common for socio-political issues than for personal life domains.[15] This imbalance would thus seem to place political systems at a continual disadvantage -- suffering criticism on personal life situations from the personally dissatisfied, but not gathering an equal amount of support from the personally satisfied.

Value Priorities and the Politicization Process

While the last section dealt with the impact of environmental factors on the politicization process, objective conditions can have an impact only by influencing attitudes -- what individuals value and find important in life. By directly measuring these values we should be able to more fully specify the nature of the politicization process and the manner in which environmental factors exert influence.

Research on relative deprivation and perceptions of the quality of life has often relied on a value typology to classify human needs.

Runciman distinguishes between three general sets of values which when not satisfied may lead to feelings of deprivation: economic, power, and status values.[16] Gurr constructs composite typology of values drawing on several sources.[17] He suggests that relative deprivation arises when value capabilities fall short of value expectations in one of three general areas: welfare, power, and interpersonal values. Abraham Maslow has not only proposed a list of human needs, but also suggests an intrinsic relationship between broad areas of need.[18] Maslow arranges values in a hierarchy: when initial physical needs are satisfied attention shifts to safety and order needs, when these safety needs are satisfied then social and self-actualizing needs emerge.

The Maslovian model was adopted by Campbell in his initial research on perceptions of the quality of life.[19] We have also chosen the Maslovian model to guide our research. First, the hierarchical ordering of values yields an analytical power to the theory missing from alternative approaches. Not only can we say that individuals value different things, we can also predict which values specific individuals are likely to hold, and the relationship between value needs.[20] Secondly, our findings in the last section seem consistent with the Maslovian model. Among lower income groups sustenance and safety needs are more important, and they consequently attach greater weight to economic domains in evaluating the political system. With increasing affluence economic needs become satiated, and economic concerns become less important to the individual. In place of these economic or materialist concerns, higher priority is given to non-materialist goals by affluent Europeans.

Inglehart has conducted extensive analyses of European value priorities and included in the 1973 study a measure of values based upon the Maslovian model. Respondents were asked to rank the importance of four political goals, and on the basis of their choices they were classified as favoring materialist needs of sustenance and security or post-materialist needs of free expression and self-actualization.[21]

Stratifying the European sample by this values index should determine whether personal value priorities alter the basis of political evaluations in a manner consistent with Maslovian theory. We would expect materialists to place greater weight on income and housing satisfaction in determining political satisfaction. On the other hand, it is more difficult to determine which domains represent post-materialist goals such as participation, self-expression, and a free choice of life styles. Previous research suggests that entire domains are neither intrinsically materialist nor post-materialist, i.e. both value groups evaluate the same domain on the basis of their own criteria.[22] However, from the available domains the leisure item appears to be the most likely candidate to fit within the post-materialist category. Thus, we expect income and housing satisfaction to be more closely linked to political satisfaction for materialists, while post-materialists should place relatively more stress on leisure satisfaction.

Table 7-3 presents the results of regressing our three personal life domains on political satisfaction while controlling for value priorities. Materialists actually place slightly greater

TABLE 7-3

POLITICIZED DISSATISFACTION BY VALUE PRIORITIES

1973	Materialist	Mixed	Post-Materialist
Income	.13	.15	.06
Housing	.08	.08	.06
Leisure	.07	.07	.10
R	.20	.23	.18
(N)	(8377)	(2606)	(1274)

stress on income satisfaction in evaluating the functioning of the political system. Post-materialists, on the other hand, are more likely to emphasize the leisure domain while attaching less importance to the economic domain. Because of the counter-trends between the two sets of concerns, the combined impact of all three personal items on political satisfaction is virtually identical for materialists (R=.20) as it is for post-materialists (R=.18).

Although these results generally conform to our theoretical expectations, the magnitude of these differences is quite modest. One explanation we have already put forward lies in the imprecision of classifying entire domains as exclusively materialist or post-materialist. Research has convincingly shown, for example, that an apparently materialist domain such as occupation is, in fact, perceived and evaluated quite differently by the two value groups.[23] This overlapping meaning tends to limit the possible contrast we can find between value groups when relating personal life domains to political satisfaction.

A more direct test of the importance of value priorities can possibly be drawn from an analysis of policy satisfaction in the 1973 survey. The policy domain contains two items which appear to clearly tap separate value concerns: the materialist item of satisfaction with social welfare benefits, and the post-materialist item of satisfaction with the education one's children receive. Regression analyses predicting political satisfaction with only these two policy item show a more obvious shift in the basis of political evaluations as a function of value priorities.[24] Materialists tend to slightly emphasize social welfare benefits (b=.17) over satisfaction with the educational system (b=.15).

Conversely, post-materialists stress satisfaction with the educational system (b=.24) ahead of satisfaction with welfare benefits (b=.14) as a basis of political evaluations. If the materialist/post-materialist meaning of personal satisfaction items could be as clearly identified as these two policy items, then we would expect the faint interaction between values and the politicization of personal satisfaction presented in Table 7-3 to become even more visible.

Thus, these data suggest that value priorities have an effect on the politicization of personal dissatisfaction. Materialists are more likely to stress personal and policy domains which represent economic concerns. In contrast, post-materialists apparently take their bearings from relatively abstract non-economic criteria (which are consequently more difficult to measure). The tentative evidence of this section supports the notion that post-materialists actually rely more on non-economic domains such as leisure satisfaction and evaluations of the education system in determining feelings of political satisfaction.

Left/Right Ideology and the Politicization Process

Another attitudinal dimension of potential relevance to the politicization process is Left/Right ideology. At least three distinct approaches to the concept of Left/Right ideology may have implications for the relationship between personal and political satisfaction.

First, one of the defining characteristics of a Leftist ideology has been the acceptance and even expectation that the political system is responsible for improving the lot of the individual citizen. Leftist parties in Europe have traditionally adopted an advocacy role, using government intervention to improve the conditions of their supporters. Communist practice, if not Marxist theory, saw the state as a vehicle for redressing unsatisfactory conditions.[25] This situation would predict that Leftists will exhibit a stronger correlation between perceptions of the quality of life and satisfaction with the political system. It is less clear how a Conservative ideology will affect the politicization process. European conservatives may either oppose government intervention in principle, or only because of its goals. In general, however, we can assume that a conservative ideology should lead to a relatively weaker correlation between personal and political satisfaction.

In addition to these attitudinal influences, the Left/Right continuum may also reflect the impact of institutional factors on the politicization process. Curr hypothesizes that Leftist, and especially Communist, parties provide a political infrastructure condoning and enoouraging the politicization of personal dissatisfaction.[26] The active stimulus of a vocal leadership exploits

the ideological predispositions of their followers and channels personal dissatisfaction toward the political arena. The actions of Leftist elites thus act to further politicize and mobilize the personal dissatisfaction of their supporters.

Combining attitudinal and institutional factors, this first theoretical approach would predict a linear decline in the correlation between personal and political satisfaction when we compare Leftists to Rightists.

A contrasting approach to ideology focuses not on Left/Right orientation, but treats ideology as an indicator of support for the incumbent government. The role of opposition parties -- Left or Right -- is to mobilize popular dissatisfaction in order to improve their own electoral chances.[27] Conversely, the strategy of governing parties is to disassociate themselves from popular dissatisfaction, much as European governments have recently attempted to deflect economic dissatisfaction resulting from the post-OPEC recession. This contrasting theoretical argument would lead us to predict that the effects of Left/Right ideology would vary from nation to nation. In nations where a Leftist government was in power the politicization of personal dissatisfaction should be strongest among Conservatives; in nations with Rightists governments the personal-political link should be stronger among the opposition Leftists.

A third approach to the study of ideology treats this variable as a cognitive indicator. Ideological extremism often implies a sharper and more intense perspective on politics, and may thereby lead ideologues to perceive a closer tie between personal satisfaction and evaluations of the political system. On the other

hand, moderate Centrists are frequently indifferent and uninformed about politics. It is therefore less likely that Centrists would generalize their personal dissatisfaction to political evaluations. Klingemann's research on the influence of ideological awareness on the interrelationships among political attitudes tends to support this hypothesis.[28] These ideological influences would appear in our data as a curvilinear pattern for the politicization process. The strength of the personal-political correlation should be strongest among ideologues (of both the Left and Right), while non-ideologues of the center should display a relatively weaker relationship between personal and political satisfaction.

Thus, several aspects of the Left/Right dimension may have relevance to the process of politicizing personal dissatisfaction. Our data can be used to decide between these several competing hypotheses.

Ideological position was measured in the 1973 survey by means of a 10-point Left/Right self-placement scale.[29] To ensure a sufficient sample size for each regression analysis this scale was used to divide the European sample into four groupings: Leftists, Center-Left, Center-Right, and Rightists. The Left/Right scale was not available in the 1975 study, so as an alternative we grouped respondents according to whether they supported a party of the Left, Right, or had another or no party preference.

Table 7-4 provides clear evidence of an interaction effect between Left/Right ideology and the politicization of personal dissatisfaction. In 1973, respondents on the far Left see a substantial correlation (R=.31) between their personal situation and the

TABLE 7- 4

POLITICIZED DISSATISFACTION BY LEFT/RIGHT ATTITUDE

1973	Extreme Left	Left	Right	Extreme Right
Income	.15	.10	.13	.11
Housing	.09	.11	.05	.07
Leisure	.14	.09	.09	.07
R	.31	.23	.21	.18
(N)	(2411)	(3230)	(2590)	(2210)

1975	Left	Other	Right
Income	.22	.19	.13
Housing	.08	.06	.06
Leisure	.17	.13	.13
R	.37	.30	.26
(N)	(2924)	(2814)	(3302)

functioning of the political system. On the far Right the relationship is significantly weaker (R=.18). Further analyses using all ten positions of the 1973 Left/Right scale also show a linear decline in the personal-political correlation without any evidence of a curvilinear rise among even the most extreme ideologues. This same general pattern is repeated in 1975 when we compare supporters of Left (R=.37) and Right (R=.26) parties.

To determine whether this pattern in the politicization process is due to Left/Right ideology or opposition/incumbent effect, we replicated these analyses within each nation. If the opposition/incumbency effect is the primary factor we would expect shifts in the polarity of the pattern between Leftist-ruled and Rightist-ruled governments. Even though the group sizes become rather small, these analyses display essentially the same Left/Right pattern with few exceptions.[30] In sum, these data suggest that the primary impact of ideology on the politicization process reflects Left/Right ideological orientation, with a Leftist ideology stimulating the politicization of personal dissatisfaction.

Table 7-4 also indicates that all three life domains contribute to the Left/Right differences in the overall personal-political relationship. Income, housing and leisure satisfaction are generally more weakly correlated with political satisfaction among conservatives than among Leftists. Left/Right ideology is thus a broad-based influence on the politicization process, and not closely tied to only economic issues as might be assumed.

These findings also imply an asymetric relationship between personal and political satisfaction. Chapter 5 has found that

European Leftists tend to express lower levels of personal satisfaction,[31] and we have found that this dissatisfaction is closely linked to criticisms of the functioning of the political system. Conservatives, on the other hand, are generally more satisfied with their personal life situation, but only weakly transfer this positive support to the political system. Because the dissatisfied sectors of European society are more likely to politicize their dissatisfaction, the stress and demands on the political system amplify the actual amount of dissatisfaction in society.

Political Efficacy and the Politicization Process

The politicization of personal dissatisfaction may also be influenced by expectations about the citizen's influence on the political system.[32] Individuals who believe the political system is responsive to their demands may evaluate the system in terms of whether their personal wants are satisfied. Conversely, those less sanguine about system responsiveness may be "turned-off" by politics and be less likely to politicize their dissatisfaction.

The belief that the individual can influence the government (political efficacy) and perceptions of system responsiveness have frequently been cited as correlates of political participation, including political protest and social unrest.[33] These attitudes also have a direct impact on political satisfaction and trust in government. However, attention has not been devoted to whether political efficacy affects the politicization of personal dissatisfaction.

TABLE 7-5

POLITICIZED DISSATISFACTION BY POLITICAL EFFICACY

1973	Change Nation	Cannot Change
Income	.13	.13
Housing	.09	.07
Leisure	.07	.06
R	.20	.20
(N)	(5315)	(5306)

1975	Change Nation	Cannot Change
Income	.17	.18
Housing	.08	.08
Leisure	.08	.12
R	.25	.30
(N)	(3143)	(4370)

Both the 1973 and 1975 surveys contain an indirect measure of perceived political efficacy. Respondents were asked if they felt they could bring about a change for the better if things were not going well in their country. Dividing the population according to whether they felt they could influence the state of the nation, we performed separate regression analyses for each group.

Table 7-5 finds that feelings of political efficacy apparently have little impact on the politicization process. Efficacious and non-efficacious citizens give virtually the same weight to each personal life domain in determining their satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. In addition, the total strength of the personal-political relationship is nearly indistinguishable between efficacy groups.

Thus, the politicization of personal dissatisfaction is not moderated or altered by perceptions that the political system will not respond to demands. The efficacious and non-efficacious are equally likely to evaluate the political system in terms of their perceptions of the quality of life. Past research suggests, however, that feelings of political efficacy increase the likelihood of political dissatisfaction leading to political violence.[34] In short, the interaction between political efficacy and our hypothesized causal chain of the satisfaction process apparently occurs after dissatisfaction has been politicized, as political dissatisfaction is being translated into political action.

Political Resources and the Politicization Process

In this last section we want to consider a cluster of attitudinal variables which measure the political resources and skills of individual citizens. That is, the ability to understand and interpret the complexities of politics, and actual involvement in politics.

One of the most basic indicators of cognitive skills and contextual political knowledge is formal education.[35] Higher education brings with it a large volume of political information and understanding necessary to grasp the complexities of contemporary politics. Indeed, many have argued that modern politics has become so complex that involvement "requires participants to possess unprecedented expertise."[36]

Greater political sophistication almost invariably leads to a more structured belief system, where attitudes towards political objects are more highly intercorrelated. Thus we would expect a stronger correlation between personal and political satisfaction among the highly educated, than among those Europeans with only minimal education. The evidence supporting this expectation is so strong that this proposition might almost be considered a social science "law."[37]

This hypothesized interaction between education and the politicization process also bears fundamental implications for the operation of political systems. Chapter 5 has shown that highly educated Europeans generally tend to be more satisfied with their personal life situation. A strong personal-political link for this educational stratum would translate this personal satisfaction

into positive support for the political system. Conversely, less educated Europeans are generally less satisfied with the quality of life. If personal dissatisfaction is only weakly politicized for this educational group, then this would decrease the demands placed upon the political system. In short, the hypothesized educational differences would accentuate the support generated for the political system while minimizing political demands resulting from personal dissatisfaction.

To examine this hypothesis we computed separate regression analyses for four education groups.[38] Table 7-6 quite convincingly refutes our expectation. Very little variation exists in the strength of the personal-political relationship between education groups. Moreover, existing differences suggest a weaker relationship for the highly educated. In 1973, for example, the Multiple R is .27 for respondents who quit school by age 15, while it is only .22 for college educated Europeans. Similarly, there are only minor differences in the relative weight of the three personal life domains between education groups.

We suspect this pattern reflects the conjoint influence of two forces. First, the cognitive dimension of education should strengthen the personal-political relationship among the highly educated. Second, the status dimension of education should weaken the relationship among the highly educated, just as we have found a weak relationship among high income groups. These countervailing forces appear relatively balanced, leading to only minor differences between education groups in the politicization of personal dissatisfaction.

TABLE 7-6

POLITICIZED DISSATISFACTION BY EDUCATION

1973	Low	2	3	High
Income	.14	.16	.17	.10
Housing	.06	.10	.09	.16
Leisure	.14	.08	.09	.05
R	.27	.26	.26	.22
(N)	(4979)	(1608)	(3163)	(1157)

1975	Low	2	3	High
Income	.18	.21	.24	.11
Housing	.06	.05	.03	.17
Leisure	.16	.14	.11	.16
R	.33	.30	.30	.31
(N)	(3690)	(1173)	(1745)	(1394)

In an attempt to separate the cognitive and status dimensions we sought a more direct measure of political cognitions which was not as closely tied to social status. From the several political interest variables in the European surveys we selected a question on the frequency of political discussion as our indicator. Our assumption is that individuals who frequently discuss politics will be more informed and involved in the political world, and be more likely to see politics as relevant to their lives. For this group a strong relationship should link perceptions of the quality of life and satisfaction with the functioning of the political system. At the other extreme, politics must be fairly remote for those Europeans who never discuss politics. Consequently, we do not expect the politically uninvolved to politicize their personal feelings of dissatisfaction.

Table 7-7 indicates that the politicization of personal dissatisfaction is virtually unaffected by general involvement and attention to politics. The 1973 results, for example, show essentially the same politicization of personal dissatisfaction among those frequently discussing politics (R=.26) as among those who never discuss politics (R=.27). In addition, each of the three personal life domains receives roughly equivalent weight across control groups.

Despite the evidence presented so far, we were hesitant to discount the potential importance of political cognition for the process of politicizing personal dissatisfaction. After all, empirical evidence that the politically sophisticated have a more highly structured political belief system is virtually overwhelming.

TABLE 7- 7

POLITICIZED DISSATISFACTION BY POLITICAL DISCUSSION

1973	Frequently	Occasionally	Never
Income	.13	.13	.14
Housing	.08	.08	.09
Leisure	.13	.09	.11
R	.26	.24	.27
(N)	(1932)	(5815)	(4217)

1975	Frequently	Occasionally	Never
Income	.17	.19	.17
Housing	.11	.04	.07
Leisure	.05	.11	.16
R	.25	.29	.32
(N)	(1545)	(3788)	(3116)

This hesitancy was fueled by the belief that we essentially faced an indicator problem -- if a sufficiently sensitive measure of political cognition were used, then the hypothesized interaction effects would be observed. As a final effort to assess the impact of the cognitive dimension we constructed a refined measure of political cognition developed by Inglehart and Klingemann.[39] This 7-point scale combines formal education and active opinion leadership, running from: 1) left school by age 15 and never discuss politics, to 7) university education and take an active role in influencing the political opinions of others.

Even stratifying the European population by this indicator of political cognition provides little evidence of a systematic interaction with the politicization process, Table 7-8. The combined impact of all three personal life domains is of about equal importance for the groups with the highest and lowest level of political sophistication. To emphasize this point, the high cognition group represents the uppermost 2-3% of the European population in terms of political sophistication, and even in this rarified atmosphere differences fail to emerge. Looking across both timepoints it is difficult to locate any systematic and consistent pattern in the strength of the personal-political link as a function of political cognition.

Thus, the political skills and resources tapped by the variables in this section are consistently, and surprisingly, without effect on the politicization of personal dissatisfaction. If political cognition has any impact, its effects are clearly outweighed by the opposing influence of social status.

TABLE 7-8

POLITICIZED DISSATISFACTION BY COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION

1973	Low	2	3	4	5	6	High
Income	.22	.16	.12	.11	.12	.11	.16
Housing	.05	.08	.09	.09	.07	.05	.18
Leisure	.07	.10	.08	.05	.08	.11	.11
R	.28	.25	.22	.18	.18	.19	.28
(N)	(1071)	(1920)	(2365)	(2726)	(2886)	(975)	(314)

1975	Low	2	3	4	5	6	High
Income	.14	.17	.21	.18	.21	.21	.00
Housing	.06	.01	.00	.03	.11	.08	.27
Leisure	.16	.09	.11	.11	.03	.09	.03
R	.30	.24	.28	.24	.28	.29	.28
(N)	(2025)	(1841)	(1704)	(1181)	(692)	(400)	(143)

Concluding Comments

Determining which factors affect the politicization of personal dissatisfaction provides some indication of the dynamics of the politicization process, and thereby the likelihood of personal dissatisfaction resulting in political violence. If the politicization process is stronger among Leftists or those interested in politics, then we might assume that periods marked by the population moving Left or increasing interest in politics may strengthen the politicization of dissatisfaction and increase the demands on the political system.

We have found, however, that cognitive measures such as political involvement, education and political efficacy have little impact on the politicization process. This finding is important because it implies a separation of the cognitive and evaluative dimensions of politics. High levels of political interest may have major implications for the likelihood of actual protest, but elite actions and events which merely increase the salience of politics will apparently not influence the level or sources of political satisfaction in terms of personal discontent. Although examples of intense political involvement spring to mind when we think of the politicization of personal dissatisfaction, these data suggest that this is not a necessary nor contributing factor. Thus, all else being equal, an increase in educational levels or an intensification of political involvement should not affect the personal bases of political satisfaction.

The factors that actually interact with the politicization process suggest it might be more appropriate to use the term

mobilization of dissatisfaction because of the role political elites can play in stimulating the politicization process. Elites do not have to involve the dissatisfied in politics in order to tap the reservoir of personal dissatisfaction and direct it towards the political system. Developing a Leftist ideological commitment is a strong stimulant to linking personal and political satisfaction. The politicization of personal dissatisfaction is consistently stronger among Leftists than among Centrists and especially Rightists. This finding confirms the importance Gurr and others place on ideological orientation affecting the likelihood of political discontent and civil strife.[40]

Objective conditions also appear to affect the politicization process. Within West European societies individuals in the lowest economic stratum are most likely to evaluate the political system in terms of their personal feelings of well-being. As objective conditions (and presumably personal satisfaction) improve, the link between personal and political satisfaction weakens. Thus, objective deprivation and the politicization of dissatisfaction appear to go hand in hand -- when deprivation is greater it is more likely to find a political outlet.[41]

These asymmetries in the politicization process apparently work to accentuate the personal demands placed upon the political system. Two groups of Europeans who are relatively less satisfied with their situation in life -- Leftists and lower income groups -- are more likely to politicize their dissatisfaction. On the other hand, Europeans who are generally more satisfied with the major aspects of life -- higher income groups, Centrists and

Rightists -- are less likely to transfer these positive feelings to evaluations of the functioning of democracy.

While this situation produces demands on the political system disproportionate to actual dissatisfaction in the population, it may serve to balance the two conflicting systemic goals discussed in the conclusion to Chapter 6.

First, political systems should be sensitive and responsive to citizen needs, and open to change. Because the personally dissatisfied politicize their dissatisfaction, the political system is more likely to be responsive to these needs. Demands by the Left and lower classes should serve as a stimulus for social change and concentrate political resources on areas of greatest demand. If perceptions of the quality of life were equally politicized by satisfied and dissatisfied groups, then the political system might not be as responsive and concerned about dealing with demands for change. That is, support from the satisfied sector of society would balance off the demands of the dissatisfied sector and produce a more accurate (and positive) perspective of public wants. This balanced image might therefore lessen the government's perception of a need for change. In addition, if affluent, but still dissatisfied, Europeans increased their personal demands upon the political system this would lessen the resources available for redistribution to lower income groups.

There is also a second systemic need for diffuse political support, relatively independent of immediate gratification of needs.[42] These data suggest that diffuse support may be drawn more heavily from the middle and upper-status groups, and Conservative ideologues.

These groups are less likely to evaluate the political system in terms of fulfilling their personal needs, and generally tend to be more satisfied with the functioning of the political system (once incumbency effects are controlled).

The variations in the politicization of personal dissatisfaction we have examined in this chapter suggest how these needs for change and continuity are balanced off in the dynamics of the politicization process.

Footnotes to Chapter 7

[1] Hadley Cantril, Patterns of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

[2] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[3] For example, see: Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Life-styles, Values and Social Welfare," in Burkhard Strumpel (ed.), Economic Means for Human Needs (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, 1976).

[4] As an illustration see: Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pp. 317-359.

[5] A basically economic approach characterizes the work of Strumpel, Muller, and Miller: Strumpel, "Economic Life-styles;" Edward Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, 66 (Sept., 1972); Athur Miller, "Change in Political Trust: Discontent with Authorities and Economic Policies," (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, undated).

[6] Especially lacking are measures tapping satisfaction with essential government policies. For example, see the analyses of Arthur Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government," American Political Science Review, 68 (Sept., 1974); Jack Citrin, "The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," American Political Science Review, 68 (Sept., 1974).

[7] Strumpel, "Economic Life-styles."

[8] In 1973 a standardized 6-point income scale was converted into local currency and used in all eight nations. In 1975 different income codes were used in each country, so income was collapsed within each nation into quartiles.

Regression analyses in this chapter are based on listwise deletion of missing data. As in Chapter 6, satisfaction with how leisure is spent is used as the 1975 indicator of leisure satisfaction.

[9] The Multiple Correlations from this analysis are as follows:

Lo Inc	2	3	4	5	Hi Inc
.33	.31	.26	.22	.21	.12

[10] David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale, 1950); Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (August 1967).

[11] Inglehart, Silent Revolution; Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (eds.), The Matrix of Political Action (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Forthcoming); Kai Hildebrandt and Russell Dalton, "The New Politics: Political Change or Sunshine Politics," in Klaus Beyme and Max Kaase (eds.), German Political Studies (London: Sage Publications, 1978).

[12] A mean score was computed as the index of policy satisfaction, allowing one missing data item. The same procedure was used to construct an index of personal satisfaction.

[13] This anomaly does not reflect the specific satisfaction items we examined, since footnote 9 finds the same pattern using the complete inventory of personal satisfaction items. We were also able to rule out problems of insufficient variance in either independent or dependent variables as an explanation.

[14] Here we are thinking primarily in terms of income satisfaction, which is where the greatest differences in satisfaction levels occurs.

[15] See Chapter 4 for the relative ranking of satisfaction items.

[16] W. G. Runcimann, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

[17] Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

[18] Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1962).

[19] Angus Campbell and Philip Converse (eds.), The Human Meaning of Social Change (New York: Russell Sage, 1972).

[20] Inglehart, Silent Revolution; Barnes and Kaase (eds.), Matrix of Political Action; Hildebrandt and Dalton, "The New Politics."

[21] Respondents were asked, "On this card are listed some goals to which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which of these you consider the most important? And the next most important?

* Maintenance of law and order
Giving people more say in government decisions
* Fighting rising prices
Protecting freedom of expression

The materialist choices are starred.

[22] Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, and Subjective Satisfaction in Western Publics," Comparative Political Studies, 9 (Jan., 1977);

[23] Ibid.; Strumpel, "Economic Life-styles."

[24] The results of regressing political satisfaction on the two policy items are presented below:

	Mater.	Mixed	Post-M.
Welfare	.17	.15	.14
Education	.15	.19	.24
R	.27	.28	.34
(N)	(3435)	(5371)	(851)

[25] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Chapter 7.

[26] Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

[27] Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[28] Hans Klingemann, "Levels of Ideological Thinking," in Barnes and Kaase (eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[29] Ronald Inglehart and Hans Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Publics, in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Farlie (eds.), Party Identification and Beyond (New York: Wiley, 1976).

[30] In France, Belgium and Germany the Left and Right equally politicized their dissatisfaction, but no nation reversed the pattern.

[31] Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, and Subjective Satisfaction," Comparative Political Studies , 9 (Jan., 1977).

[32] Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in Angus Campbell and Philip Converse (eds.), The Human Meaning of Social Change (New York: Russell Sage, 1972); Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pg. 39.

[33] Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper, 1971); Arthur Miller, "Political Discontent or Ritualism," American Political Science Review, 68 (Sept., 1974); Barnes and Kaase (eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[34] Alan Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness (Beverely Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977): Barnes and Kaase (ed.), Matrix of Action.

[35] Philip Converse, "Some Priority Variables in Comparative Research," in Richard Rose (ed.) Electoral Behavior (New York: Fress Press, 1974).

[36] Giuseppe DiPalma, Apathy and Participation (New York: Free Press, 1970), Chapter 5; Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt, West German Politics in Transition (Forthcoming), Chapter 3.

[37] Angus Campbell, et. al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1961), pp. 250-256; Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 224-227.

[38] In both surveys education was measured by terminal age of schooling. This variable was collapsed according to the following scheme: 14 and under, 15-16, 17-19, and age 20 and over.

[39] Inglehart and Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference," pg. 261ff.

[40] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Chapter 7; Barnes and Kaase (eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[41] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Chapter 3; It should also be noted that it appears that as deprivation in one area declines, attention shifts to other concerns in determining political evaluations. To some extent this provides additional support of Maslow's hierarchical model of value priorities and the transferal of goals posited by Inglehart, "Values, Objective Needs, and Satisfaction."

[42] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).

CHAPTER 8

THE QUALITY OF LIFE AND POLITICS

The central theme of this dissertation -- linking the objective conditions of life to evaluations of the political system -- has drawn together evidence from several disciplines to answer a question of long-standing concern to political scientists. In the course of these analyses we have replicated and expanded upon the major findings of social indicator research, and research on the bases of political support. Data from several European surveys probed perceptions and evaluations of the objective conditions of life. Many of our findings support the basic conclusions of previous American social indicator research by identifying equivalent phenomena and causal relationships in the European context. There are, however, several areas where the cumulative evidence from our European surveys suggests significant revisions or extensions to our knowledge of perceptual social indicators. In terms of political support, by linking personal satisfaction to evaluations of the political system we mapped a causal path through an area where hard evidence was often lacking. Not only have we assessed the strength of this causal relationship, but more importantly the factors affecting this link. In sum, this bridge between objective conditions and political dissatisfaction yields a better understanding of the

political implications of objective life conditions, and the dynamics of political support.

In this concluding chapter we intend to take a retrospective look at the findings of this dissertation and their implications in three areas. First, what have we learned about the sources and influences on perceptions of the quality of life? Second, what are the implications of these findings for the potential use of perceptual social indicators as system performance measures? Third, what are the implications of the process of politicizing personal dissatisfaction for the operation of European political systems?

Perceptions of the Quality of Life

The first step in the causal process we studied was to understand European perceptions of the quality of life. Can the quality of life be measured? What factors influence expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction? While we have accumulated several specific pieces of evidence, the most valuable information drawn from this research is a general understanding of the nature of the satisfaction process.

We have repeatedly seen that strong correlations between indicators of objective conditions and feelings of satisfaction are a rare commodity in social indicator research. This characterization applies not only to this dissertation, but to the bulk of previous empirical research.[1] This situation basically reflects the nature of the satisfaction process. The objective conditions of life are not directly reported as feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Objective conditions are evaluated in terms of a subjective standard

of reference. Satisfaction is basically a psychological state of mind. Moreover, several different reference standards may be used, and the exact combination of criteria used in determining satisfaction appears to be a very individual decision.[2]

This conceptualization of the satisfaction process leads to several expectations about social indicator research. Rather than searching for strong causal relationships which hold throughout the entire population, it is necessary to adopt a more differentiated view of the process. The exact accounting algorithm which explains satisfaction for one social group (i.e. $X leads to income satisfaction) may be poorly suited to predicting the satisfaction of another group because expectations differ. In addition, the dynamic relationship between expectations and objective conditions tends to minimize satisfaction differences.[3] That is, expectations appear to rise with accomplishment and stagnate or even decline with failure. Although some timelag is involved before this cycle is completed, this process also contributes to our collection of weak or apparently inconsistent correlations.

In attempting to predict feelings of satisfaction we also find that it is necessary to focus on specific life domains, rather than feelings of overall life satisfaction. Overall life satisfaction often provides the central focus of social indicator research. Indeed, we find that life satisfaction lies at the very core of European perceptions of the life space. Normally social research gravitates toward such global attitudinal measures.

However, the broad meaning of overall life satisfaction might actually limit its value in defining and interpreting feelings of

well-being. Specific life domains such as income, housing, or leisure clearly define the object of evaluation. This specificity allows us to identify indicators which tap these life experiences, and thereby enhance our ability to predict feelings of satisfaction. For example, in general terms we know how the objective conditions of income, housing and leisure actually change through the life cycle. To decide on a single description of the overall conditions of life would be an infinitely more complex task.

Differentiating between life domains is also important because we consistently find that the correlates of satisfaction are substantially different for each life domain. Age, for example, is linearly related to housing satisfaction, has a convex curvilinear relationship with leisure satisfaction, and a concave curvilinear relationship with income satisfaction. Nearly all of the predictors we examined -- education, income, occupation, region, and Left/Right attitudes -- display a different causal relationship with each life domain. Furthermore, these relationships are generally interpretable in terms of the convergence of expectations and objective conditions represented by the predictor.

Taken alone, these different causal relationships are sufficient justification for focusing social indicator research on life domains, rather than overall life satisfaction. The causes and concentration of feelings of well-being will lead to substantially different conclusions depending on the life domain under study. In addition, these differing causal relationships also explain why previous research has had such difficulty in linking social characteristics to overall life satisfaction.[4] If differing causal relationships are aggregated

into a single relationship (as with overall life satisfaction), then the resulting correlation must balance the contradictory causal relationships at the domain level. The likely result of this averaging process is a relatively weak correlation between social characteristics and the overall satisfaction index. Thus, the broad and diffuse nature of overall life satisfaction makes it unlikely that research will find a close relationship between life satisfaction and the correlates of satisfaction for any single domain.

Differentiating between life domains is advisable on additional grounds. Despite variations in the objective conditions of the eight nations we studied, the satisfaction ranking of life domains is virtually identical in each nation. Housing satisfaction, for example, consistently receives high rankings, while income satisfaction is always near the bottom of the rankings. These rankings are also strikingly similar to the results of American research.

This consistency in satisfaction rankings most likely reflects intrinsic properties of life domains, rather than consistent cross-national differences in the objective conditions of life. That is, some domains facilitate expressions of satisfaction independent of objective conditions, while other domains are likely to elicit feelings of dissatisfaction.

Social conditioning is one apparent explanation of these differences between domains. Life domains vary in the social acceptability of expressing dissatisfaction.[5] To be dissatisfied with one's income is normal, and even encouraged as an indicator of

motivation. However, to be dissatisfied with one's leisure, family life, marriage, or life as a whole may be considered as a personal failing. Consequently, social norms may dissuade individuals from expressing dissatisfaction in these areas.

In addition to social influences, the objective characteristics of a life domain may also affect expressions of satisfaction. We have presented evidence that temporal comparison is at least one of the reference standards individuals use in evaluating their present life conditions. Life domains differ widely, however, in the amount of temporal change they experience. Housing conditions, for example, are fairly stable life attributes, while conditions in the economic or poltical domain are likely to fluctuate over time. Expectations may thus have time to adjust to conditions in the housing domain which leads to feelings of satisfaction, while a cognitive balance is never achieved in the economic domain.

The cross-national aspect of this research has furnished one further insight into the nature of the satisfaction process. We have seen that the general level of satisfaction in a nation apparently reflects the influence of a distinct cultural/affective component which is not tied to objective conditions. The Dutch, for example, consistently express high levels of satisfaction for all aspects of their life situation; Italians consistently find their life conditions unsatisfactory. While this may reflect differences in language or the objective conditions of life, our evidence suggests that these differences result from national variation in either the meaning of "satisfaction" or the general affective levels of societies. Even if the same causal process determines satisfaction in each

nation, this cultural/affective component distorts cross-national comparisons of satisfaction levels. Furthermore, these national cultural differences may also exist at the subnational level.[7]

The ultimate question, however, is whether taking all of these factors into account, can we really still claim to measure perceptions of the quality of life. Are survey responses meaningful and interpretable within this framework? We believe the answer is yes! Although we often find only weak correlations between social characteristics and feelings of satisfaction, the pattern of these relationships ususally conforms to expectations derived from our conceptualization of the satisfaction process. The researcher must be wary of unqualified conclusions and the subtleties of perceptual indicators, but these caveats necessarily reflect the complexities of measuring the human dimension of life experiences.

In fact, in one sense the complexities of life perceptions legitimize the use of perceptual social indicators. If individuals simply and directly reported the quality of life in terms of objective conditions alone, then there would be no need for measuring psychological states. But if we are interested in measuring evaluations of life and the impact of these evaluations on other attitudes and behaviors, then perceptual social indicators tap this human dimension.

Social Indicators as System Performance Measures

The second question we dealt with was the possible use of perceptual social indicators as measures of the performance of the social and political systems. Western government are now deeply involved in promoting and ensuring an improvement in life quality. What is needed is a method of evaluating the success of past government policies, identifying areas in pressing need of attention, and monitoring the progress of future policies.[8]

Previous research has noted the intrinsic weaknesses of objective statistics as indicators of the quality of life. It is difficult, for example, to make comparisons between policy areas using objective statistics because the units of measurement are often incomparable, e.g. housing sufficiency and income levels. Such cross-sector comparisons are the most difficult, and important, comparisons to make in setting government priorities. Perceptual social indicators possibly allow for such cross-sector comparison by evaluating each life domain on the same satisfaction scale.

Objective statistics were also criticized because they often yield only a single population estimate of life conditions, when the crucial information is the distribution of resources within society. As we have seen in earlier chapters, perceptual social indicators can be used to identify the distribution of satisfaction throughout the population in great detail.

Finally, as we have argued in the preceding section, evaluations of the quality of life are essentially psychological states. Using both sets of indicators provides a fuller understanding of the human condition. But individual evaluations are the ultimate measure

of how well the social and political system is performing.

The complexities of perceptual social indicators discussed in the last section may, however, dampen this ardor for perceptual measures. Differences in the nature of life domains (social norms, temporal stability, etc) may be more important than system performance in explaining cross-domain comparisons of satisfaction levels. Similarly, cross-national differences in satisfaction are apparently more a function of cultural/affective influences than national differences in performance. In short, while the separation of satisfaction from objective conditions makes it essential to measure life perceptions, this same separation poses problems if we intend to use satisfaction as a measure of system performance.

However, these apparent limitations of perceptual social indicators should not lead one to underestimate their value as performance measures. A timeseries approach to social indicator research may actually avoid many of the pitfalls we have just discussed. Repeated survey measurement of satisfaction levels allows us to evaluate each domain in terms of its own baseline (or trendline). Comparing satisfaction levels at one timepoint to the same domain measured six months or one year earlier holds constant many of the cross-national and cross-domain factors influencing these indicators. Moreover, to know that housing satisfaction is on the decline, or that health satisfaction is rising provides the most essential policy guidance that perceptual social indicators are attempting to furnish.

Thus, the value of perceptual social indicators as performance measures seems tied to repeated measurement and longitudinal analyses.

Since satisfaction is itself a dynamic process, this should substantially strengthen our knowledge of the sources and implication of these evaluations.

Relating Personal and Political Satisfaction

The final question we have considered is the relationship between personal and political satisfaction. To what extent are political evaluations based upon feelings of relative deprivation, rather than policy issues or diffuse support of the political system?

While theories linking personal dissatisfaction to political action have been widely accepted elements of political science, recent research has increasingly begun to question this theory. Muller and Grofman conclude that the relationship between deprivation and political action "does not appear to be of a strength warranting imputation of major causal or predictive significance."[9] Similarly, Barnes and his colleagues find only a tenuous link between personal dissatisfaction and protest potential.[10] Even recent research on Black urban riots which has heretofore supported the relative deprivation approach is now advising a more cautious re-evaluation of the theory.[11]

Our results, then, contrast with this trend of evidence. We have found a moderate, and often substantial relationship between perceptions of the quality of life and political satisfaction. In some nations the relationship approaches the .50 level, a strong correlation for survey data. This relationship largely reflects the influence of income satisfaction on political evaluations, although leisure satisfaction also displays surprising influence.

The divergence between the findings presented in this dissertation and recent criticisms of the relative deprivation theory can be traced to several factors. The first factor is a conceptual one. Perhaps too much emphasis has previously been placed on the direct relationship between personal dissatisfaction and political protest. As we have argued in Chapter 2, there are a series of causal steps linking these two concepts. Yet much of past research seeks to validate the relative deprivation hypothesis by examining the direct relationship between the endpoints of the causal chain. The major impact of personal dissatisfaction is on general feelings of political satisfaction, with political violence being several steps removed. By examining the causal process within this framework one obtains a clearer and more accurate view of the political significance of perceptions of the quality of life.

A second explanation of divergent research results is methodological. Past attitudinal research on relative deprivation has relied almost exclusively on the Cantril self-anchoring ladders.[12] Muller has noted, however, that if several different reference standards may be used in evaluating the objective conditions of life, then several different methods of indicator construction are possible with the Cantril scales.[13] The raw scale scores can be used alone, compared to past or future self-ratings, the perceived position of a reference group, or what the respondent feels justly entitled to. Each of these approaches carries different theoretical assumptions concerning the satisfaction process, and results in different measures of perceptions of the quality of life. Furthermore, if several criteria are used in determining feelings of well-being, then any

single method of indicator construction which is uniformly applied to the entire population cannot capture the actual complexities of the process. Thus, the Cantril scales pose substantial problems in measuring perceptions of life quality.[14]

Rather than become involved in this indicator construction problem we asked respondents to make their own comparisons and report the resulting feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. That is, rather than the researcher computing satisfaction scores, individuals make their own self-judgement. This approach limits our ability to study the process of how satisfaction ratings are determined, but should yield a more valid self-assessment of satisfaction than could be obtained with the Cantril ladder.

Another aspect of methodological divergence is our measure of political satisfaction. Past attitudinal research on relative deprivation has simply not examined the relationship between personal satisfaction and political satisfaction. Muller measures trust in government and government legitimacy, but not basic satisfaction with the government's performance.[15] Similarly, the Barnes, et. al. study links general measures of personal dissatisfaction to satisfaction with fairly specific government policies.[16] Measuring personal and political satisfaction with a common metric provides a more accurate assessment of the relationship between these two concepts.

In short, our research provides support for the importance of personal dissatisfaction (relative deprivation) for evaluations of West European political systems, although the eventual impact on political violence is likely to be minor. Moreover, the evidence

at hand suggests that this relationship is strengthening as European governments increase their involvement in society, and European publics expect the government to become more responsible for ensuring the quality of life.[17]

Political theorists have argued that the strength of the personal-political link has fundamental consequences for the operation of political systems.[18] On the one hand, a close relationship between personal and political evaluations increases the demands placed upon the political system. Since the incumbents are evaluated in terms of narrow self-gratification, this results in a relatively weak base of specific political support. Governments cannot always perform up to expectations, and constant personal demands may eventually be unfulfilled, leading to stress on the system.

On the other hand, when personal and political evaluations are relatively independent, this is assumed to moderate demands on incumbents. Political support is based on diffuse criteria as well as improvement in the conditions of life. This separation of the personal and political worlds enables the system to function under less stress, while still being responsive to public needs.

While the strength of the personal-political relationship is important, we have argued that variations in the strength of this link within the mass public spell out the full significance of this relationship. Feelings of personal satisfaction outline the potential pattern of social discontent before political aggregation occurs. The process of politicization presonal dissatisfaction determines the nature of aggregated discontent.

Depending on the nature of this linkage, perceptions of personal

well-being may serve as either a reservoir of political support, or of political opposition. That is, if the personally dissatisfied sectors of society are more likely to politicize their dissatisfaction, then a strong personal-political relationship would indeed lead to increased political demands being placed upon the system. Conversely, if groups of satisfied citizens are more likely to politicize their personal feelings, then a strong link would systematically generate support for the system and actually lessen demands. In sum, we should not only ask whether personal feelings are politicized, but also who is more likely to politicize these feelings.

We examined a number of factors which might conceiveably strengthen or weaken the relationship between personal and political satisfaction: family income, value priorities, Left/Right ideology, and cognitive mobilization. These data show a systematic tendency for social groups who are generally less satisfied with the quality of life -- especially low income groups and Leftists -- to politicize these feelings. Conversely, the personally satisfied sectors of European society tend to separate their personal feelings from evaluations of the political system.

In short, the dynamics of the politicization process suggest an uncertain future lies ahead for West European governments. On the whole, feelings of personal well-being are likely to be of increasing relevance to political decisions. This alone contradicts the mainstream assumptions of political science.[19] Moreover, the asymmetries of the politicization process tend to accentuate the demands placed upon the political system, and channel the dissatisfied

toward political action. For the present most Europeans are satisfied with their personal conditions of life, so demands are not excessive. However, if conditions reverse and dissatisfaction increases,[20] the framework for political crisis may already be laid.

Footnotes for Chapter 8

[1] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Willard Rodgers, The Quality of American Life (New York: Russell Sage, 1976); Frank Andrews and Stephen Withey, Social Indicators of Well-being (New York: Plenum, 1977); Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

[2] Campbell, Quality of American Life, Chapter 6.

[3] Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Needs, and Subjective Satisfaction," Comparative Political Studies, 9 (Jan., 1977).

[4] See especially Ibid.

[5] Burkhard Strumpel, "Economic Deprivation and Societal Discontent," in Burkhard Strumpel (ed.), Economic Means for Human Needs (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1976).

[6] Angus Campbell, "The Quality of Life as a Psychological Phenomena," in Burkhard Strumpel (ed.), Subjective Elements of Well-being (Paris: OECD, 1974).

[7] Inglehart, Silent Revolution, Chapter 5.

[8] Frank Andrews, "Social Indicators of Perceived Quality of Life," Social Indicators Research, 1 (1974).

[9] Bernard Grofmann and Edward Muller, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, 67 (June 1973), pg. 536.

[10] Samuel Barnes, Barbara Farah, and Felix Heunks, "Political Dissatisfaction and Political Action," in Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (eds.), The Matrix of Political Action (Forthcoming).

[11] Abraham Miller, Louis Bolce and Mark Halligan, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots," American Political Science Review, 71 (Sept. 1977).

[12] Cantril, Human Concerns; Edward Muller, "A Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, 66 (Sept., 1972); Grofmann and Muller, "The Strange Case;" Barnes and Kaase (eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[13] Grofmann and Muller, "The Strange Case," pp. 515-520.

[14] Also see the more methodological criticisms of Andrews and Withey, Social Indicators.

[15] Muller, "Theory of Political Violence."

[16] Barnes, et. al., "Political Dissatisfaction."

[17] Ibid.; Strumpel, "Economic Deprivation." There is also some evidence from generational comparisons that perceptions of government responsibility are more common among postwar cohorts. For example, the politicization of personal dissatisfaction was analyzed controlling for generation, and the personal-political correlation decreases slightly with age; also see M. Kent Jennings, et. al., "Generations and Families," in Barnes and Kaase (eds.), Matrix of Political Action.

[18] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965); Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[19] For example, see Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1965).

[20] Donella Meadows, et. al., The Limits to Growth (New York: Universe, 1972); Jay Forrester, World Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: Wright-Allen, 1971).

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